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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Steve Olufemi Ojelade

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2018

Abstract

Counterterrorism Policy Towards Boko Haram in Nigeria During 2009-2015

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BA, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 2001

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Public Administration

Walden University

November 2018

Abstract

The Nigerian government has emplaced counterterrorism policy measures to combat Boko Haram terrorism since the group became violent in 2010. However, there is a gap in the understanding of how these policies were developed and implemented. Such knowledge may offer suggestions as to how these policies can be improved. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Scott's institutional theory and Baumgartner's punctuated equilibrium theory constituted the study's theoretical foundation. Interview data were collected from individuals selected using a purposive and criterion sampling strategy who played prominent roles in the development and implementation of the policy as well as those who were its beneficiaries. Data were analyzed using content analysis and coding. Key findings from this study provide an understanding of how the policy was developed and how it is being implemented and might be improved. Recommendations include the development of a holistic strategy involving both soft and hard approaches. Collaboration between stakeholders in the security sector and key community leaders in northeast Nigeria is crucial to active counterterrorism effort. The insights from the study on Nigeria's past counterterrorism policy development and implementation may assist policy makers in making improvements in their mechanisms and strategies for actively fighting Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Policy makers in other African countries may also find the outcomes of this study useful as they provide a potential blueprint for counterterrorism policy development and implementation.

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Dedication

I dedicate this doctoral study to God the Almighty who enabled me to achieve this height. My dedication also goes to my wife, Mary, and my lovely children, Emmanuel, Grace, and Joshua, for their prayers, care, support, and encouragement to make my doctoral dream a reality against all the odds; I appreciate each of you. I also dedicate this study to my father and mother, the late Mr. Gabriel Adekola Ojelade and Mrs. Dorcas Owoola Ojelade. You made me make a promise that I would not stop until I achieved my doctoral goal. Thank you for instilling values and character in me. My father, how I wish you were here to share my joy because I know you would be proud of this achievement.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

Nigeria is presently confronting the challenge of Boko Haram terrorism most especially in the northeastern part of the country (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olufu-Adeoye, 2014). The Boko Haram group started as a small Sunni Islamic sect in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria but became violent in 2009 after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf (Blanchard, 2016; Blanchard & Husted, 2016; Idowu, 2013). The group, which is primarily based in the northeastern part of Nigeria, calls itself “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad,” which means persons devoted to the preaching of Islam (Ikezue & Ezeah, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). The group is arguing against Western education, on the basis that it is un-Islamic, and advocating for the full implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria (Blanchard, 2016; Blanchard & Husted, 2016).

Since 2009, when Boko Haram terrorist activities escalated, the group has carried out vicious attacks, criminal acts, and killings causing security problems in Nigeria (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). These attacks, which are sources of insecurity in the country, are being carried out in Adamawa, Bornu, Bauchi, and Yobe States (Blanchard, 2016; Blanchard & Husted, 2016; Idowu, 2013). This phenomenon has also affected the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Kano, Kaduna, Niger, and Plateau States (Blanchard, 2016; Blanchard & Husted, 2016; Idowu, 2013). The terror group has bombed many churches, mosques, police stations, army barracks, and some public places. According to Blanchard and Husted (2016), thousands of lives were lost in these attacks, and properties worth millions of Naira destroyed. The Boko Haram bombing of the United Nations

(U.N.) office in Abuja in 2011 has been noted as the significant incident that informed classification of the group as a terrorist organization by the United States (Akpan et al., 2014).

As a result, the government put in place measures to fight Boko Haram terrorism (Dasuki, 2013; Jonathan, 2013). The Nigerian government overhauled the nation's security architecture, improved its security intelligence gathering mechanism, increased its budgetary provision to the military and other security forces, and emphasized security collaboration among the internal security agencies and with neighboring countries (Jonathan, 2013). Bartolotta (2011) observed that the Nigerian government set up an administrative panel to dialogue with the sect; however, the group bluntly refused to enter into discussion with the government team. Other frameworks of the Nigerian counterterrorism policy on Boko Haram include the establishment of Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) with the responsibility of jointly fighting Boko Haram terrorism. The task force, which is headquartered in N'Djamena, Chad Capital city, consists of the military majorly from Nigeria and its neighboring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Sampson, 2015). The Nigerian government also declared a state of emergency and imposed curfew in the affected states, and banned and subsequently unbanned global system for mobile communication (GSM) services (Onapajo, 2017).

The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 and the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Act of 2013 provided a legal framework for these efforts. The military and other security forces under the coordination of Nigerian National Security Adviser were tasked by President Goodluck Jonathan with the responsibility of developing

antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs to protect the Nigerian people and other Nigerian stakeholders (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014). Fighting Boko Haram terrorism became a difficult task for security forces because Boko Haram terrorism was new to the Nigerian experience and Nigerian judicial authorities (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014; Omale, 2013). According to Onapajo (2017), reliance on the use of force and military hard-power could not be effective because the fight against Boko Haram must be asymmetrical. Due to this flawed approach, Boko Haram gained much ground, employing guerrilla warfare tactics of hit and run and committing more atrocities (Akpan et al., 2014; Husted, 2016).

The Boko Haram counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during the years 2009-2015 needs to be reviewed and documented to inform present and future policy in the hope of guaranteeing a functional outcome. Presently, there is a lack of adequate literature on how policy makers developed and applied Boko Haram counterterrorism policy in the country. A possible reason for this inadequacy is the relative newness of Boko Haram terrorism and policy, as well as the absence of quantifiable metrics as it relates to the group's operation.

I conducted this qualitative study to contribute to the literature on the subject. I interviewed retired personnel of the Department of the State Services and the Military, key community leaders, and former National Assembly members who participated in the formation of the policy. I did so to unravel the process and the implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism.

This chapter includes background information on the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. In the chapter, I also discuss the research problem and the purpose of the study; state the research questions; provide an overview of the theoretical frameworks; and consider the assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the study along with its implications for social change. Common terms and concepts in the study are also described.

Background of the Study

The significant increase of Boko Haram terrorist activities primarily in the northeastern part of Nigeria is a profound challenge to the country's security forces (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Odoma, 2014). Blanchard (2016) reported that Boko Haram terror groups had killed at least 15,000 people in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015, a statistic that has made it the deadliest terrorist group in the world. According to a U.N. report, about 2.8 million persons have been displaced by Boko Haram, and another 5.6 million people need emergency food aid (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2016). Blanchard also claimed that the coordination efforts of government agencies in Nigeria had not produced the desired reduction in attacks on civilian and military facilities in the country and the spread of such violence to the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The continued destruction of lives and properties by Boko Haram terrorist group, thus, remains a source of concern.

The aim of counterterrorism policies by any government is to reduce the threat of terrorism (DoD, 2013). The Nigerian government put in place different antiterrorism

policy measures, which took effect in 2010, to fight the threat of Boko Haram terrorism when the group became violent due to the emergence of its new leader, Abubakar Shekau, after the death of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf (Loimeier, 2012). The change in approach became important when it was apparent that the military strategy hitherto in use by the federal government had not produced the desired result (Loimeier, 2012) as the security forces were losing the war against the Boko Haram sect (Onapajo, 2013). The government, therefore, emplaced soft approach measures to address this challenge (Onapajo, 2017).

The characteristics of an effective counterterrorism policy are adequate planning, review mechanisms, a distinct threat profile, resource allocation, and application as well as adequate training (Brzoska, 2011; DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Renard, 2012). The Nigerian legal system empowers the military to take over internal security operations when the police become overwhelmed (Peterside, 2014). However, since the military is trained in the art of conventional warfare, the intelligence gathering and threat assessment which are paramount in counterterrorism policy and implementation are lacking (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Understanding the policy framework developed by the Nigerian federal government and its application may provide insight that policy makers can use to better combat the threat of Boko Haram terrorists and other global terror threats.

The emergence of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria has already led to significant changes in the management of internal security as the Nigerian government has increased budgetary allocation to the security sector to protect national security and combat the

terrorist group (Adesoji, 2011; Ewa, 2017). The government has also developed and implemented some policies to fight the sect, made laws to give legal force to the counterterrorism efforts, and created the Office of the Coordinator, Counterterrorism Centre in 2011 (Adesote & Abimbola, 2012; Akinlade & Ibitoye, 2012; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

These efforts have brought changes to internal security methods and operations and a shift in the ideology of security management regarding coordination and communication among the security forces (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000; Akinbi, 2015; Dasuki, 2013; Oladeji, Niyi-Eke, & Uche, 2012). However, in the view of Agbiboa (2013), these measures have not achieved enough change because of the uncoordinated and solely kinetic response of the Nigerian government security forces against Boko Haram terrorism. The complex nature of the Boko Haram terrorist threat in Nigeria and its international linkage with al-Qaeda, have defied a single counterterrorism approach involving coercion, according to experts. As Aghedo and Osumah (2012) noted, there is a need to adopt human security methods to counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, as Akpan et al. (2014) noted, the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorism policy and interagency collaboration have negatively affected the success of counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria. This lack of interagency collaboration and leadership crises and high-level corruption in the security sector, in addition to human rights abuse, has accounted for the failure of the Nigerian military in counterterrorism efforts (Bappah, 2016; Blanchard, 2016; Bodunde, Ola, & Afolabi, 2014).

As asserted by Odoma (2014), the failure of security forces to fight the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was due to conflicts arising from a superiority and inferiority complex among the security forces. These conflicts suggest the need for synergy among the security forces, according to Odoma. Lamb (2014) emphasized the significance of collaborations with international special operation forces (SOF) in counterterrorism efforts and recommended the use of the historical and observational approaches to counterterrorism.

Although the Nigerian government counterterrorism strategies towards Boko Haram have achieved some successes and have led to the destruction of various Boko Haram bases by the security agencies, confinement of the activities of the terror group to the northeast has made it difficult for the sect to use improvised explosive devices (Dasuki, 2013; Ewa, 2017). The government forces have also killed many of the sect's members including their commanders. However, the threat remains potent; the group still enlists new members and carries out more kidnappings, bombings, and killings. Boko Haram terrorism, thus, continues to threaten the protective function of the state, development, and democracy in Nigeria (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

Therefore, it is necessary to examine factors responsible for the ineffectiveness of this strategy and to use this information to develop a comprehensive and effective Boko Haram counterterrorism policy (Eme & Ibietan, 2012; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In reviewing the literature, I found few studies on the counterterrorism policy of Nigeria towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. To address this gap in knowledge, I explored the

implications of the current counterterrorism policy on national security and how it may be improved.

Problem Statement

The problem of the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria has continued unabated due to lack of policy clarity and coordination in counterterrorism efforts, according to experts (Akpan et al., 2014; Omale, 2013; Blanchard, 2016; USAID, 2016) and has become a profound challenge to the Nigerian government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Odoma, 2014). Researchers have investigated the rise in terrorism by Boko Haram by looking at its nature, its cause, and Nigerian government efforts in combating it (Akpan et al., 2014). However, the literature search does not provide a systematic understanding and analysis of the process of counterterrorism policy development and its implementation so that policy makers can learn why past efforts have not been successful. The lack of literature on the development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram created a gap in the understanding of the factors that have informed how current Boko Haram counterterrorism policy is being interpreted and applied. I conducted this case study to during a bounded time period to provide policy makers with useful analysis they can use to improve their efforts to counter the terrorist group.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case research was to explore and describe counterterrorism policy and its development and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015. The increased impacts of Boko Haram terrorism on lives and property is a serious threat to the country's security (Bamidele, 2013, 2015), and the government's policy

response to this threat was the focus of this research. I specifically examined the various approaches that the federal government of Nigeria has taken to tackle Boko Haram terrorism. The study provides an in-depth understanding of counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during the bounded time frame of 2009-2015. I also sought to uncover principles of policy development, collaboration, and implementation that may help the leaders of the Nigerian security forces to improve their policies for more effective Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts.

Research Question

The research question was what was the process of development and implementation of Nigerian policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015? In combating the threat of Boko Haram terrorism, the Nigerian government developed and implemented policy measures to address it (Bamidele, 2013; Idowu, 2013; Onapajo, 2017). However, these policies have in most cases been insufficient to counter the violence threat of the group started by Abubakar Shekau who emerged as the new leader after the death of Mohammed Yusuf (Loimeier, 2012). I conducted this study to provide qualitative data concerning the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy in Nigeria. This data may be the catalyst for future improvements in government approaches to the threat posed by Boko Haram.

Conceptual Framework

The theoretical frameworks for this study were Scott's (1995) institutional theory, and Baumgartner's (2006) punctuated equilibrium theory. I used institutional theory to explain the cross-national challenges to counterterrorism policy and how these challenges

have affected counterterrorism efforts. I used punctuated equilibrium theory because it provides ideas, thinking, and models of change that are vital to analysis. As Baumgartner noted, government policy processes might engender marginal adjustments but rarely produce significant change essential to identify and explore the variables within policy development in order to explain the limited ability of policy reformers to effect change. I used the organizational theory to explain the dynamism of institutional factors on the Boko Haram counterterrorism action. I also used punctuated institutional theory to explain incremental stages of the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy and the dynamic change the Nigerian decision makers faced during the bounded period.

The social theorist Selznick was the original proponent of institutional theory, which grew out of his explanation on factors affecting the performance of an organization (Selznick, 1948). Selznick claimed that every organization is unique and that the process by which an organization distinguishes itself is the institutionalization of its operations (Selznick, 1948). He argued that the uniqueness of every group, the prevailing norms, and the understanding of the organizational environment influence its behavior (Selznick, 1948). An institution is a part of the global environment but has unique internal mechanisms necessitated by the prevailing cultural context (Bruton, Lau, & Obloj, 2014). In a traditional institution, the focus is on conformity with the rules and norms of the organization through accountability, security, and legitimacy to obtain a competitive advantage (Webb, Ireland, Hitt, Kistruck, & Tihanyi, 2011). In the Nigerian counterterrorism strategy, all security organizations are involved, however, they are unique with their peculiarities (Bodunde, Ola, & Afolabi, 2014). These peculiarities influence

their competitive nature at the expense of the counterterrorism goal (Bamidele, 2013; Omale, 2013).

In this study, I used concepts from institutional theory to convey how knowledge systems, norms, and rules that characterize industries and organizations influence the representatives of participant organizations' life experiences. I adopted concepts from institutional theory as the lens for conducting this research study to explore the challenges of Nigerian government organizations implementing the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram. Institutional theory (Selznick, 1948) was pertinent to this research because the core concept components and constructs align with the institutional peculiarities of the different government agencies I examined.

The punctuated equilibrium theory also refers to as the punctuated equilibrium discontinuous change (Baumgartner, 2006; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). It postulates that changes in policy incrementally occur until a new event happens that alters the current situation thereby necessitating a significant modification (Sabatier, 2007; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012). The punctuated equilibrium theory provides ideas, thinking, and model of evolution that are vital to analysis. The theory affirms that policy change arises progressively and incrementally. Baumgartner (2006) submitted that during the period of marginal adjustment, the processes might not produce enough influence to bring about necessary change as decision-makers will be compelled to accept a less important decision because there is no better alternative (Tyson, 2007). The theory also affirms that in the period of dynamic change, the choices are made rapidly out of necessity even absent sufficient information (Baumgartner, 2006) and that policy is

generally on a long-term path of incremental change until an exogenous shock occurs thereby causing a dramatic policy change (Givel, 2010).

Punctuated equilibrium theory was critical to the policy development and implementation towards Boko Haram counterterrorism. I assert that the incremental basis of counterterrorism policy since 2009 as well as the delay in its enactment was due to ideological and political polarization, an assertion that supports the punctuated equilibrium theory. In this study, the lens guided me to examine the process of the development and implementation of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009 and 2015. I discussed in detail the institutional theory and punctuated equilibrium theory in chapter 2.

Nature of the Study

The nature of this case study was qualitative. Creswell (2013) illustrated that case study could be used to explore a problem from beginning to end of one or more cases within a bounded system. The rationale for selecting the qualitative case study was that it afforded useful data gathering from multiple sources such as in-depth interview, document review, and field notes. The aim of this qualitative research was to provide an understanding of the import of the phenomenon of the study by the selected government agencies and individuals associated with the Nigerian security forces involved in the combat against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In this case study, I sought to explain how an understanding of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram could affect the overall counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria.

As described by Stake (2010), the researcher has a duty of explaining the action to enable readers to understand and share the experience. So I interviewed participants in policy development and implementation and examined policy documents to provide an answer to the research question. The focus was former members of the Nigerian National Assembly for their roles in the enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Acts, retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the military being the two primary agencies involved in the counterterrorism efforts, which align with institutional theory and punctuated equilibrium theory. I analyzed the present counterterrorism policies towards Boko Haram terror group in Nigeria. I coded, interpreted, and analyzed the collected data, as well as member checking for the validation of data analysis to gain an understanding of how Nigerian security forces implemented the counterterrorism policy. I provided the detailed information about the design and procedure of the research in Chapter 3.

Design of the Study

In this qualitative case study, I interviewed retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the Military who participated in the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy during the years chosen. Also, I interviewed community leaders in Yobe state, Nigeria who were the recipients of the government policies. I also interviewed three members of the Nigerian National Assembly who played a significant role in the enactment of the Counterterrorism Prevention Acts. I conducted this study to provide an in-depth understanding of counterterrorism policy in Nigeria. In the view of

Creswell (2009) qualitative research involves the use of interviews to gain an understanding or meaning participants ascribed to a phenomenon.

The most basic source of data collection for this study was from the 12 participant interviews that the researcher conducted. The interview questions were all open-ended and the period for each interview lasted for between 45 minutes to one hour. The participant's responses were compiled electronically and sent to them for member checking being a tool of qualitative research trustworthiness (Creswell, 2009). Based on criterion sampling, I used the purposive method to extract the maximum amount of usable data from the participants who are knowledgeable on the subject of the study. According to Creswell (2013) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), purposive sampling is used to identify and select participants who are knowledgeable or have experience on the phenomenon of study.

Methodology

The methodology for this study involved the use of purposive and criterion methods. I used purposive and criterion method to involve those who had engaged in the counterterrorism operation against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The criterion sampling is used when the participants are required to fulfill a specific criterion (Creswell, 2013) while purposive sampling is used to identify and select participants who are knowledgeable on the phenomenon of study (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). In this case study, the participants were those who had been involved in the counterterrorism of Boko Haram, including retired personnel of the Department of State Service and the military. The secondary data was from the analysis of various policy documents. The qualitative

study assisted in exploring the development and the implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism. I sorted, analyzed and interpreted collected data for clear and concise comparison, from where I developed themes and code data.

Definitions

The following terms are defined in line with how they were used in the study:

Almajiri: An educational system whereby individuals are educated at home or on transit (Fowoyo, 2013).

Antiterrorism awareness: The basic understanding of the existence of the terrorist threat and the needed measures to minimize its vulnerability (DoD, 2013).

Antiterrorism measures: The defensive measures to limit the effect and the vulnerability of the terrorist attack on individuals and properties (Dillion, Liebe, & Bestalka, 2009).

Antiterrorism: The protective and defensive mechanisms emplaced to thwart or deter terrorist attacks. It also includes contingency measures to minimize the effects of the attack when it occurs (Arce & Sandler, 2005). The concept involves tactics that lessen the susceptibility of an individual and property (Pushies et al., 2000).

Boko-Haram: A concept that originates from the Hausa word “Boko” which figuratively means Western or non-Islamic education is forbidden and unIslamic. The movement was established by late Yusuf Mohammed who was a secondary school dropout (Salaam, 2013). Later, he went to Chad and Niger Republic for his Quranic education where he developed the radical views that abhorred western education or modernization. The group held the belief that the country’s taxation, banking, and legal

systems are for the infidel, therefore should be avoided by a true Muslim. The group claims that Western education projects negativity and is contrary to the will of God and thus views its influence on Islam as the cause of religious backsliding.

Containment: Measures emplaced to keep an event or occurrence under control or to prevent it from escalating.

Counterterrorism: The offensive measures put in place by the security agencies to identify and neutralize the terrorist attack and reduce its effect in case of an attack (Malkki, 2016). It is a term used to describe strategies emplaced to fight or prevent terrorism (Bynam, 2015). The offensive method is used to capture terrorists and to protect a potential target from attack (Pushies, Griswold, Giangreco, & Tomajczyk, 2000).

Counterterrorism awareness: The knowledge of the various measures, practice, and strategy a government and security agencies put in place to fight terrorism (Kraft & Marks, 2012).

Counterterrorism measures: The process of preventing or where that is not possible, to minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack (Omelycheva, 2009).

Crisis: Any incident or threat to a country, its territories, citizens, or security that requires security actions to protect resources and realize national objectives (Pushies et al., 2000).

Development: The societal participatory process of social change aims at material and social progress among the majority of the population who are familiar with their environment (Currie-Alder, 2016).

Implementation: The process of performance and the execution of an idea, a plan, design, or policy (Fixsen, Naoom, Blase, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005). It's a defined strategy and activities to achieve a plan, and program of known dimensions. Thus, it involves actions that make things happen after the initial conceptualization (Sjostrom & Maskin, 2002; Weiner, 2009).

Intelligence: The information that has passed through the process of collection, collation, analysis, synthesis, evaluation, integration, and evaluation. The information which must concern one or more aspect of the target must be significant to security operation and planning (Lowenthal, 2009).

Policy: A specific course of action or decision selected from among the alternatives to guide an institution, a government, or a group of individuals, usually for implementation to achieve rational outcomes (Hicks, Hicks, & Maldonado, 2016).

Policy objectives: The specific actions to be achieved in the desired time frame (Pushies et al., 2002).

Security agencies: The statutory or constitutional government organizations saddled with the responsibility of the maintenance of law and order and counterterrorism within a country.

Security intelligence organization: An agency of government saddled with the responsibility of collecting domestic or foreign intelligence. It is usually a counterintelligence organization.

Security targets: The individuals, organizations, entities, and facilities identified as vital to security planning and operations.

Security: A condition achieved when there is safety, freedom from danger, threat or danger (Flexner, 1987).

Target hardening: The strengthening of a security target such as a place, building, and an installation for its protection or reduction of the effects of an attack against it.

Terrorism: The use of violence either singly or in a group, military or non-military directed against government or individual to cause a political change or extension of diplomacy or political ideology by one state against the other or by a group of the individual against the state (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2017).

Assumptions

The methodological assumption of any research is determined by the research approach and the philosophical elements (Ponterotto, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The uniqueness of qualitative research is that the researcher commits the study to elaborate meaning (Creswell, 2007). Based on the reviewed literature, the following assumptions underlay this study.

I was the primary source of data collection, and mainly my concern was to drive the process of understanding the variables by attributing meaning to the data. The counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram is significant to counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria, without which there cannot be any meaningful success. This is vital to the effective counterterrorism efforts of the Nigerian security forces. A clear counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram has the potential to reduce the bickering and conflict occasioned by conflict of roles of the security agencies. Each participant that was engaged in this research was knowledgeable about the development and

implementation of previous counterterrorism policy and was prepared to share their knowledge. I also assumed that participants would provide sufficient information openly and honestly in answer to the interview questions.

Scope and Delimitations

The rationale for selecting the Department of State Services and the Nigerian military personnel as participants in this study was because the two agencies were at the helm of the fight. The military was to crack down on the terror group while the Department of State Services provided the intelligence for the confrontation. The bounded time of the study was between 2009 and 2015, during which Boko Haram terrorism emerged, and the Nigerian government's focus was on the development of enduring counterterrorism policy. The research does not cover every other security agencies and every aspect of the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy because of its enormity and complexity. The study is limited to some elements of the Boko Haram policy and used the intelligence and military components of the Nigerian security agencies to explore the phenomenon.

The participants of this study were limited to the 12 participants comprising former members of the Nigerian National Assembly, retired personnel of the two security organizations who are involved in the development and implementation of the policy, and the community members who are beneficiaries of the system. The account that was provided by the participants helped to explore the understanding of the phenomenon of study. The conceptual frameworks explain the nature and effects of bickering and

conflict among the Nigerian forces, as well as the development and implementation processes of counterterrorism policy.

Limitations

Limitations describe the shortcomings of any research and the possible effects of these deficiencies (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013). According to Wilson-Genderson & Pruchno (2015), every research has its limitation. The first limitation of this study was the small sample size as it was impossible regarding resources and time to survey the entire population of the northeast and security agencies in Nigeria. The results could only be generalized and limited to the sample population. However, generalizability can be the potential implication for other settings.

Another limitation was the lack of access to classified information on intelligence and security policy issues. Because the nature of the research is sensitive as it deals with intelligence and security issues, I was unable to access certain classified information. I, however, depended on open source information relevant to the study as well as retired personnel from the two services. The study is also not classified as it does not contain any classified information, nor discuss how sensitive information is processed and disseminated.

Tufford and Newman (2012) explained that a qualitative researcher has an unavoidable bias as the primary source of data collection instrument. Thus, this potential bias constitutes a limitation. Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers (2002) argued that qualitative research outcomes are useful if its process is rigorous and credible. I adhered

to basic principles of methods to trustworthiness to ensure the research was rigorous, credible and reliable.

Finally, the insights of this research was provided by former members of the Nigerian National Assembly, retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the military who were involved in the development and the implementation of the policy. The insights they offered from their service knowledge and experience carried its own bias. However, to address this limitation, the researcher employed what is being referred to as “standardized open-ended interview” to structure my interview sessions (Patton, 2002, p. 230).

Significance of the Study

This qualitative case study contributed to social change as well as a public policy application for the Nigerian government. By examining the content and context of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram, this research offered assistance to the Nigerian security forces to improve service delivery in the fight against the terrorist group. Bodunde et al. (2014) asserted that the inter-agency bickering and conflict was a challenge to current security provision while Akpan et al. (2014) posited that poor counterterrorism policy of the government had been a setback to Nigerian counterterrorism efforts. Understanding the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy development and implementation provides lead to policy direction that can facilitate greater effectiveness in dealing with the menace of terrorism in Nigeria.

This study also contributed data to policy makers for use in counterterrorism policy directed at improving communication, coordination, and collaboration efforts

among government agencies responsible for counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria.

Therefore, utilizing this data addresses the challenge of bickering and misunderstanding and ineffectiveness that has marred the counterterrorism efforts of Boko Haram in Nigeria. It also creates a more proactive approach to the government of Nigeria towards countering Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and positions the security agencies to tackle the threat of Boko Haram terrorism.

This study was the first attempt to explore factor that informed the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study fills the gap in the academic literature by laying the framework on counterterrorism policies and practices and contributes data on counterterrorism policy that further researchers can explore.

Summary and Transition

This study was to explore the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. The study examined the process of development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram. I have explained my case study approach, the background to the study, the research question, as well as the design and approach to answering the questions posed. I also explained that I interviewed 12 participants for information gathering and analysis and used the application of institutional theory and punctuated equilibrium theory to understand the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram. The research findings are useful for future researchers to view through various lenses. Chapter two provides for the review of the literature on Boko Haram terrorism, counterterrorism

policy in Nigeria, and factors that informed the development and implementation of such strategies. Chapter 3 follows with a detailed description of the study design and its suitability. It also involves sample size, methods of data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results of the study and Chapter 5, social change implications, recommendations, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The problem of the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria has continued unabated due to lack of policy clarity and coordination in counterterrorism efforts of Nigeria (Omale, 2013) and has become a profound challenge to the Nigerian government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Odoma, 2014). Blanchard (2016) reported that Boko Haram terror groups had killed at least 15,000 people in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015, which has made it the deadliest terrorist group in the world.

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe counterterrorism policy and its development and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015. The increased impact of Boko Haram terrorism on lives and properties is a serious threat to the country's security (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Omale, 2013). The government's policy response to this terrorism was the focus of this research; I examined the various approaches that the federal government of Nigeria has taken to address Boko Haram terrorism. The study provides an in-depth understanding of counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during the bounded time frame of 2009-2015. I also sought to uncover principles of policy development, collaboration, and implementation that may help Nigerian security forces to be more effective in their Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts.

Literature Establishing Relevance of the Problem

The lack of effective counterterrorism policy in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism has resulted in the Nigerian government being unable to curtail increased Boko

Haram attacks (Omale, 2013). According to a U.N. report, about 2.8 million persons have been displaced by Boko Haram, and another 5.6 million people need emergency food aid (USAID, 2016). Blanchard (2016) also claimed that the coordination effort of government agencies in Nigeria had not curtailed the increased attacks on civilian and military facilities in the country and the spread of such attacks to the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (p. 1). This continued Boko Haram attacks may not be tackled except comprehensive policy that will address this threat is put in place to improve perhaps efforts to counter Boko Haram (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Omale, 2013).

Effective counterterrorism policy ensures adequate planning, a distinct threat profile, deterrence, contingency planning, review mechanisms, resource allocation, and application as well as proper training (Brzoska, 2011; DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Renard, 2012). The statutory responsibility of the Nigerian police force is to maintain law and order, but, when overwhelmed, the Nigerian legal system empowers the military to take over internal security operations (Peterside, 2014). However, because the military is trained mainly in the art of conventional warfare, the intelligence gathering and threat assessment which are paramount in counterterrorism policy and implementation are lacking (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Effective measures will be all-encompassing and coordinated and must adopt human security (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Omale, 2013). Understanding the policy framework and its implementation may provide policy makers with insight they can use to better combat the threat of Boko Haram terrorists and other global terror threats.

Preview of the Chapter

In this chapter, I discuss the literature search strategy, resources used in obtaining literature, and terms in the study. I also discuss literature related to the theoretical foundations of this study. The literature in the chapter primarily focuses on the historical perspective on terrorism, global perspective of counterterrorism, and the evolution of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. I also provide documentation on the Nigerian government's Boko Haram counterterrorism policy, and how I sought to fill the gap I identified in previous studies and increase the body of knowledge.

Literature Search Strategy

The Walden University Library was very useful in locating peer-reviewed articles and journals. Google search was also useful in finding additional peer-reviewed articles. I used the EBSCOhost and ProQuest Central search engines, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collections and Homeland Security Digital Library for this review. I also used online materials and hard copy documents from Nigerian strategic institutions.

The terms I used in searches included *terrorism* and *counterterrorism*. My searches of EBSCOhost and ProQuest Central databases provided limited literature that was useful for my study. The International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collections, and Homeland Security Digital Library via Walden Library yielded literature that was directly connected to my research question. Linking terrorism, counterterrorism, Boko Haram, and Nigeria in varying combinations provided current literature related to my research question.

The selection of different search options produced articles and books that were relevant to the purpose of my research. Searching the reference lists of these articles and books produced additional literature. I then searched the other materials from the databases. This process allowed me to obtain literature on the history of terrorism globally and the history of terrorism in Nigeria as well as counterterrorism. Topics of this literature were terrorism, counterterrorism, Boko Haram, and counterterrorism policy. The literature I reviewed revealed counterterrorism strategies being used in developing and developed countries (see Bartolotta, 2011; Barzoka, 2011; Bynam, 2015; Campbell, 2014). After obtaining insight into Nigerian history and counterterrorism efforts, I started to explore the physical and psychological situations in Nigeria that have been the precipitating factors for the present Boko Haram terrorism. The literature search provided an understanding of the government policy documents and articles on policy process relevant to terrorism, counterterrorism, Boko Haram, and counterterrorism policy. I discussed the literature later in this chapter.

Theoretical Foundation

Counterterrorism policy is all encompassing as it involves planning, policy review, resource allocation, implementation, training, and simulation exercises (DoD, 2014; Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016; Vanderlinden, 2014). The theoretical foundation I applied for the analysis of this study were the institutional theory (Selznick, 1948) and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner, 2009). Each of the theories provided an understanding of some essential elements of the policy development process. However, the two theories collectively offered a comprehensive understanding of the

complexity of the implementation of the policy and reasons it went through the short periods of rapid change and long periods of stagnation.

Institutional Theory

A tenet of institutional theory is that organizational behaviors, activities, and outcomes are products of values and knowledge systems, as well as enabling rules and regulations that govern the organization (Sirmon et al., 2011; Suddaby, 2014). Buil et al. (2013) in their study explained that the institutional orientation relating to its stakeholders' value, financial strength, and knowledge base influence the competitive edge of an organization. The theory asserts that the organizational leaders determine the operational efficiency to gain a competitive advantage over others (O'Sullivan & Abela, 2007; Stewart, 2009). An institution is a part of the global environment but with unique internal mechanisms necessitated by the prevailing cultural context (Bruton, Lau, & Obloj, 2014). In a traditional institution, the focus is on conformity with the rules and norms of the organization through accountability, security, and legitimacy. The organization conforms to already established organizational norms, values, and regulations to gain a competitive advantage (Webb et al., 2011).

The social theorist Selznick was the original proponent of institutional theory, which grew out of his explanation on factors affecting the performance of an organization (Selznick, 1948). He claimed that every organization is unique and that the process by which an organization distinguishes itself is the institutionalization of its operations (Selznick, 1948). Selznick also argued that the uniqueness of every group, the prevailing norms, and understanding of the organizational environment influences its behavior.

Selznick (1948) explained that an organization makes use of its unique environment to determine its goals. Similarly, the institutional structure influences the members' actions and pressures to each situation. Institutional peculiarities such as enabling laws, administrative regulations and organization goals inform the operations and behaviors of an organization. The institutional theory claims that decisions in society are not only influenced by organizational goals, but also by factors such as social, cultural, and legitimacy concerns (Garry, David, & Han-Lin, 2010). Therefore, the environmental factors determine the strategies of an organization and also influence its relationship with other agencies (Selznick, 1948).

In a study carried out by Shou et al. (2014) 324 Chinese companies were surveyed to establish the effect of institutional factors on organizational behavior and outputs. The result of their study revealed a linkage between organizational behavior and outputs and also discovered that organizational norms strengthen its performance but reduce the effect of foreign influence on its performance in China. Similarly, Contractor et al. (2014) carried out a study on how institutional theory attracts the partial foreign direct investment acquisition. Contractor et al. (2014) concluded that leaders make choices based on organizational factors and that weak organizational norm, regulatory and cultural factors affect acquisition. Thus, the organizational rules and regulations influence the choice of an asset.

In their study on institutional theory, Selznick, (1948) and Webb et al. (2011) asserted that due to differences in the knowledge base and value system, organizations are not the same even when they are operating within the same field. This is why during

crisis security leaders do not make decisions based on the crisis but individual agency's interest. An operational norm is that in the period of insecurity, institutions stick to their operational procedures thereby affecting synergy among them (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2011). These behaviors of holding rigidly to the operational procedure by institutions affect collaboration and synergy among the agencies to fight the terror group (Campello et al., 2010). This is evident in the limited guidance on how organizational managers should develop regulations regarding operational strategies during the period of insecurity (Lilien & Srinivasan, 2010). According to O'Malley et al. (2011) sticking rigidly to the agency's operational procedures during crisis reduces performance (Chakravarty & Grewal, 2011).

Operational guidance and procedures vary from organization to organization and have been as a result of statutory responsibilities, ownership structures (Hau & Ngo, 2012), desire to please the political leadership and prominence (Kim & McAlister, 2011), and to get more funding (Vorhies et al., 2014). Additionally, the dynamism of Boko Haram attacks call for a change in the Nigerian security agencies' standard operational procedures, and also, a change in their standard operating systems to influence its effectiveness (Chan-Olmsted, 2011).

In their study on institutional theory, Webb et al. (2011) asserted that since institutions establish their rules and regulations, share values and principles they are firm in structures, and to continue to exist and gain legitimacy, institutions must conform to them (Connelly, Ketchen, & Slater, 2011). There are no acceptable operational procedures because organizations differ, and developing one would become a herculean

task for practitioners and researchers (O'Sullivan & Butler, 2010; Stewart, 2009).

Researchers, however, agreed that the enabling laws setting-up these agencies influence their behaviors and statutory responsibilities, and thus, determine the key performance indicator.

Selznick, (1948) argued further that the leaders in organizations adapt their operational strategies to balance-up the internal factors and external societal factors. In this study, I used the concepts from institutional theory to convey how knowledge systems, norms, and rules that characterize industries and organizations influence the representatives of participant organizations' life experiences. So, through the lens of institutional theory, it was necessary to establish a standard for the Boko Haram counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, because different organizations have different leadership styles, values, and regulations, it became tough to develop a standard counterterrorism policy. As a result, the counterterrorism efforts suffer (Rust et al., 2004) as experts try very hard to agree on the best strategy to apply in the Boko Haram counterterrorism operation.

Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous (2015) and Hillebrand et al., (2011) argued that when pressure from institutional environment influences organizational strategies and processes, effectiveness is assured. On the other hand, while leaders in an organization are to be mindful of the environmental factors, they should also be heedful of external factors, to develop counterterrorism policy that effectively assures operational success (O'Sullivan & Butler, 2010). While there are difficulties in defining a standard

operational procedure, there is the need to develop a single framework for the counterterrorism operation (Bui et al., 2013; Stewart, 2009).

In a period of crisis such as that of Boko Haram terrorism, it is imperative for organizational leadership to be heedful of the influence of institutional factors and dynamism of environmental factors to win the war (Latham & Braun, 2011; Eggers & Sattler, 2011). It was essential to consider the relevance of this theory while making and implementing of counterterrorism framework to foster a standard operating procedure that regulates the conducts and activities of all security agencies that are involved in the counterterrorism efforts (Caruana & Ewing, 2010).

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

The punctuated equilibrium theory explains why and how security policies have the propensity to go through short periods of quick change and protracted periods of stagnation (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012). The punctuated equilibrium of change is also called punctuated equilibrium of discontinuous change (Baumgartner, 2006; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The theory asserts that changes in policy occur progressively over time through incremental adaptations until the status quo is disrupted by an outside source thereby forcing on the spot a significant change (Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). The punctuated equilibrium theory has been broadly applied in the fields of Biology and Seismology for many years (Givel, 2010; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Since 1993 punctuated equilibrium theory has been acknowledged in public policy (Cairney, 2015; Givel, 2008; Prindle, 2012). In the work of Jones and Baumgartner on the reaction of federal government to sudden and extreme events in the course of

budgetary policy change, they asserted that the concept of bounded rationality is dominant to punctuated equilibrium theory that has its origin from physical science and the “bounded rationality” models that existed in the 1950s and 1960s (Boushey, 2012; Bruenig & Koski, 2012; Givel, 2010; Jones & Baumgartner, 2012).

Many qualitative and quantitative studies between 2011 and 2016 inferred punctuated equilibrium theory is useful in governance decision making when applied to a triggering event, and the factors necessitating the policy change from one event to another (Hu, 2012; Kwon et al., 2013). The punctuated equilibrium theory study asserts that government decision dynamics determined significant incident recovery policy (Givel, 2010; Prindle, 2012). This conclusion is of concern to a researcher to investigate further factors that informed policy decisions within the ambient of critical events. In this study, I brought to fore the assumptions of the alignment of punctuated equilibrium theory similar to this study, the basis for choosing the theory and the reason the research question supports the current knowledge of the punctuated equilibrium theory.

An attack or friction incident is usually an unplanned event that interrupts the normal policymaking process and compels the policymakers to contemplate and act decisively to address the issue and restore normal life (Givel, 2008; Jensen et al., 2014; Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). The analysis of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram and environmental factors that informed decisions on Boko Haram attacks provided an opportunity to justify the use of punctuated equilibrium theory in this research (Givel, 2010; Yin, 2014). In this study, the analysis focused on how punctuated theory influenced Boko Haram policy after a triggering event.

As described earlier, counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram was in response to Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria to adequately respond to the legal issues to tackle Boko Haram terrorism in the midst of several allegations of human rights abuses by the Nigerian government forces, in May 2011. In Nigeria, counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram has been on incremental basis since 2009 when the group emerged (Blanchard & Husted, 2016; Idowu, 2013). The event of December 25, 2009, in which a young Nigerian, Umar Abdulmutallab who had links with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was found to be in possession of an explosive aboard Delta Airlines 253 in Amsterdam after an unsuccessful attempt to detonate the bomb, was an exogenous shock to counterterrorism policy. Nigeria was subsequently blacklisted as "country of interest" on the US Terror Watch list by the United States Transportation Security Administration (Omoleye-Ajileye, 2015). This event was a disruption that necessitated a policy.

During gradual changes, the policy makers find it difficult to summon an adequate amount of information to bring about change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). In contrast, at the period of dynamic change, the policy formulators are made to accept choices hurriedly based on the degree of data or information available at the time (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). In explaining counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram, the punctuated equilibrium theory and bounded rationality would suffice for the explanation of the Nigerian policy formulation towards Boko Haram. The speed at which the National Assembly passed Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013, as well as its endless controversies and mild changes, supports the claim of the punctuated equilibrium theory.

The Boko Haram bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja, Nigeria on 26th August 2011 brought disruption to the initial event which necessitated a drastic change in counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria (Oyeniya, 2014; Sampson, 2015). The bombing of the United Nations building, Abuja, by Boko Haram caused fear and generated a lot of negative comments within and outside Nigeria mainly from the United States of America and the United Nations. This forced the Nigerian government to prescribe and tag the Boko Haram as a terrorist group and brought about a policy change (Blanchard, 2016). This incident later pushed the policy change over the edge as it informed the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013. The concept of bounded rationality forces a decision maker to accept a choice not because it was a perfect one but because there was none that was better at that particular time (Tyson, 2007). So during the incremental adaptation as well as in the time of dynamic change of punctuated equilibrium theory, decision makers demonstrate bounded rationality (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). This event could be regarded as the trigger that led to the enactment of the Terrorism Amendment Act 2013 (Omoleye-Ajileye, 2015).

The National Assembly comprises of the Senate and House of Representatives passed the “Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011” and signed into law in June 2011 by President Goodluck Jonathan on June 3, 2011, and the Terrorism Amendment Act 2013 on May 2, May 2011 (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015). By modern standard, the Acts were passed with urgency, but as asserted by the punctuated equilibrium theory, the fact that they were passed speedily does not explain that they were not faultless or without

challenges (Adesina, 2012). The Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013 are good examples of the justification of the punctuated equilibrium theory which got rid of the pattern of the incremental flow of security policy change for the sudden changes brought about by the enactment of Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and the Amendment Act of 2013. The Acts speedily fixed several sensitive national security issues affecting the Boko Haram counterterrorism operation (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015). The National Assembly faced a serious crunch, rapidly passed the Bill to meet the aspirations of the Nigerian people and to fulfill their electoral promises (Bhura, 2012; Ikenna, 2016). This adequately describes the bounded rationality of the punctuated equilibrium theory. Since the signing into law of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 there have been some concerns on some issues about the Acts. Some of the problems were ignored or rejected while some have gained support that led to the Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2013. The Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2013 illustrates the backward shift to gradual or incremental policy changes.

The enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 generated human rights concerns due to some aspects considered as constituting serious threats to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (Bhura, 2012; Ikenna, 2016). For instance, section 25 of the Terrorism Act 2011 gave sweeping powers to the security and intelligence officers without any judicial oversight is a source of concern. The Inspector General of Police and National Security Adviser may search in any place, vehicle or person “without a warrant” if he suspects the commission of any offense. The opposition was so intense that President Jonathan had to send another Bill to

the National Assembly for its amendment. The urgency of the passage that required increased security measures subsided temporarily partisan politics and provided an opportunity for the Nigerian National Assembly to unite together to strengthen security (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015; Traister, 2013). The Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 brought some changes to address the human right issues in the Act. However, there is still some imperfection in the Act. For example, Section 27(1) provides that upon an ex-parte application, a court can order for the detention of a terrorist suspect for a period not exceeding 90 days but still renewable for a similar period until the completion of the investigation (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015).

Bounded rationality as a decision-making model asserts that the decision maker is compelled to accept any available choice at any time even if it is a less than perfect (Boushey, 2012; Cairney, 2013; Tyson, 2007). Punctuated equilibrium theory explains that during the period of the incremental stage and dynamic change decision-makers frequently display bounded rationality (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Prindle, 2012). During the gradual change, decision makers do not conjure sufficient time to bring forth change but are compelled to take any available choice (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). The decision makers make decisions hastily without sufficient information or options during the dynamic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). In history, the decision makers have been made to accept this imperfection in security policies, and this has played out in the current counterterrorism policies towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework was that comprehensive counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria has the potential to address and eliminate all the acts of terrorism in Nigeria and all hands must be on deck to remove all forms of Boko Haram extreme behaviors through security emplacement, long-term economic, educational and social strategies. The research was put together by using a qualitative case study approach to investigate and describe the concepts found in the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during the year 2009-2015. The research process and progress was based on data collected from an open-ended interview protocol as indicated in the appendix

The Concept

The rationale for counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015 was because it has the potential to address and eliminate all the acts of terrorism in Nigeria.

Series of attacks, as well as the failed terrorist plots in Nigeria, more than ever, have shown the vulnerabilities of the country to terrorist attack (Omotosho, 2015; Onuoaha, 2011; 2014). The strategies of the Boko Haram terrorist attacks in previous ones sometimes did not fit the subsequent ones and had contributed to the challenge of counterterrorism in Nigeria (Oyewole, 2013). The strategies employed by Boko Haram indicated a selection of a variety of targets. Different Boko Haram actors used methods of attacks such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, armed robbery, fighters, and lone actors,

and executed through the selection of different weapons or explosives (Odo, 2015; Ogunseye, 2012; Oyeniya, 2014; Oyewole, 2013).

Nigerian populace, therefore, calls on governments and policy-makers for appropriate and adequate responses to these Boko Haram terrorist attacks (Aghedo & Osunmah, 2012; Ogundita & Amzat, 2008; Omale, 2013). Similarly, researchers have recognized the lack of comprehensive counterterrorism as the primary barrier to progress in the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts (Akinola & Tella, 2013; Akpomera & Omoyibo, 2013; Ayandike, 2013). The recognition has led to scholars to suggest effective counterterrorism responses that stressed the importance of information sharing, multi-agency collaboration, effective counterterrorism legislation and good governance and respect for human rights (Okoro, 2014; Omale, 2013; Onapajo, 2013).

Albert (2017) suggested an inter-agency approach to counterterrorism effort in Nigeria and advocated for a deeper understanding among the security forces. There is the need to strengthen the international cooperation against Boko Haram terrorism. Counterterrorism policy in Nigeria should aim to improve criminal justice capacity that will base on the effective rule of law for the investigation, and prosecution of terrorist cases (Akinlade & Ibitoye, 2012; Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015).

Countering terrorism approach should be holistic; it should be comprehensive to address the extremist ideology, prevent funding and training assistance, access to weapons, and frustrate membership recruitment and offer legal platform to fight terrorists (Aderonke, 2015; Akinbi, 2015; Odo, 2015; Onapajo, 2015; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016). The contextual lens will be counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria. The

contextual lens was applied to the development and implementation of the policy in Nigeria as an indispensable tool in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism.

Synthesis of Literature Related to the Concept

The following is a synthesis of the significant studies identified relative to the concept of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015.

Cockayne (2011) in his study, state fragility, organized crime and peacebuilding claimed that illicit flows of money and arms are factors fuelling kidnapping and terrorism in West Africa and that elites in religious and political entrepreneurialism are making a profit from these criminal and illegal activities. He argued that this development had manifested in Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, a situation that is already a threat to its democracy and economic growth (Cockayne, 2011). He proposed an understanding of the normative (when a criminal gets the protection of the state), analytic (understanding of the nature of Boko Haram terrorism) and strategic confusion within the country socio-economic and political situation of a nation (Cockayne, 2011).

Aghedo and Osumah (2012) in their study claimed that the Nigerian approach to terrorism is unplanned, informal and unprepared and not comprehensive to address issues of Boko Haram terrorism because of its ad-hoc approach of resolving problems of a terrorist act. They submitted that the reaction from the security forces is reactive, only treating symptoms of terrorism and suggested the need for a law to address the causes of terrorism directly and comprehensively and to develop the capacity of the security forces to counterterrorism (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). The study generally applied to these

concepts of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in a bid to provide a robust and comprehensive examination of the strategy for an in-depth understanding (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012).

Bodunde et al. (2012) in their study found that the advent of Boko Haram in Nigeria has increased the existing security challenges in the country and that it appears that Nigerian security forces are not well positioned to tackle the threat because of the multiplicity of the security organizations. They affirmed that instead of collaboration and intelligence sharing along institutional discipline there exist interagency rivalries and bickering among the security forces that snowballed into an armed confrontation (Bodunde et al., 2012). The study recommends a collaborative approach to insecurity in the country in the form of intelligence sharing, joint training, and supply of modern crime equipment to the security forces for adequate performance.

Idowu (2013) carried out a study to determine whether the Nigerian government and international community approaches were sufficient enough to address the challenges of the Boko Haram terrorism. In his mixed method study, he found that the cause of Boko Haram terrorism is multi-dimensional that arose from the problem of poor governance, corruption unemployment, injustice among others (Idowu, 2013). He argued that solution to Boko Haram terrorism cannot be attained primarily through the use of force but good governance that can ensure transparency, justice and genuine negotiation with relevant conflicting parties (Idowu, 2013). He concluded that the most workable strategies to address Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria approach must be all-encompassing that will combine the use of force with the provision of sensible socio-

economic and political policies and social securities for the masses. Idowu averred that there is the need for the overhauling of the Nigerian security and judicial institutions to enhance effective policing and justice administration.

Omale (2013) studied terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria and found the hemorrhagic acts of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria require an in-depth discourse. He argued that counterterrorism in Nigeria needs an understanding of the connection between extremism and criminality in the social, political and religious spheres. His conclusion was in line with Cokayne (2011) that terrorism threatens not only democratic gains but the coexistence of a nation. He argued that terrorism must be tackled as a long-term project through intersectoral and interdisciplinary approaches while all stakeholders must employ these processes of learning, exchange, and experimentation to bring about effective methods (Omale, 2013). He suggested economic, socio-psychological and security measures to counter Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria (Omale, 2013).

Agbiboa (2013) studied Nigerian response to Boko Haram terrorism and affirmed that increasing sophistication of its attacks might be due to the tactical and operational assistance from Al Qaeda, and unfortunate fuelling of the terrorism by the terrorism of the Nigerian state, leaving no opportunity for any resolution through political dialogue. He asserted that in a bid to restore order and maintain security, the Joint Military Task Force that was established fight Boko Haram terrorism had committed terrible human right violations in the northeast of the country by resorting to extrajudicial killings and intimidation of the helpless Nigerians (Agbiboa, 2013). He proposed an intelligence-driven counterterrorism operation and a non-killing tactic conflict resolution approach in

lieu with of military tactics that incorporate security, respect of the human rights of the citizenry and development (Agbiboa, 2013). He recommended an amnesty along with physical and social protection from the state as a panacea to the threat of Boko Haram terrorism (Agbiboa, 2013).

Bamidele (2013) provided a stark analysis of the Boko Haram domestic terrorism in Nigeria as an aftermath of increasing level of poverty, ethno-religious conflict, criminality in the country. His study revealed that a nation that places developmental projects above security is only planting seed on the rock because no meaningful development can take place. He averred that unless justice is allowed to reign and human rights protected, tackling the threat of Boko Haram will remain a difficult task but concluded that fighting the criminal sect must involve the removal of all religious and political gladiators that are responsible for corruption that is generating the conflict (Bamidele, 2013). He recommended the diversification of Nigerian economy to tackle the underlying factors of poverty and unemployment which are the causes of Boko Haram terrorism and transparent budgeting that citizens can use to hold their leaders accountable (Bamidele, 2013). This work offered an understanding of the phenomenon of this study as well as provided innovation that may be useful in tackling Boko Haram terrorism.

Osumah (2013) studied the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria to determine its implications for internal security. He found that Boko Haram terrorism has linkage with the breakdown of the social contract between citizens and government that has different effects ranging from an international image problem, humanitarian crisis, massive economic loses, and heavy burden on security forces (Osumah, 2013). He

posited that the projection of the Boko Haram terrorism as a military threat makes it difficult to employ political solution to it and that neither granting of amnesty and the massive presence of deployment of security forces can effectively tackle the menace (Osumah, 2013). He recommended that the causes of Boko Haram threat be addressed instead of using reactive approaches that cannot ensure enduring peace and security, and for the Nigerian citizens to have confidence in the state, there must be a reconstruction of the social contract between the citizens and the government (Osumah, 2013).

Oyeniyi (2014) claimed that an internal dialogue option between the government and the Boko Haram members could not produce negotiation. In his study on the prospects of the dialogue option between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram terrorist group, he found that the country has the statutory responsibility of not only protecting the rights of its citizenry but ensuring strict adherence to the constitution (Oyeniyi, 2014). He posited that Boko Haram cannot be killing people in one hand, unwilling to accept responsibility for the destructions of life and property and still demand justice for the assassination of its leader (Oyeniyi, 2014). He concluded that no matter how good dialogue is in conflict resolution, dialoguing with the sect will be a sheer emptiness from which the country cannot achieve anything and granting it amnesty will throw out of the window the constitutional responsibility of accountability and justice of the government (Oyeniyi, 2014).

Akpan et al. (2014) argued that the Nigerian government had responded to the Boko Haram terrorism that started in 2009. Akpan et al. described the government's response as not being a proactive or inclusive, but rather a reactionary that depends

primarily on the government's security forces and because of this flawed approach, Boko Haram has gained a lot of ground by employing guerrilla warfare tactics of hit and run (Akpan et al., 2014). They claimed that in spite of the response, the sect continued to attack innocent Nigerians through the use of improvised explosive devices, kidnapping and shootings (Akpan et al., 2014). They affirmed that the factors responsible for the nonoptimal performance the state in combating Boko Haram was due the weak state institutions such as political instability, the brutality of security apparatus, poverty, economic inequality and porosity of border (Akpan et al., 2014). Their study concluded that the Nigerian government needs an assessment of its counterterrorism strategies to answer salient questions as to what informed government policies and how effective they are to develop proactive strategies to counter Boko Haram terrorism (Akpan et al., 2014). They also suggested the need to discover flaws in these responses and strengthen state institutions to make them work effectively and make better counterterrorism policies (Akpan et al., 2014).

Blanchard and Husted (2016) studied Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram terrorism and found that the Nigeria attempt to address the security threat resulted to the death of about 700 persons including security personnel, the militant and the innocent civilians. Blanchard and Husted claimed that efforts to facilitate negotiations with the sect up to date had not been successful due to political and economic reasons. They found that social, economic, and security challenges are the major threats to the country that must be addressed for any meaningful security and development to take place, and also advocated for supportive reforms initiatives from the United States to

tackle the issues of insecurity, corruption, and human rights abuses (Blanchard & Husted, 2016).

Eji (2016) claimed that the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism is the most significant security challenge in Nigeria which considerably changed the country's security architecture. Eji argued that the government's Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy appears ineffective because of it has some implementation flaws, stating that the Nigerian counterterrorism efforts were mainly military-centric and did not have a document to guide the national strategy until the release of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014. He posited further that even with the release of the NACTEST, it is still fraught with gaps that question its suitability as a counterterrorism policy document in Nigeria (Eji, 2016). The study concluded that there is the absolute need for the emplacement of a people-centered counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria that employs whole-of-government approaches (Eji, 2016).

Onapajo (2017) provided a framework in which the Nigerian government can defeat Boko Haram. He concluded that many successes had not been recorded in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism because the government only adopt the military tactics which cannot eliminate the threat and that the existence of the sect is still a potent threat to Nigeria and West African sub-region. He found that the military approach is good and the country should not abandon it entirely, but argued for a detailed strategy that would address the underlying factors that created the problem and complement the military approach. Onapajo concluded that the reliance on this conservative approach of the use of force and military hard-power could not be sufficient because the fight against Boko

Haram must be asymmetrical (Onapajo, 2017). He suggested that poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment that are alarmingly high in Nigeria should be addressed to discourage people from becoming Boko Haram recruits (Onapajo, 2017). He recommended a developmental programme that would consider rehabilitating the captured members of the Boko Haram sect as the path to a permanent solution and the strengthening of Nigeria's criminal justice system to arrest and prosecute the sect's members and elites who clandestinely sponsor terrorism (Onapajo, 2017).

Definitions of Key Concepts and Benefits of the Framework

The frameworks for key definitions in this study include terrorism, counterterrorism, counterterrorism policy, and Boko Haram terrorist group.

Terrorism. Terrorism as a concept is difficult to define. It continues to generate debate among scholars and professionals (Akinola & Tella, 2013; Crelinsten, 2009; Isyaku, 2013). Due to the complexity of the phenomenon that portrays different perceptions, there is no universally accepted definition and thus remains a concept that is not clearly understood (Coady, 2004; Franks, 2006; Griest & Mahan, 2003; Merari, 2007; Oberschall, 2004). Hoffman as cited in Purpura (2007) claimed that the changing nature of the phenomenon compounds the difficulty in defining the concept of terrorism. The problem originates from the viewpoints of national politics in which terrorism is used to explain national ideological purposes.

The vagueness of the phenomenon that genetically refers to violence, crime, use of force or military force also makes it difficult to define (Fischer et al., 2008). Griest and Mahan (2003) explained that because terrorism connotes different meaning to different

persons, governments, disciplines and political viewpoints, conceptualizing the accurate definition of terrorism would be subjective. They explained further that most people or countries define terrorism primarily from the viewpoints of religious motivations, hate and calamitous groups, non-state actors, and state-sponsored terrorism (Kielsgard, 2006). Hoffman (2006) concluded that it is subjective to tag an individual or group as ‘terrorists’ because of the sympathy for or opposition against any group or person. The lack of consensus on the definition is also due to the reason that hardly anyone agrees to be named a terrorist as the perpetrator of the terrorist acts often sees themselves as freedom fighters (Hallett, 2004; Primoratz, 2004).

This peculiarity notwithstanding has changed into dynamism with time in its definition and its meaning transformed over time starting from the time of French revolution to the contemporary time of small violent non-state actors (Neumann, 2009; Weinzierl, 2004). Based on the above, developed nations use the term to define, condemn and refer to kidnappings, violence, assassinations, and bombings as a terrorist act (Neumann, 2009; Weinzierl, 2004). However, the United States Department of State defines terrorism as premeditated, calculated violence act, singly or in group against the civilians and noncombatant military personnel who are not armed (United States Department of State, 2003). According to the definition of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, adopted at its 5053rd meeting, terrorism involves criminal acts against civilians with the intention to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or hostage taking to instigate violence in the general public or in a specific group of individuals or to coerce a population or intimidate a government or secure the neutrality of an

international organisation for taking action on offences relating to terrorism within the scope of international conventions and protocol (United Nations, 2004).

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In this study, the definition is not the same as crime, assassination, hostage taking murder, guerrilla tactics, jail breaks, armed robbery, hijacking, theft of nuclear materials but employ these tactics to achieve its aim (Borum, 2004). The United Nations' definition of terrorism is broad and all-encompassing as it includes the basic description of terrorism such as premeditated action, violence, ideology, and political intent, multiple actors, and supporters (Franks, 2006; Richardson, 2006). Although people can ascribe different definitions to terrorism based on their viewpoints, one can conclude that

terrorism is a fear-induced activity to kill and frighten (Franks, 2006; Richardson, 2006).

According to Chalian and Blin (2007), terrorism has been used as a tool of terror.

A quick look at historical perspective reveals that terrorism has taken the religious dimension (David, 2013; Hoffman, 2006). Between 60 and 70 AD, the Jewish zealots have used it to cause a rebellion in Rome while between 1090 and 1275 AD a radical Shiite movement fought a Jihad for the purification of Islam (Neumann; 2009; Weinzierl, 2004). The Hindus and the Thugees in India have used terrorism to strangle the sojourners and used them as a sacrifice to their goddess, Kali (Nuemann, 2009).

There is also a nexus between terrorism and repressive government actions. During the French Revolution (1793 to 1794), French authority used state-sponsored terrorism to suppress opposition (Isyaku, 2013). According to Rapoport (2004), there are four waves of contemporary terrorism which are the Religious, the Anarchist, the New Left and the Anti-Colonial Waves. The Anarchist wave was pronounced in the 19th century Europe with the characteristics of the removal of government authorities and structures through the assassination of the government officials (Rapoport, 2004). Czar Alexander II in 1881 and Czarist officials were assassinated in Russia by Narodnaya Volya (Marsella, 2004).

Between the 1920s and 1960s, the Anti-Colonial wave pursued self-determination ideology against the European colonial masters (David, 2013; Rapoport, 2004). The terrorists targeted government officials and their relatives (Marsella, 2004; Rapoport, 2004). In the 1960s, the New Left wave fought the West over observed global injustice perpetrated, using the instrument of nationalism and radicalism (Davis, 2013; Marsella,

2004). The groups comprised of the Italy Red Brigades and Japanese Red Army amongst others through guerrilla tactics, kidnapping, assassination and taking of government officials hostages (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The Shining Path of Peru and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia were used as tools in the struggle for Irish independence from Britain in the early twentieth century. The groups fought a long year war for Irish unity in 2005 (Marsella, 2004; Richardson, 2006). The resultant effect of this campaign was the encouragement of independence struggle in other colonies (Chaliand & Blin, 2007).

In 1979, the religious wave which aimed at a religious state and religious self-determination emerged from Islamic radicalism (David, 2013; Leonard & William, 2010). According to Hoffman (2006) and Neumann (2009), the emergence of political Islam and Islamist terrorism defines the present period and plays a significant role in the modern religious terrorism. The beginning of this wave is linked to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the offer of military aid to the secular state by the Soviet in 1979 and the Afghanistan pro-communist regime in 1979 which was opposed by Islamist proponents. The Islamic war, Jihad, is an expression of hatred for the Marxist East and the West by the Islamist proponents and has manifested in its networks of operation across states and countries to counter secular governments (Roy et al., 2000).

The resultant effect of this insurrection was the growth of Shiism, and violent Islamism in Lebanon, Nigeria, and Malaysia (Chaliand, 1987). According to Roy et al. (2000), the September 2011 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, was an evidence of the Al-Qaeda network in the world (Khan, 2013; Marsella, 2004). The violent Islamism was instrumental to the bombing in Saudi Arabia, the United States

military barracks in 1996 (Esposito, 1999). Currently, Al-Qaeda presently has networks in more than 50 countries of the world (Abdalla, 2011; Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has links in some parts of North and West Africa, while Al-Shabaab claims has a connection with Al-Qaeda functions from Somalia, some areas in Kenya and East Africa (Abdalla, 2011; Akinola & Uzodike, 2014; Clarke & Lekalake, 2016).

The revolution has manifested in Nigeria in the 1980s Maitatsine riots and the present Boko Haram terrorism (Onapajo & Usma, 2012). The proclamation by Boko Haram in 2016 of its affiliation to ISIS and quest to have Sharia law entrenched in Nigerian legal system is an indication that the sect falls under the religious wave of Islamic radicalism (Adesoji, 2011; Ajayi, 2016; Oladunoye & Omemu, 2013; Somorin, 2016). The increase in terrorist activities globally has led to improvements in terrorism literature (Hoechner, 2014; La Roche, 2004; Neumann, 2009; Ogbonnaya, Ogunjiuba, & Stiger, 2014). The study ranged from definitions to typologies, causes, methods, impact, and characteristics (Brinkel & Ait-Hida, 2012; Okemi, 2013). According to Brown (2008), terrorism is a willful killing of the innocent individual to achieve a political objective either carried out in group, military or nonmilitary. He explained further that terrorism is a use of violence directed against government or individuals to cause political change or extension of diplomacy (Brown, 2008). From this definition, terrorism can be used to achieve a legitimate cause and can be carried out singly by a lone individual terrorist as well as in group such as Boko Haram terrorist group or by state (Gutteridge, 1981; Marsella, 2004).

Terrorist methods can be in the form of guerrilla warfare, murder, political rioting, suicide bombings, hijackings, and political assassinations Schweitzer & Shay, 2003. The illegal response can be in the form of guerrilla warfare, political assassinations, political rioting, bombings, hijackings, suicide bombings, and kidnappings (Schweitzer & Shay, 2003). Boko Haram has manifested these illegal actions in its modus operandi (Akinbi 2015; La Roche, 2004). These vices may be evident in other criminal activities, but the distinguishing factor is that terrorism aims at changing the social and political order (Akinbi 2015). Thus, it can be inferred that Boko Haram is a political organization (Akinbi 2015; Marama, 2016; Neumann, 2009). This explains why Boko Haram aims to establish an Islamic caliphate and abhors Western education and the secularity of the Nigerian State (Azumah, 2015). Corroborating the view of Brown (2008), Whelan (2016) believed that political messages usually go together with terrorism using media. After an attack, Boko Haram and ISIS pass their messages through YouTube and other social media platforms to justify their attacks. The reasons for their violent attacks may be political, socio-economical, religious or ideological. The attack is usually to make a demand from the government and carrying out an attack is to strip the government of its legitimacy (Walker, 2012).

Every phenomenon has its precipitating factors and so terrorism. While political options of negotiation, lobbying and bargaining are available to terrorist organizations, yet many do not exhaust these alternatives before terrorism option (Richardson, 2006). In the same vein, Abi-Hashmen (2004) and Franks (2006) advanced the precipitating factors for terrorism as poverty, religious indoctrination, economic exploitation, politics,

lack of access to education and proper medical care. However, Franks (2006) explained further that if an unknown culture infiltrates another culture it may lead terrorism. In describing the cause of terrorism, Ankersen, (2008) claimed that the cause of terrorism is attributed to the perceived domination of the American culture on others worked out through globalization especially in the Middle East. These views are indications that terrorists mostly come from the lower class of the society.

Crenshaw (1981), however, submitted that terrorism may not be as a result of deprivation of necessities, and may not be tools of the oppressed but in its place an apparatus of the advantaged. Crenshaw corroborated his submission by claiming that the Italian Red Brigades and Red Army Faction in West Germany were not deprived in any way. La Roche (2004) ascribed the cause of terrorism to the cumulative exposure of an individual to extreme behavior. This position was amplified by O' Brien, (2010) that terrorism may not originate from poverty because certain individual terrorists are comfortable and ready to disregard their comfort to wage Jihad. He explained further that they may not be comfortable with Western culture because they consider it as evil (O' Brien, 2010). O' Brien argued that this position agrees with the claim that an individual can take to terrorism if deprived of the basic necessity of life terrorism but quick to argue that some in spite of their good standard of living still take to terrorist behavior. He further agreed that these persons are those who are excited about religious socialization (O' Brien, 2010). These precipitating factors account for the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In support of this claim, Akinola and Uzodike (2013) argued that the

growth of Boko Haram terrorism in the northeastern part of Nigeria is attributed to poverty.

Ahokegh (2012) corroborated the view that people of the northeastern part of Nigeria are attracted to terrorism due to the economic and political backwardness of the northern Nigeria as well as their unwillingness to be separated from Islam. An analysis of Boko Haram membership agrees with the submission of Onuoha (2010) that Boko Haram terrorist group recruits its member from disgruntled youths and the unemployed graduates. In explaining the connection between the factors for and factors to curtail terrorism, Ahokegh (2012) argued that if Boko Haram is checked and social injustices, corruption, and bad governance are not addressed, other similar groups can emerge. This calls for the examination of the Nigerian counterterrorism policy if it is tackling Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and suggests how it can be improved. The attraction of a former commissioner in Borno State Alhaji Buji Foi, and a former university lecturer, Kadiru Atiku who were members of the sect suggests that they both had the similar ideology with Boko Haram as they were 'comfortable' (Abubakar, 2009; Mukairu & Muhammad, 2009).

Terrorism in Nigeria. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to Nigeria nation. The country has witnessed terrorism during the colonial periods and military rule (Ajibola, 2015; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). The terrorist tactics used by the British colonial masters to suppress and conquer the Benin Kingdom led to the death of some notable personalities of the Kingdom (Ago, 2017). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some small autonomous communities used guerrilla and terrorist tactics to fight

against the British colonialism (Ewa, 2017). In 1966 about 150 insurgents led by Adaka Boro declared a Republic of Niger Delta; the Nigerian forces however aborted it after 12 days of its declaration (Levey, 2014). In 1966, during the Nigerian civil war, the Biafra soldiers adopted guerrilla tactics against the Nigerian forces (Ewa, 2017). The periods could be said to have witnessed intra-state terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism (Babatunde, Unwana-Obong, & Olanrewaju, 2014; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). In 1996, the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida was alleged to have killed the editor of Newswatch magazine, Dele Giwa with a letter bomb (Madunagu, 2005). According to Ogundiya and Amzat (2008), only a few terrorist activities could be attributed to international terrorism in Nigeria. The assassination in 1981 of four members of the Nigerian security forces by Cameroonian forces could be described as international terrorism (Madunagu, 2005).

The prevailing conditions in Nigeria support the growth of terrorism in the country or encourage an individual to terrorism (Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). The development, as well as an increase in terrorist activities, could be linked to socio-political, psychological, economic and cultural differences of an aggrieved individual or group in the country (Crenshaw, 1981; Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). According to Crenshaw 1981, the discrimination of the majority by the minority group is a real grievance that could lead to terrorist activities in the country. The discriminated group could form a social movement to redress their grievances and to seek for equitable society while an extreme faction of the group could result to acts of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). According to Niworu (2013) lack

of good governance, legal systems, access to qualitative education and cultural values accounted for terrorism in Nigeria. In explaining this phenomenon, Duru and Ogbonnaya, (2012) and Niworu (2013) argued for an understanding of Nigeria in the colonial period.

The Nigerian experience under colonial domination or rule was that of arbitrariness and oppression with the attendant negative impact of terrorism, rebellion and religious and ethnic conflicts, and other social vices in the society (Niworu, 2013; Okpaga, Chijioke, & Okechukwu, 2012). The Nigerian First Republic between 1960 and 1963 was characterized by violence, thuggery, and low social values that ruled through coercion (Ate, 2011; Ukase, 2015). The political economy of the Nigerian state was centrally structured, and this made inevitable the struggle for power devoid of lawful means (Niworu, 2013; Omale, 2013; Omede & Omede, 2015). This political structure promoted ethnic and religious militancy in the polity that cut across all ethnic groups and regions.

In the southeastern part of Nigeria, there is agitation by the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) for Igbo presidency, in the Niger Delta, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDV) and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) are agitating for resource control, while in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram is agitating for societal reform based on the rules of Sharia (Babatunde, Unwana-Obong, & Olanrewaju, 2014; Idowu, 2013). The violent activities of these groups against innocent individuals are being sustained and sponsored by the desire to gain access to economic power by unleashing violent terrorist acts against innocent citizens and foreign investors (Azumah, 2015; Chinwokwu, 2013; Niworu, 2013).

The growth and development of terrorism have been attributed to the psychological factors resulting in frustration and provocation of the Nigerian citizens. The psychological challenge is occasioned by the relative deprivation of socio-economic and political benefits of a group of people over time (Crenshaw, 1981; Afoaku, 2017; Orie, 2016). In response, the aggrieved groups unleash terror and carry out attacks on the perceived enemy by disruption of oil and gas installations and kidnap of oil workers (Azigbo, 2008; Duru, Ogbonnaya, 2012). The deprivation of the Nigerian government and insensitivity of the multinational oil companies to the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta area of Nigeria since the 1990s has created a precarious situation of protests, violence, and agitation by the people of the Niger Delta of Nigeria (Azigbo, 2008; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). Significant militant groups in the Niger Delta include the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Force (NDVF), Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade, and the Avengers (Idowu, 2013; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

Scholars on the political economy of violence in Nigeria argued that resource issue is a significant factor that has generated economic-based violence (Babatunde, Unwana-Obong, & Olanrewaju, 2014; Olomjobi, 2013; Okpaga, Chijioke, & Okechukwu, 2013). Researchers affirmed that social and economic inequalities and deprivation are forces that cause terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Omede, & Omede, 2015). This position is buttressed by the reports of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that countries, where terrorism is harbored, are in a terrible economic state (Okoro, 2014; Zumve, Ingyoroko, & Akuva, 2013). Omale (2013), Stern (1999), and Whelan (2016) attributed the economic inequality as one of the reasons while individuals or groups take

to violent behavior. In Nigeria, the economic inequality has resulted in a vertical and horizontal crisis between the state and federal government or between geopolitical zones (Bamidele, 2015; Idowu, 2013). The crisis behind oil and resource control and poverty due to economic deprivation has led to individuals or groups taken to arms against the (Idowu, 2103). The inability of the Nigerian government to provide adequate security and good governance created a situation the militant group explores to recruit membership into terrorism (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013)

The desire for equal participating and all inclusiveness in the governance of Nigeria necessitated the formation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) (Aba, 2015; Campbell, 2017). The group which was declared a terrorist group by the federal government of Nigeria approved violence as a tool for reviving Biafra, a separatist organization committed to the secession of the Igbo ethnic group from Nigeria (Ibrahim, 2017). The group was alleged to have killed about fifty-five people and unleashed violence on individuals considered not supporting its cause (Opejobi, 2018). Government forces arrested the leader of the group, Nnamadi Kanu, when the group ordered a "sit-at-home" protest in all the five states in the southeastern part of the country to press home its demand for his release (Campbell, 2017; Ibeh, 2018). The group used dangerous weapons such as machetes, stones, and broken bottles, to extort money forcefully from innocent civilians at illegal roadblocks to finance its cause (Nwankwo, 2017). The government later proscribed the group, and the government used military action to suppress the group (Nwankwo, 2017).

Religion is vital to the growth of terrorism in Nigeria. It causes violence and violence response (Omale, 2013). Scholars have claimed that while globalization assists the purchase of weapons and explosive in the international market, religion played a significant role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (Ajibola, 2015; Olomjobi, 2013). The Boko Haram terrorism developed from Islamic fanatical ideology and practice. The group aims at establishing a religious state ruled by Sharia despite the secularity of the Nigerian state. The group abhors Western Education and denounces democracy (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013; Ukase, 2015).

Boko Haram. The term *Boko Haram* is a Hausa word which means ‘education is forbidden’ (Odo, 2015; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016; Oyewole, 2013). The name is a media construct as it is not a name given by the leaders and founder of the group (Odo, 2015). The sect is also called Yusufiyah, which means Yusuf’s movement, named after the founder. Besides, Boko Haram group is connected with the name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad which means people who are in the way of the Prophet (Adesina, 2013; Onapajo, 2013; Udama, 2013). The exact time of the Boko Haram emergence has not been agreed upon by scholars, and some claimed it emerged in 1995 under different names led by Abubakar Lawan (Adesina, 2013; Onapajo, 2013). Others claimed it appeared in 2002 when some disenchanted students from the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bayero University Kano, Bauchi, University of Maiduguri and Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria met with Mohammed Yusuf and founded a preaching association which afterwards metamorphosed into the extremist Islamic sect, Boko Haram terrorist group (Adesina, 2013; Onapajo, 2013; Onuoha, 2014; Udama, 2013).

The membership of the group is majorly from all the states of the northern region of Nigeria (Onapajo, 2013; Omotosho, 2015). They include the unemployed youths, the university lecturers, the undergraduates, migrants from neighboring countries and few elites of the society (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Onapajo, 2013; Omotosho, 2015). Other members of the group are the drop-outs who were members of the Quranic School set up by the sect. Instructively, some Nigerian politicians who are from the northern part of the country have been indicted as members of the group (Odo, 2015; Omotoso, 2012). The group has its leadership. At the start of the group, Mohammed Yusuf was the leader who was allegedly killed by the Nigerian police in July 2009 while in police detention (Oarhe, 2013; Odo, 2015; Omotoso, 2012). After his death, Mallam Sanni Umaru became Boko Haram acting leader (Oarhe, 2013; Odo, 2015; Omotoso, 2012; Omotosho, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Onapajo, 2013).

Since then, the group has passed through the phase of identity and ideology, and many had laid claim to its leadership (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Onapajo, 2013). Presently, Mallam Abubakar Shekau is the leader of the sect who has been reportedly killed by the Nigerian security forces several times (Oyeniyi, 2014; Udama, 2013). In 2002 when its preaching mission, it was nonviolent. Its aim was the implementation of Sharia law (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014; Oyeniyi, 2014; Oyewole, 2013; Udama, 2013). Contrary to the widespread claim in the media, that Boko Haram merely abhors Western education, the ideology of the sect is the total opposition to Western culture and civilization (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Onapajo, 2013; Oyeniyi, 2014). The group believes that Western education is a product of Western culture that corrupts

Muslims and the society, and it is an impediment to an Islamic political order (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014; Okoro, 2014; Oyeniya, 2014; Oyewole, 2013; Udama, 2013; Sani 2011).

The group distances itself from government and private establishment which it considers as instruments of Western culture (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). The group also conceives state authorities as agents of Westernization or Western culture which presents the West as agent a significant factor in the socialization of Western ideas and hinders a Muslim faithful from observing daily prayers (Blanchard, 2016; Nweke, 2014; Whitlock, (Ed.), 2014). Boko Haram considers individuals in governments as unbelievers and infidels (Blanchard, 2016; Nweke, 2014). However, it does not have any gross with the general public but government authorities except the general public that supports the government (Aderonke, 2015; Adibe, 2014). The sect warns the public from being close to the politicians and security agents because they are behind the illegalities and atrocities in the society (Aderonke, 2015; Adibe, 2014; Adora, 2010). The Boko Haram terrorist group perceives the people of the southern region of Nigeria as enemies because of their acceptance and promotion of the Western culture in Nigeria (Afoaku, 2017; Sani, 2011).

The main aim of the Boko Haram sect is the establishment of a social, political order based on Sharia law. The group advocates a traditional Islamic order mainly based on the teaching of the Quran and Sunnah as conceived by the first generation of Muslim faithful (Aderonke, 2015; Adibe, 2014; Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014; Adora, 2010; Oyeniya, 2014; Oyewole, 2013; Udama, 2013). The sect advocated an independent political system that will be characterized by a modern state such as territory,

government, population, and economic base but governed by Islamic tenets and ideology (Sanmi, 2011). The financial system of its society would be based on farming and trading and would be different from the modern economic system based on capitalism (Omotosho, 2015).

Scholars have explored reasons for individuals' engagement in terrorism, and they have come up with different explanations to justify terrorism behaviors (Azumah, 2015; Okoro, 2014). Some viewed motivation for terrorism as a product psychopathological syndrome (Azumah, 2015; Chinwokwu, 2013). This means that those who engage in terrorism have some level of insanity or abnormal personality traits. However, Silke, (2004) and Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) have established that individual terrorists have sense like any other human being and therefore the reason of psychopathology may not suffice as it will produce disappointing outcomes. Given the disappointing outcome of the psychopathology justification for terrorist activities, some scholars have concluded that terrorist behavior is a combination of some factors ranging from personal, socio-environmental factors (Borum, 2004).

Based on the above thesis, motivations for terrorist behavior may include poor parental upbringing, poverty, lack of education, relative deprivation, and socioeconomic circumstances (Borum, 2004; Okoro, 2014). Several reasons may inform terrorism behavior which is categorized into ideological, personnel and obligatory (Borum, 2004; Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba, & Stiegler, 2014; Omale, 2013; Sanni, 2011). The individual belief system may inform the motivation for terrorist behavior. Others may get involved

in terrorist activities for personal reasons which could be pecuniary, revenge seeking, honor or to promote societal ideals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Okoro, 2014).

Boko Haram Ideological Factor

The preaching and ideology of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf informed the ideology of the Boko Haram terrorist group. Mohammed Yusuf was a brilliant Islamic scholar and preacher who was tutored by Sheik Jafar Mohammed, in Kano state, Nigeria (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Okoro, 2014). He was, however, killed on the eve of Nigerian general elections in 2009. Before his death, he disagreed with his teacher, Sheik Jafar Mohammed, over doctrinal issues (Onuoha, 2014; Oyewole, 2013; Sani, 2011). According to Oyewole, (2013) and Smith, (2015) Mohammed Yusuf's ideology predicated upon a strong opposition to the philosophy and principles of Western culture because he saw the Nigerian state as an appendage of Western culture and civilization. As a result, he and his followers distanced themselves from the government and disregarded constituted authority by disobeying the law of the land (Oyewole, 2013; Smith, 2015). Mohammed Yusuf and his followers believed that they would rather die than to submit to the corrupt government (Sani, 2011; Okoro, 2014). Against this backdrop, the group developed an animosity against the Nigerian state and clashed on some occasions with the security forces (Ikezue & Ezeah, 2015; Odo, 2015).

The bloody event that led to the death of some of the Boko Haram members in July 2009 was because of their refusal to obey the new law made by the Borno State government (Odo, 2015; Okai, 2015). The new law mandates all motorcyclists to use crash element, but Boko Haram refused to comply with the law on the account that the

law was illegal (Odo, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Siegle, 2013). In the attempt to enforce the law, a violent encounter ensued between the government security forces and the Boko Haram sect. The security forces shut some of its members and arrested many, but the group later mobilized in a reprisal attack which led to the death of some security forces and some innocent civilians (Odo, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Siegle, 2013). This violent rapidly spread to other parts of the country as Boko Haram members unleashed terror on people in solidarity with their members in Maiduguri, Borno state of Nigeria (Gusau, 2009; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016).

The Nigerian government, in response to their attacks, cracked down on the sect by arresting their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and summarily killed him with some of their members (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Oyewole, 2013). According to Crenshaw (1981), people take to terrorism because they want to retaliate on behalf of their members. This is evident in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. As a result of the massive clampdown on the members of the sect by the government forces resulting into the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, in July 2009 and the killing of many of the group prominent members, some Muslims in the northeast shaved their beard to avoid being killed or arrested by the security forces as Muslims were being mistaken as Boko Haram members (Sanni, 2011). Sequel to the horrendous killing of the sect members by the security forces, important members of the Boko Haram group determined to hit back on the government, and to make the country ungovernable (Gusau, 2009; Sanni, 2011). It was explained that Abubakar Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf's deputy vowed to retaliate the

killing of their members and to use guerrilla tactics against the government (Gambrel, 2011).

Accordingly, the Boko Haram became violent in retaliation for the perceived injustice against their members (Okoro, 2014). Some became members of the group because of the monetary rewards (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). Abdul Rasheed Abubakar who was arrested by the police confessed that he was attracted to the group because of financial inducement (Onapajo, 2013; Onuoha, 2014; Whitlock, (Ed.), 2014). He claimed that a sum of US\$ 500 was paid to him by the group before he could be trained as bomb specialist in Afghanistan with another promise that another \$3500 would be pay to him if could return for more training (Ibrahim, 2011; Odo, 2015; Ori, 2009). Mohammed Manga who carried out the suicide bombing at the headquarters of the Nigerian police confessed to receiving 4 million Naira, about US \$25400, he later willed to his family members. Some members were attracted to the group because they enjoyed the proceeds of bank attacks carried out by the sect (Ibrahim, 2011; Odo, 2015; Ori, 2009; Salaam, 2013; Sani, 2011). The group's believed that if they robbed banks, the government would pay back the depositors who siphoned government funds (Ibrahim, 2011; Salaam, 2013).

The failing state of the Nigerian nation created the opportunity for the Boko Haram sect to recruit members (Agbibo, 2014; Nweke, 2014; Udama, 2013). The inability of the Nigerian government to provide basic necessity of life, positive political good, and good governance give platforms for the sect to indoctrinate weak minds and get them recruited into their group (Nweke, 2014; Udama, 2013). The good governance includes the provision of adequate security, healthcare, employment opportunities,

education and legal framework for governance. The apparent failure of the government created a situation whereby the citizens see the government as having lost legitimacy, and this produced a situation of lawlessness characterized by intense violence directed against the state (Ibrahim, 2011; Odo, 2015; Ori, 2009; Salaam, 2013; Sani, 2011). There is a high-level corruption in Nigeria as politicians and civil servants siphoned state resources at will to enrich themselves and oppress the poor (Odo, 2015; Ori, 2009). Different regimes became irresponsible to demands of the citizenry (Odo, 2015). The transition from the military government to democratic rule in 1999 has not helped matter as it has increased rates unemployment and poverty in Nigeria (Onapajo, 2013; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). According to World Bank report, Nigerian citizens live in abject poverty (Gabriel, 2014; Nweke, 2014; The World Bank, 2017). The general discontent from the army of the unemployed youths created disaffection and disloyalty among the citizenry (Onapajo, 2013; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012).

The religious bodies and non-state actors capitalized on the poor economic situation to indoctrinate the poor masses as they intervene to ameliorate their suffering and also used it to advance their selfish interest (Ibrahim, 2011; Odo, 2015; Ori, 2009; Salaam, 2013; Sani, 2011). These individuals exploited the porosity of the Nigeria borders to smuggle firearms into the country to arm the political thugs and intimidate their political opponents (Gusau, 2009; Odo, 2015). This situation has driven the nation's citizens into severe economic stress and hardship (Gusau, 2009; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016; Salaam, 2013). Within this context, Boko Haram manipulated the weak minds in northern Nigeria by offering them economic and social reliefs (Odo, 2015; Salaam,

2013). As already argued, some poor individuals were motivated by monetary gains. This position was supported by the Presidential Committee's report on the danger of Boko Haram where the factors of poverty and unemployment were highlighted as motivators for the group membership recruitment (Ikuomola, 2011; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016; Udama, 2013).

Inadequate security and reactive nature of the security forces in the country was vital to the growth of the group in Nigeria (Aderibigbe & Olla, 2014; Salaam, 2013). Some Islamic clerics and community leaders provided early warnings and information to the police and the government on the potential threat of the group but were ignored (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Stern, 2003). The lack of response to warnings caused the preventable clash between the security forces in July 2009 (Aderibigbe & Olla, 2014). Aderibigbe and Olla affirmed that the Department of State Services provided security intelligence to the federal government but not used. The intelligence report submitted to the government on Mamman Nur who organized the bombing of the United Nations in August 2011 was treated with levity. They claimed that, Mamman Nur was arrested by the Department of State Services based on the security intelligence but was later released by the government of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua shortly after his arrest (Aderibigbe & Olla, 2014). The apparent weakness in Nigeria's security apparatus gave rise to Boko Haram terrorism in the country (Aderibigbe & Olla, 2014; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Okai, 2015; Stern, 2003). There was no effective intelligence coordination to provide proactive intelligence in the bud terror attacks (Adesina, 2013; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Okai, 2015).

The impact of globalization in the northern part of the country, a predominantly Muslim area has been theatrical especially on its conservatism (Omotoso, 2012; Omotosho, 2015; Onuoha, 2014). The new waves of foreign cultures into the country through globalization gave rise to new social development in the northern part of Nigeria that negatively affected its traditional core values (Okai, 2015; Omotoso, 2012; Omotosho, 2015; Onuoha, 2014; Oyewole, 2013; Sani, 2011). The new age of technology as seen in video and cinema advanced liberalization of the media and challenged the Islamic culture that has been predominant in the area (Adesina, 2013; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Sani, 2011). This increased the disgust for Western culture in the northeastern part of Nigeria; a development significantly motivated some Muslims to join the Boko Haram sect and informed the call for the implementation of Islamic society (Adesina, 2013; Okai, 2015; Nyuykonge & Osai, 2016; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Oyewole, 2013; Sani, 2011). The trend explains why the group sees Western culture as the cause of social vices in the society as well as their hatred for it. Globalization also assisted the linkage of the group with the foreign terror group such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia and Taliban in Afghanistan where some of Boko Haram members trained in bomb-making (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Salaam, 2013; Smith, 2015). Consequently, many fanatical and radical Islamic preachers expressed this hatred to this development (Adesina, 2013; Okai, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2013; Sani, 2011).

Global perspective of counterterrorism. Counterterrorism measures vary globally because terrorism environments are not the same. As forces behind terrorism vary, the means to fight terrorism will also not be the same (Crelinsten, 2009). The

measures to combat terrorism from country to country may not be the same, and they may include anti-terrorism laws, counterterrorism institutions, funds as well as personnel (Crelinsten, 2009; Okai, 2015; Okeke, 2005). This position is supported by Chailand (1987) that counterterrorism in a form of reaction to address terrorism. Richardson (2011) argued in favor of this position that government can tackle terrorism only when it has understood the factors that caused it. Kundnani (2015) suggested the need for policy makers to understand the cause of terrorism before they develop or implement counterterrorism policies. He added that counterterrorism measures should comprise of hard and soft approaches such as of military action, intelligence gathering, preventive actions and police investigation (Kundnani, 2015). The position is further supported by Hoeft (2015) when he argued that soft approach is crucial in counterterrorism but military action only necessary when terrorists defy soft approach. He, however, observed that counterterrorism measures of a particular country might not be effective in another (Hoeft, 2015).

In their analysis of counterterrorism, Lum, Kennedy, and Sherly (2006) claimed that counterterrorism should be all encompassing to include prevention, detection, intelligence gathering, and hardening of terrorist targets. According to Amy (2014) and Dasuki (2013), the federal government of Nigeria has adopted these counterterrorism strategies. Consequently, this study will adopt the definition of Stepanova (2003) who submitted that counterterrorism and anti-terrorism cannot be separated as this rightly speaks of the situation in Nigeria. In his definition, he explained that counterterrorism is a security task carried out by the security forces of a country or international authority

while antiterrorism involved the use of the legal instrument, political and economic measures and other peace-building mechanisms to prevent and counter terrorism.

Therefore, the concepts of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism will mean the same in this study and will be used as a single definition (Purpura, 2007).

The success of any counterterrorism effort of any government lies in the measures adopted. The approach comprises of the use soft power and hard power. The soft power includes the use of public awareness lecture and education, economic reforms, good governance, and advocacy initiatives while hard power entails the use of the military, law enforcement measures, and law courts (Crelinsten, 2009). The use of both soft and hard powers has been valuable in the counterterrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Uduonwa, 2013). The military approach to counterterrorism will involve the use of military force, peacekeeping operation, and military aid to the civilian population and to equip military (Kielsgard, 2006). The non-military measure is different from hard power as it entails the use persuasive methods to address the cause of terrorism (Crelinsten, 2009; Kielsgard, 2006). While causes of terrorism may be similar but across states and nations it may manifest in different forms, and this may inform the different counterterrorism strategies (Brown 2008; Richardson, 2011). It may involve relations with allies, economic assistance, and deradicalization initiatives (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2015). However, in whatever model that is applied, intelligence is sacrosanct as counterterrorism is intelligence driven (Bobbitt, 2008).

The counterterrorism approach of the United Nations stands on 5Ds of dissuading, denying, deterring, developing and defending (United Nations, 2006). The model aims at

discouraging individuals from resorting or supporting terrorism, denying is to prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks, deterring is to make it difficult for a state to support terrorism. The concept of developing is to build state capacity to fight terrorism while defending aims at protecting human rights (United Nations, 2006). In support of the United Nations' approach, Onuoha and Uwgueze (2014) advocated a uniform counterterrorism approach because they believed that terrorism had become a global threat (Crelinsten, 2009; Gambari, 2006; Hallett, 2004). The refusal of terrorists to agree that they are terrorists and the differences in the perception of terrorism across nations, uniform counterterrorism approach suffers globally (Bobbitt, 2008; Hashmen, 2004). However, because the United Nations' model is all-encompassing, some scholars on counterterrorism have suggested the model across counties (Briggs, Fieshi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; Bobbitt, 2008; Kielsgard, 2006; Taşpinar, 2009). Accordingly, Gambari (2006), Hoeft, (2015), and Primoratz (2004) advocated a multilateral approach based on the principle of the 5Ds and the importance of cooperation among the regional bodies. They suggested that their respective strategies must agree with and not contradict the principles of the 5Ds (Gambari, 2006; Hoeft, 2015; & Primoratz, 2004). This view was corroborated by Richardson (2006) who suggested that cooperation and synergy among global and regional organization as well as among countries are vital to any thriving counterterrorism effort.

In recognition, of the multilateral approach, Kielsgard (2006) argued for an integrated approach based on the principle of the UN strategy that will comprise of the military, law enforcement, and human rights. Crelinsten, (2009) supported the view of

Kielsgard but stressed the concepts of coercive, proactive, persuasive and defensive counter-terrorism (Crelinsten, 2009) while Hoefts (2015) argued in favour of soft approach to counterterrorism which will involve the elements of radicalisation, counter-radicalisation, and deradicalisation but submitted that this model cannot adequately address terrorism. Primoratz (2004) did not emphasize either the use of soft or hard approach but explained that it is the duty of any society bedeviled with terrorism to enact and enforce laws, develop and implement policies, initiate political will to combat terrorism.

According to Chaliand (1987), terrorism needs to be curtailed at the initial stage before progressing to guerrilla, but if it cannot be stopped at the initial stage, he recommended counterterrorism actions that can reduce its activities at the early guerrilla stage. The counterterrorism measures include intelligence gathering, military action, blocking the logistic supply to the terrorists and dissuading the citizens from being sympathetic with the terrorists (Chaliand, 1987). This position supports the counterterrorism model of soft and hard power. In analyzing terrorism in the United Kingdom Briggs et al. (2006) argued for a community-based approach that will involve the Muslims in the decision-making process having concluded that the Muslims are causing terrorism in the United Kingdom. This approach, however, does not support any military action against terrorism on the British soil. This approach may create a kind of disquiet among the Muslims because they may question the rationale behind the assumption that they are terrorists.

Gupta (2004) rejected the idea of entirely relying on military action. Gupta argued that terrorist activities are executed in groups with operating cells. He advocated for ideology as an option to support military actions which are accomplished through good governance, education and promotion of positive cultural values through the media that tackles terrorism's causes (Gupta, 2004). However, it might be difficult to conclude that the roots of terrorism may be entirely addressed because terrorism is a global issue and therefore, will require a military approach to tackle the radical terrorists. The world is presently grappling with the threat of terrorism as it has become a global threat. This has informed the development and implementation of different counterterrorism policies in different countries of the world.

Counterterrorism efforts in Kenya and Algeria need to be studied because it has led to the adoption of different strategies (Mohochi, 2011). The terrorist activities in these two countries are similar to the operations of Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. Kenya has recorded some terrorist attacks from the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization since 1975 (Mohochi, 2011). On August 7th, 1998, the Al-Shabaab terrorists claimed the responsibility of the bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi and the suicide bombing of a hotel in Kikambala (Mohochi, 2011; Shinn, 2011; Amnesty International, Kenya, 2005). In a joint operation between Kenyan and Somaliland, the military had been able to prevent many of the Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks (Clarke & Lekalake, 2016; Megged, 2015). The British Broadcasting Corporation report in 2014, reported that the membership of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group is about 25% Kenyans and 75% a combination of Afghanistan, Iraqis and other foreigners (Clarke & Lekalake, 2016;

Megged, 2015; United States Department of State, 2016). Other attacks, by the Al-Shabaab group, included the attack at the Garrisa University College where about 145 people, majorly students lost their lives (Shinn, 2011), and the attack on 21st September 2013 at West Gate shopping mall (Megged, 2015).

The counterterrorism approach of the Kenyan government has been a combination of soft and hard methods. The government of Kenya has employed military and non-military approaches (Clarke & Lekalake, 2016; Megged, 2015). The Kenyan's counterterrorism policy encompasses legal reforms, capacity building of the government forces, bilateral and multilateral collaborations (Mohochi, 2011). In 1998, the Kenyan military created the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit deployed to man Kenyan/ Somalia border, pre-military training for Kenyan youths to facilitate easy manpower access during attacks, started the building of the perimeter fence to provide physical security at the Somali border and made more budgetary provision for defense (Mohochi, 2011). The government also created the Joint Terrorism Task Force (Megged, 2015; Mohochi, 2011).

The Kenyan's government non-military model includes the formulation of the local security policy which encourages the participation of the people at the community level to provide information on the suspicious individuals in their area (Mohochi, 2011). The use of Muslim preachers to preach messages devoid of violence or Islamic radicalism as well as the confiscation of all assets belonging to those who are sympathetic to Al-Shabaab to thwart money laundering (Megged, 2015). The government also ensured collaboration between the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance and the National Security Intelligence Service. The Kenyan government established the National

Counterterrorism Centre, and in 2003, passed the Terrorism Suppression Act (Mohochi, 2011).

However, there has been the allegation that the Kenyan government counterterrorism policies have been concentrated primarily in areas with higher Muslim population (Mohochi, 2011). There has been the report of human right abuses by the government like detention without trial, harassment of the suspects and torture of the detainees, and prevention of access by family members to the detained suspects (Amnesty International, Kenya, 2005). The allegation may not be easy to establish because the arrests were only made based on the suspects' involvement in terrorist activities (Schweitzer & Shaul, 2003).

Algeria has also been in the history of terrorism (Botha, 2008). Organizations like Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Islamic Liberation Front and its successor Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been acknowledged as terrorist organizations in Algeria (Abdalla, 2011). A number of these organizations affiliate to what is currently called Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and this must have informed the claim of Torelli (2013) that the know-how of counterterrorism emanated from GSPC and after that AQIM.

The Algerian counterterrorism policies are a combination of hard and soft power strategies. The elements of the hard approaches were the formation of inter-departmental task force saddled with the responsibility to suppress terrorism, the establishment of military intelligence service, the extension of the detention period extended, and the reduction of criminal liability age to 16 years (Hasan, Hendricks, Jansen, & Meijer, 2012;

Torelli, 2013). It also includes an increase in the award of death penalty, military onslaught against the terrorists and apparent military deployment of about 4,000 to provide security at the Tunisian border , 75,000 at South Eastern border, and 50,000 at the Libyan borders (Hasan et al., 2012; United States Department of State, 2016). The elements of the Algerian government's soft power approach are the deradicalization of the repentant Islamist militants and their encouragement to condemn terrorism openly; granting of amnesty to terrorists; provision of employment opportunities for the unemployed youths in government to preventing them from terrorism and engagement of the young ones in the military (Hasan et al., 2012).

Other elements include the monitoring of sermons by Islamic clerics to prevent extreme behavior in the society and the enactment anti-terrorism laws for the prosecution of terrorist suspects (Hasan et al., 2012). The Algerian anti-terrorism law also increases the detention period to 12 days and specifies how to collaborate with foreign countries (Hasan et al., 2012; The Law Library of Congress, 2015). The Algiers Criminal Court has prosecuted about 62 terrorism cases, and under the amnesty program, pardoned 90000 terrorists, while the military killed or captured nearly 157 terrorists, seized arms, and ammunition as well as drugs from them (Radio Algerie, 2014). The Algerian counterterrorism approaches have achieved significant outcomes; however, some works still have to be done (Radio Algerie, 2014).

Just like Algeria and Kenya, the Nigerian government has implemented the soft and hard power approaches. In its military strategy, the Nigerian's government deployed troops to the crisis' area of the northeast, created the 7th division of the army and moved

the military commanders to the war theatre (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Okai, 2015). The security forces have been trained in terrorist operations (Azumah, 2015; Chinwokwu, 2013). The adoption of the non-military approaches is the enactment of Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, increased collaboration among the Nigerian security forces and foreign security agencies and increased funding for the security operations (Campbell, 2014; Ikenna, 2016; Onuoha, 2014). In spite of the laudable achievements by the Nigerian government in her counterterrorism efforts, Nigeria has, however, been accused of human right abuses such as illegal detention, indiscriminate killings and improper feeding of people at the IDPs camps (Ojeme, 2016; Onuoha, 2014; Mohammed, 2014).

The literature review indicates that counterterrorism approaches should be a combination of hard and soft approaches (Ikuomola, 2011; Isyaku, 2013; Kielsgard, 2006; Malkki, 2016; Nacos, 2006). The Nigerian government has adopted both approaches (soft and hard) (Nweke, 2014; Oarhe, 2013; Odo, 2015). Therefore, understanding the degree of these strategies is vital to this study.

Counterterrorism Policy towards Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Counterterrorism policy has two main aims to defeat the threat of terrorism and to make it difficult for terrorists and their allies to carry out terrorist attacks (DoD, 2006). The Nigerian government has put in place some strategies to fight terrorism in the country. Some approaches have been successful while some have not (DoD, 2006; Dasuki, 2013; Jideofor, 2014). The strategies included the development, application, and coordination of instruments of national power such as military, diplomatic, economic, and information and could be divided into two main strands of strategic and tactical

(Ikenna, 2016; Onuoha, 2014). The Boko Haram terrorist group has lost its safe haven in the northeast as the group cannot still hold on to any territory in Nigeria. Many of the members including its leadership have been killed. The community has rallied together with the security forces to fight terrorism (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). The local population voluntarily cooperates with the law enforcement, military, and the intelligence agencies by volunteering information. Those who gave tacit support to the terrorist group have realized the danger of their actions and now part of the solution.

The strategic counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government has been strengthened with the creation of the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) with the primary responsibility of developing a holistic framework for the nation's counterterrorism engagement (Dasuki, 2013; Jideofor, 2014; Hassan, 2014). Harmonization of existing and contradictory legislations, such as the Financial Crimes Law and Anti-Money Laundry Law that aim at addressing terrorism financing and other lacunae (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015; Traister, 2013). The government reformed the Nigerian criminal justice system to address the issues of terrorism investigations, prosecutions, trial delays, witness protection and protection of judges. The National Assembly promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act 2011 which was amended in 2013 (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015; Traister, 2013). The Nigeria government strengthened the bilateral and multilateral engagements with friendly countries at the sub-regional, regional, continental and global levels (Dasuki, 2013). The cooperation between Nigeria and her immediate neighbors of Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon, led to the establishment of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), with Headquarters in Abuja (Aderonke, 2015). Through this mechanism,

intelligence services of these five countries shared timely intelligence pertinent to tactical operational needs.

The tactical counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government included the establishment of Joint Task Forces and the Multi-National Joint Task Force, this body is currently headed by a Nigerian Military General (Dasuki, 2013; Ewa, 2017;). There was the creation of an additional Nigerian Army Division (7th Division) with the headquarters in Maiduguri in the northeast to fight the terrorist group (Akinbi, 2015; Blanchard, 2016; Dasuki, 2013; Ewa, 2017; Onapajo, 2017). Consequently, significant contingents of the military and military equipment were moved into the theatre of operations in the North-east (Ewa, 2017; Onapajo, 2017). The government encouraged joint training exercises among its various security forces (Campbell, 2014). The government established special intelligence cells to facilitate timely exchange and sharing of real-time actionable intelligence for tactical operations (Campbell, 2014). Intelligence collection and dissemination was fused through synergy among security and defense services (Akinbi, 2015; Dasuki, 2013).

The government pronounced a six-month state of emergency in the three (3) worst hit northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in May 2013, to engender clinical counterterrorism military operations in the affected areas (Idahosa, 2015; Murtala & Abubakar, 2017). The state of emergency was extended further for six-month periods in November 2013 and May 2014 while attempt to its extension was rebuffed by the National Assembly (Idahosa, 2015; Murtala & Abubakar, 2017). The Nigerian government inaugurated the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful

Resolution of Security Challenges in the northeast to dialogue with the terrorist group. The government also inaugurated the Committee on Proliferation of Small and Light Weapons to mop up firearms from unauthorized hands in circulation (Aderonke, 2015; Akinbi, 2015; Oyeniyi, 2014). The government also set up the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) to address the economic challenges of the area (Dasuki, 2013). More recently, the President Muhammadu Buhari directed the relocation of the Military High Command to Maiduguri to lead the counterterrorism operations; the directive has been complied with (Akinbi, 2015). The Nigeria government also established a counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) under the Chief of Defence Staff (Blanchard, 2016; Oyeniyi, 2014).

The government has facilitated international cooperation and agreements with regional, continental and global authorities (Dasuki, 2013; Fulgence, 2015). Some of the measures that were taken included the government's active participation in the campaign to address the shortcomings of both the 1991 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which came into force in 2002 and the entire international efforts against terrorism (Dasuki, 2013). Nigeria government enlisted the support of some West African countries, to cooperate and collaborate with the US under the aegis of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) (Dasuki, 2013; Fulgence, 2015). The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) is an initiative of the United States State Department to assist in the development of the border capacities of African countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad and combat arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the trans-national terrorists (Archer & Popovic, 2007; Warner, 2014).

At the regional level, the countries in the West African sub-region under the auspices of ECOWAS, the sub-regional body, have domesticated most of the international legislations relating to counter-terrorism (Dasuki, 2013; Fulgence, 2015). Also, the sub-regional body held several meetings to harmonize the sub-region's response to terrorism in West Africa (Fulgence, 2015; Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba, & Stiegler, 2014). Nigeria entered into bilateral agreements with all her neighboring countries of Chad, Benin Republic, and Niger to ensure cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism and currently, there are joint-border patrols among these countries especially along illegal routes in their common borders (Adetula, 2015; Fulgence, 2015).

Nigeria government entered into agreements with other countries in Africa to acquire and share security intelligence to assist the Boko Haram counterterrorism operations (Ibekwe, 2014; Mobolaji & Alabi, 2017). The Nigerian government has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and agreements with the Security and Intelligence Services of other countries like Algeria, Niger Republic, Chad Republic, Benin Republic, Cameroon, Togo and Mali (Fulgence, 2015; Ibekwe, 2014; Yohannes, 2017).

Nigeria became a founding member of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), a counter-terrorism body co-chaired by the United States and Turkey that brings together a wide variety of nations to discuss ways and share strategies to stop terrorism (Owete, 2014; Yohannes, 2017). Presently, Nigeria is working in collaboration with international bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, (AU), European Union (EU), UK's DFID and the United

Nations (UN) to examine the global dimensions of the terrorist challenges in the country. These consultations and collaborations have helped to provide a better understanding of terrorism, and Nigeria has received advice and assistance in capacity building through bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Kolawole, 2017).

Despite these efforts, Boko Haram terrorist attack is still on the increase (Akpan, et al., 2014). The reasons being that the terror group has been sent out of Sambisa forest and other places where it hitherto occupied, the group's members are now more dispersed (Campbell, 2014; Kolawole, 2017). However, the group or terrorist organization is organized in small cells to carry out terror attacks (Kolawole, 2017). Presently, the Nigerian government is finding it difficult to prevent or thwart all terror attacks in the northeast of the country even with the improvement in security emplacement both in the air and land (Akpan et al., 2014; Kolawole, 2017; Omale, 2014). The Boko Haram group has easy access to weapons due to the porous nature of the country and the terror group's capacity to make and use improvised explosives which are difficult to detect (Hassan, 2014; Herskovits, 2012; Onapajo, 2017). The advances in technology have aided the group to spread its propaganda, enlist members and train them in terrorist activities (Azumah, 2015; Bamidele, 2013; Herskovits, 2012). As a result of this, the government needs to provide a comprehensive policy to fight Bok Haram terrorism and the security forces to be cognizant of the skills and capacity required to protect the country.

The counterterrorism strategies must be integrated and synchronized through a collaborative effort which will involve a long-term and short-term approach to win Boko Haram terror war (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). The long-term strategy will aim at

good governance and representative democracy that will guarantee political inclusion because terrorism mainly shoots out from misinformation, non-inclusiveness, political alienation, and murderous ideology. The short-term approach must prevent attacks by Boko Haram terrorist networks, deny the group of access to weapons, disallow support from other terrorist group or rogue states, and deny the sect of any territory within the country.

The counterterrorism policy which is to be coordinated and incorporated must be based on a certain set of responsibility's standards (DoD, 2013). The counterterrorism policy is to provide a holistic framework to include both the soft and hard powers approaches. The synchronization of the approaches will spell out the duty and responsibilities of every individual as well as the security agency involved in the counterterrorism effort to provide effective counterterrorism efforts (DoD, 2013). The counterterrorism policy will also outline the standards such as the intelligence gathering, protection of targets, coordination among agencies of government, the role of non-government organizations and media, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenders and the role of the government (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016).

The policy should be holistic that will involve the promulgation of comprehensive counterterrorism law, the development of the counterterrorism capabilities of the security forces, the strengthening of the multinational forces, and the provision of basic needs for the Nigerian people by the government. The counterterrorism policy must build the capacities to detect, delay, respond to terrorist attacks, and prevent terrorist communication (Alemika, 2013; DoD, 2013). The country counterterrorism policy is to be

risk-based (Vanderlinden, 2014; Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). Counterterrorism policy must be flexible, provide detail information that will put into consideration the probability of attacks and response mechanisms (Agboola, 2014; Ancker, 2001; Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016).

Counterterrorism Policy Process in Nigeria

The extents of policies made by any state policies determine its sustainability or failure (Anyaegbunam, 2012). A policy is a tool through which a state is steered (Anyaegbunam, 2012). The Nigerian constitution of 1999 described security and welfare as the core responsibilities of the country (Anyaegbunam, 2012).

The development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram is potentially a path to active counterterrorism effort, peace, and security, and reduction of the threat of terrorism (DoD, 2013). Effective counterterrorism strategic provided a framework for tackling the terrorist and extremist threat that serves as an institutional system that brings all key stakeholders in government and civil society organizations together in a collaborative approach to take preventive, repressive and restorative measures for combating the threat of terrorism (Omale, 2013). A strategy is a comprehensive approach premised on the anticipated threat situation rather than reactive to address terrorism.

Nigeria is practicing a presidential system of government where the three arms of government are involved in the policy process (Anyaegbunam, 2012). The executive arm executes, enforces and coordinates government policies to ascertain that they are implemented as designed or planned (Anyaegbunam, 2012, FGN, 2009). The executive arm comprises of security agencies, public servants, and civil servant. The legislature

(National Assembly) makes the law and may overrule any decision from any of the security agencies by repealing laws, and this may affect implementation (Eneanya, 2009; Oni, 2013). The judiciary interprets policies especially when it comes to their specific application (Eneanya, 2009). The National Assembly plays significant roles in the deployment of the troops and funds allocation for the counterterrorism operations as prescribed by the Nigerian constitution (Anyaegbunam, 2012).

The government can terminate or modify a policy that has or has not achieved its purpose. A policy can be to come to an end abruptly due to evaluation outcome or modification of the system (Abgbor & Bassey, 2015). Consequently, the policy cycle goes on in that form. Scientific researchers who consult for the government, courts and the parliament and international watchdogs can conduct the monitoring and evaluation (Fashagha, 2009). The oversight function of the legislature - National Assembly is a good example (Fashagba, 2009).

Nigeria government has made many commendable policies, but the issue is usually with successful implementation (Abgbor & Bassey, 2015; Fashagba, 2009). The challenge associated with this is lack of political will to policy implementation, inadequate workforce, ethnocentric dispositions, corruption, scarce resources, as misplaced priorities, as well as the multiplicity of policies to tackle similar issues (Bodunde et al., 2014; Kundnani, 2015). In policy process, the policy statement is significant because it described the intention of a government which may be in the form of presidential orders, administrative rules and statutes, regulations, legislative statutes,

and court opinions. Policy process involves a combination of inputs from the three arms of government; the legislature, executive, and judiciary (Anyaegbunam, 2012).

The manifestation of the Boko Haram terrorist made the Nigerian government to make some policy decisions to fight the sect (Dasuki, 2013; Ewa, 2017; Idowu, 2013). These measures which were carried out by the government were implemented, monitored and evaluated for the purpose of modifications to suit current situations that bring to fore the importance of making a holistic review of the functions of the arms of government in the policy process so as to have an in-depth understanding of the counter-terrorism policy process in Nigeria. The three arms of government are essential in the policy process. The Nigerian federal constitution of 1999 section 305 allows the president to make some orders which may or may not need the consent of the National Assembly (Akinola & Tella, 2013; Akpan et al., 2014). For example, the president can declare a state of emergency anywhere if he discovers a threat to the security and peace of the country, but this declaration must secure the approval of the two-thirds majority of the parliament, however, if such proclamation fails to receive the support of the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it ceases to exist (Anyaegbunam, 2012; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

The constitution permits the state of emergency for the first six months, but if the situation remains or peace is not restored, it can be extended by the president for another six months but requires the approval of the National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). In May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states which was extended two times but

rejected by the National Assembly for the fourth times (Jideofor, 2012; 2014). The continued attacks by Boko Haram after the 18 months of the emergency rule necessitated the request for the extension of the emergency rule (Dasuki, 2013). The non-approval of the emergency rule by the National Assembly was as a result of an evaluation of the earlier ones through an oversight function (Dasuki, 2013; Fashagba, 2009).

The policy of the suspension of telephone communication through the military in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe state in a bid to decimate the Boko Haram was a delegated policy (Abgbor & Bassey, 2015; Onapajo, 2017). This was a policy made, executed, monitored and evaluated by the military. The drafting of National Counterterrorism Strategy policy documents had inputs from the security agencies, National Defence Council and National Security Council and Ministry of Justice (Abgbor & Bassey, 2015). In this situation, the three arms of government were involved in the monitoring and evaluation. Policies such as relocation of the military command center, deployment of troops, and the establishment of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps were strictly through presidential directives as well as administrative rules and regulations (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014).

The legislature played significant roles in the making of laws, the passage of the annual budget, ratifying of international treaties, approval of the declaration of war and state of emergency, and endorsement of foreign loans (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Fashagba, 2009). The Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and its amendment of 2013 were passed by the legislature (Dasuki, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). The need to make Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013 became pertinent from the need

to tackle Boko Haram terrorist group with inputs from the security agencies, National Defence Council and National Security Council and Ministry of Justice before they were sent to the National Assembly for passage (Abgbor & Bassey, 2015). A critical examination of the counter-terrorism policies in Nigeria shows that they were made in response to the Boko Haram menace.

Literature Review Related to Key Concepts

The following provides the literature reviewed relative to key concepts:

Description of Related Studies

In Nigeria, terrorism is a major issue of insecurity which is being confronted with the use of kinetic power by the Nigerian government security forces (Agbibo, 2013). The complex nature of Boko Haram terrorist threat made a single coercive method ineffective (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). Akpan et al. (2014) analyzed the counterterrorism strategies of the Nigerian government, and this analysis is relevant to this study. They described that the challenges of counterterrorism as that of the single coercive method, lack of interagency collaboration and leadership crises, and high-level corruption in the security sector (Akpan et al., 2014). Since government possesses the instrument of coercion, it followed that the use of military power was the path to secure environment and successful counterterrorism effort (Agbibo, 2013). This way of thinking was echoed by many of the literature I reviewed and offered an explanation why Nigerian government is primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

Omale (2013) argued that active counterterrorism effort in Nigeria involves the understanding of the social, political and religious sphere with which terrorists operate

and proposed a holistic approach that will address economic, security and socio-psychological issues in the country. This study showed that impediments to progress in the counterterrorism of Boko Haram continued to exist due to the government reliance on uncoordinated military power, lack of interagency collaboration, high corruption and leadership crisis in government, and human right abuses that prevented partnership between the citizens and the security forces (Omale, 2013). According to Idowu (2013), one of the primary functions of the government is the protection lives and properties of its citizens and other nationals within the country. He argued that the constitutional provisions saddled the government with the responsibility to take care of citizens' welfare, one of the criteria to enjoy their cooperation and loyalty (Idowu, 2013). This aspect of social contract ensures a good relationship between government and people and serves as the foundation for citizens' support (Idowu, 2013). However, due to the primordial nature of human being and government's existence nations are preoccupied with their security and welfare, all concerning self-preservation occasioned by unavoidable threat, chaos, and violence in all nations (Fischer, Halibozek, & Walters, 2012).

Fowoyo, (2013) and Jideofor (2014) examined various attempts by governments worldwide including Nigeria to maintain law and order, peace and security by the enactment of laws and establishing security agencies to ensure the protection of life and property in their jurisdictions. They, however, claimed that these efforts have not yielded the desired result due to factors of human and institutional challenges that require durable solutions (Fowoyo, 2013; Jideofor, 2014). According to them, the nature and complexity

of security threats such as that of Boko Haram terrorist group often hinge on some factors such as quality of governance, quality of administration of justice, the political and socioeconomic environment where they operate, effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, general orientation of the populace, and the interactions between a country and her neighbours (Fowoyo, 2013; Jideofor, 2014).

In Nigeria, the factors mentioned above are quite evident in the threat of Boko Haram terrorist group despite different approaches to address it, all appearing to be insufficient and not viable. This highlights the importance of a practical application of enforcement of policies to ensure appropriate counterterrorism effort and protection of life and properties in Nigeria.

Description of Previous Approaches to the Problem

The reliance on this orthodox approach of the use of force and military hard-power could not be effective because the fight against Boko Haram must be asymmetrical (Onapajo, 2017). However, due to this flawed approach, Boko Haram gained ground and employing guerrilla warfare tactics of hit and run (Akpan et al., 2014; Husted, 2016).

In analyzing government's effort at combating Boko Haram terrorism between 2009 and 2013, former President Olusegun Obasanjo in a letter to his successor, President Goodluck Jonathan, alleged that his passive action against the Boko Haram and poor administrative style of governance failed to promote national security and unity (Obasanjo, 2013). Former President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013 in his response to the letter titled "Before it is too late," claimed that his government had brought the threat of Boko Haram under significant control (Jonathan, 2013). He argued further that his

government had overhauled the nation's security architecture, improved security intelligence gathering mechanism, increased budgetary provision to the military and other security forces, and emphasized security collaboration among the internal security agencies and with neighboring countries (Jonathan, 2013). President Jonathan further averred that the counterterrorism measures of his government were poverty alleviation programs, the establishment of the '*Almajiri*' educational system, and the creation of nine additional universities in the north (Jonathan, 2013). The former President also affirmed that his government initiated a youth empowerment program called 'You win' to address the problem of poverty and youth unemployment in the country and to promote economic development through investment in infrastructural development (Jonathan, 2013).

Bartolotta (2011) observed that the Nigerian government had taken some steps to address the menace of Boko Haram terrorism which included the setting up of the administrative panel to dialogue with the sect; however, the group bluntly refused to enter the discussion with the government team.

Other frameworks with which the counterterrorism policy on Boko Haram is being fought include the strengthening of the military to reinforce the Nigerian internal security operations, and the establishment of Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) saddled with the responsibility of jointly fighting the Boko Haram terrorism (Dasuki, 2013; Jonathan, 2013). The task force headquartered in N'Djamena, Chad Capital city, consists of the military majorly from Nigeria and its neighboring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Sampson, 2015). The Nigerian government also declared the State of Emergency and the imposition of curfew in the affected states, the banning

and unbanning of global system for mobile communication services, and the setting up of roadblocks (Onapajo, 2017).

The Nigeria Federal Constitution outlines the principles of Separation of Power among the three branches of government. The legislative arm, represented by the National Assembly or State Houses of Assembly makes law; the executive arm executes and enforces laws, while the judicial arm interprets the law (Anyaeibunam, 2012, Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). As a result of the constitutional requirement, Nigeria National Assembly appropriates funds to the security forces. The Upper House (Senate) and the Lower House (House of Representatives), determines the funding needs in term of the operations, administration and intelligence gathering of the military and other security forces in the country. Various committees of the National Assembly played significant roles in the deployment of the troops and funds allocation for the counterterrorism operations as prescribed by the Nigerian constitution (Anyaeibunam, 2012; Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999).

Nigerian citizens are interested in the effectiveness of the counterterrorism operations of the security forces (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). For successful implementation of a Boko Haram counterterrorism operation, the military and other security forces under the coordination of the National Security Adviser (NSA) were tasked with the responsibility of developing antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs that will protect all the Nigerian people and other Nigerian stakeholders (Akpan et al., 2014).

An important factor in ensuring effectiveness is by providing a legal framework for the operation through the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011 and the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Act, 2013. Fighting Boko Haram terrorism undoubtedly became a herculean task to security forces because Boko Haram terrorism was new to the Nigerian experience (Omale, 2013). He affirmed further that the Nigerian judicial authorities were also not sufficiently engaged in the adjudication of Boko Haram terrorism (Omale, 2013). The challenges of these approaches are the increased attacks of the Boko Haram terrorist group and the inability of government force to successfully arrest the situation. Researchers have shown that strengthening of government institutions and employing a robust counterterrorism policy is essential to active counterterrorism effort (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Omale, 2013).

For this reason, the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during the years 2009-2015 was reviewed and documented to inform present and future policy that will guarantee a functional outcome.

Justification From Literature for Selection of Concept

Recent studies of counterterrorism strategies revealed that well-articulated counterterrorism policy development and implementation elicits high-level performance and effectiveness implications on counterterrorism efforts (DoD, 2014; Ikuomola, 2011; Isyaku, 2013; Kielsgard, 2006; Malkki, 2016; Nacos, 2006). This is a justification for this study on counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015.

Justification also comes from the research of Lume et al. (2006) who claimed that counterterrorism should be all encompassing to include prevention, detection,

intelligence gathering, and hardening of terrorist targets. Consequently, the success of any counterterrorism strategy lies in the measures adopted. The approach should comprise the use soft power and hard power. The soft power includes the use of public awareness lecture and education, economic reforms, good governance, and advocacy initiatives while hard power entails the use of the military, law enforcement measures, and law courts (Crelinsten, 2009). The methods of both soft and hard powers have been evident in the counterterrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Uduonwa, 2013). The military approach to counterterrorism involves the use of military force, peacekeeping operation, and military aid to the civilian population and to equip military (Kielsgard, 2006).

The primary duty of any responsible government is to ensure the security of its citizens and other nationals residing in its jurisdiction (Nwolise, 2006). The Nigerian Constitution provides that the statutory responsibility of the government to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens (Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The Nigerian government has enacted some laws to address many security problems in the country; however, they appear to be unworkable and inadequate (Idowu, 2013). Right from 1966 when the Nigerian Civil War started, the Federal Government of Nigeria has been proactive in protecting lives and properties of its populace from all forms of crimes (Sani, 2011). After the bombing on June 16, 2011, of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja, the President of the Federal Government of Nigeria gave an order to the Inspector General of Police to reappraise the activities of Boko Haram and curtail the menace nationwide (Bamidele, 2013). More aggressively, Boko Haram continued to commit atrocities and wanton killing of innocent individuals as well as the destruction of

lives and properties in Borno, Bauchi, Kaduna, Niger, Yobe states, and the FCT of Nigeria (Akpan et al., 2014; Akinlade & Ibitoye, 2012; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). The Federal government of Nigeria took some actions to address this security challenge.

The Nigerian state intensified foreign training and re-training for the security forces most especially the Police and military in antiterrorism warfare and bomb detection (Akpan et al., 2014; United States Department of State. 2012). The federal government provided modern and sophisticated technical equipment to fight Boko Haram terrorism (Akpan et al., 2014). The federal government launched a drive to drive to enlist more personnel into all the nation's security agencies (Dasuki, 2013). The federal government increased the deployment of Joint Task Force to the northeastern state of Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Ewa, 2017). The government also, directed the security forces to commence the trial individuals involved in the extrajudicial killing of the former leader of Boko Haram group, Mallam Mohammad Yusuf (Dasuki, 2013; Oladeji et al., 2012; Omale, 2013). The government refused to order the withdrawal of the security forces especially the military from the affected state of the northeast of the country against the request made by some key and opinion leaders of the north due to alleged excessive use of force and flouting of the rules of engagements (Adesote, & Abimbola, 2012; Akinlade, & Ibitoye, 2012; Ogbonnaya, & Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

Other steps were the Nigerian request for understanding from the United Nations Organization and other international organizations that the allegations of the extra-judicial killing by the Nigerian troops deployed to the north-east were being looked into

and those discovered to have been involved in the extra-killing would be charged to court for prosecution (Dasuki, 2013; Oladeji et al., 2012). The federal government established an eight-member committee to investigate all cases of insecurity in the affected northeastern part of Nigeria (Adesote & Abimbola, 2012). The government set up a team in April 2012 to interface with the Boko Haram terrorism group but was boycotted by the Boko Haram group (Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). President Jonathan sacked the Minister of Defence and Minister of State Defence, National Security Adviser as well as some Military Service Chiefs for their perceived incompetence and to assure Nigerians that the government was on top of situation as the terror group would be decisively dealt with (Akinlade & Ibitoye, 2012; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013). In May 2013, the federal government of Nigeria declared a State of Emergency in three states of the northeast: Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe (Idahosa, 2015; Isyaku, 2013; Jideofor, 2012). Despite these efforts, Boko Haram terrorist group is still on the increase (Agbibo, 2013; Akpan et al., 2014). The reasons being that the Nigerian forces have sent the terror group out of Sambisa forest and other places where it hitherto occupied, the group's members are now more dispersed (Adibe, 2014). Also, the terrorist organization is organized into small cells to carry out terror attacks (Afoku, 2017; Akinbi, 2015). Presently, the Nigerian government is finding it difficult to prevent or thwart all terror attacks in the northeast of the country even with the improvement in security emplacement both in the air and land (Ahokegh, 2012; Bamidele, 2015). The Boko Haram group has easy access to weapons due to the porous nature of the country and the terror group's capacity to make and use improvised explosives which are difficult to detect (Fulgence, 2015;

Gambari, 2006; Komolafe, 2017). The advances in technology have aided the group to spread its propaganda, enlist members and train them in terrorist activities (Fulgence, 2015; Komolafe, 2017). As a result of this, the government needs to provide a comprehensive policy to fight Boko Haram terrorism and the security forces to be cognizant of the skills and capacity required to protect the country.

The counterterrorism policy must be coordinated and incorporate a certain set of responsibility's standards (DoD, 2013). Ad-hoc approaches should not characterize the counterterrorism policy but holistic in a framework that will include both the soft and hard powers approaches. It must not be described by mere reactions that only deal with the symptoms of Boko Haram terrorism but should address its root causes and develop the capacity to react to it (Amy, 2014). The initial methods of approach by the Nigerian government must have the constitutional backing, and whatever effort against Boko Haram must draw inspiration from the constitution (Amy, 2014). For active operation, the synchronization of the approaches will spell out the duty and responsibilities of every individual as well as the security agency involved in the counterterrorism efforts (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). The counterterrorism policy will also outline the standards such as the intelligence gathering, protection of targets, coordination among agencies of government, the role of non-government organizations and media, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenders and the part of the government (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016).

Review and Synthesis of Related Studies of Concept

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The country has witnessed terrorism during the colonial periods and military rule (Ajibola, 2015; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). The British colonial masters used terrorist tactics to suppress and conquer the Benin Kingdom led to the death of some notable personalities of the Kingdom (Ago, 2017). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, some small autonomous communities used guerrilla and terrorist tactics to fight against the British colonialism (Ewa, 2017). In 1966 about 150 insurgents led by Adaka Boro declared a Republic of Niger Delta; the Nigerian forces however aborted it after 12 days of its declaration (Israel, 2014). In 1966, during the Nigerian civil war, the Biafra soldiers adopted guerrilla tactics against the Nigerian forces (Ewa, 2017). The periods could be said to have witnessed intra-state terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism (Babatunde, Unwana-Obong, & Olanrewaju, 2014; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). In 1996, the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida was alleged to have killed the editor of Newswatch magazine, Dele Giwa with a letter bomb (Madunagu, 2005). According to Ogundiya and Amzat (2008), only a few terrorist activities could be attributed to international terrorism in Nigeria. The assassination in 1981 of four members of the Nigerian security forces by Cameroonian forces could be described as international terrorism (Madunagu, 2005).

The prevailing conditions in Nigeria support the growth of terrorism in the country or encourage an individual to terrorism (Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). The development, as well as an increase in terrorist activities, could be linked to socio-political, psychological, economic and cultural differences of an aggrieved individual or

group in the country (Crenshaw, 1981; Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). According to Crenshaw (1981) discrimination of the majority by the minority group is a real grievance that could lead to terrorist activities in the country. The discriminated group could form a social movement to redress their grievances and to seek for equitable society while an extreme faction of the group could result to acts of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Ogundiya & Amzat, 2008). According to Niworu (2013) lack of good governance, legal systems, access to qualitative education and cultural values accounted for terrorism in Nigeria. In explaining this phenomenon, Duru and Ogbonnaya, (2012) and Niworu (2013) argued for an understanding of Nigeria in the colonial period.

The Nigerian experience under colonial domination or rule was that of arbitrariness and oppression with the attendant negative impact of terrorism, rebellion and religious and ethnic conflicts, and other social vices in the society (Niworu, 2013; Okpaga, Chijioke, & Okechukwu, 2012). The Nigerian First Republic between 1960 and 1963 was characterized by violence, thuggery, and low social values that ruled through coercion (Ate, 2011; Ukase, 2015). The political economy of the Nigerian state was centrally structured, and this made inevitable the struggle for power devoid of lawful means (Niworu, 2013; Omale, 2013; Omede & Omede, 2015). This political structure promoted ethnic and religious militancy in the polity that cut across all ethnic groups and regions.

Based on the above, the counterterrorism strategies must be integrated and synchronized through a collaborative effort that will involve a long-term and short-term approach to win Boko Haram terror war (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). The long-

term strategy will aim at good governance and representative democracy that will guarantee political inclusion because terrorism mainly shoots out from misinformation, non-inclusiveness, political alienation, and murderous ideology. The short-term approach must prevent attacks by Boko Haram terrorist networks, deny the group of access to weapons, deny support from other terrorist group or rogue states and deny the sect of any territory within the country.

A comprehensive and coordinated counterterrorism policy is essential for the defeat of Boko Haram that will base on a particular set of responsibility's standards (DoD, 2013). The approach will spell out the duty and responsibilities of every stakeholder and outline the criteria for the intelligence gathering, protection of targets, coordination among agencies of government, the role of non-government organizations and media, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenders and the part of the government (Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). It becomes imperative for all and sundry especially the agencies in counterterrorism efforts to understand and conform to Boko Haram counterterrorism policy formulated to guide the Boko Haram operations in the country. Given the complexity of security situation in Nigeria, all and sundry should be involved in the Boko Haram counterterrorism operations because they would be the first victims if there is an attack (Omale, 2013). Furthermore, with the vociferous attacks of the group on government agencies, innocent individuals, and religious centers, it was important to examine the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy and its challenges with the aim of appraising the Nigerian efforts at addressing the group's threats. There have been accusations and counter-accusations against the security forces by civil society

organizations regarding the legality of the operation of the security forces and the rules of engagements.

This study explored the responses from government forces to the development and implementation of Boko Haram counterterrorism policies. The military, the Department of State Services, the Police, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Immigration Service, the Customs and Federal Emergency Management Agency are involved in the operation (Bodunde et al, 2014; Hassan, 2014). Counterterrorism policy must be all-encompassing and comprehensive that would include preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery and should be backed-up by enabling laws and regulations (Anyadike, 2013). The policy should specify the roles of individuals and agencies and address what to do and how to respond including training, drilling and crisis management strategies. Again, the policy encompasses coordination measures among individuals and agencies of government, as well as among the three tiers of governments involved in the counterterrorism (Anyadike, 2013; Alemika, 2013).

For effective counterterrorism policy implementation, the executive must work in tandem with the legislature as well as the judiciary (Àrendàs, 2016). The Office of the National Security Adviser saddled with the Coordination of counterterrorism efforts is required to synergize with nongovernmental and multilateral organizations. The federal government is also expected to collaborate and work together with neighboring governments as well as other developed foreign governments. A good working relationship among the tiers of government, arms of governments and security agencies

will ensure adequate coordination that will enable a defeat of the Boko Haram terrorist group (Hassan, 2014; Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013).

The policy should be holistic that will involve the promulgation of comprehensive counterterrorism law, the development of the counterterrorism capabilities of the security forces, the strengthening of the multinational forces, and the provision of basic needs for the Nigerian people by the government. The counterterrorism policy must build the capacities to detect, delay, respond to terrorist attacks, and prevent terrorist communication (Alemika, 2013). The country counterterrorism policy is to be risk-based (Vanderlinden, 2014; Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016). Counterterrorism policy must be flexible, provide detail information that will put into consideration the probability of attacks and response mechanisms (Agboola, 2014; Ancker, 2001; Owczarzak & Vanderlinden, 2016).

Review and Synthesis of Related Studies to Research Question

In my review, I discovered the following studies that linked to the Nigerian counterterrorism approaches towards Boko Haram in a strategy that close to my research question. The studies talked about the challenges of Nigerian counteroffensive policy but did not bring to focus or explore counterterrorism policy development and implementation processes in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Aghedo and Osumah (2012) studied how Nigeria government responds to the Boko Haram uprising and found that the failure was due governance problem and institutional fragility which emphasis repressive state security approach rather than human security.

Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) claimed that since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the military, the police, the Department of State Services and other security agencies who are involved in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism, have been interfacing with one another. However, they are being guided by their statutory responsibilities which have caused the crisis of role and to avoid this, the functions of these agencies need to be well defined, most especially, in critical national infrastructure protection and as to which agency is to be a lead agency (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013). They claimed further that while Boko Haram can no longer lay claim to territories as the incidences of attack is now restricted to the north-east, the threat has remained a salient challenge to national and local securities affecting lives directly and indirectly which demands a more robust counterterrorism policy, an instrument to fight against the increasing terror threats (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013).

Onapajo (2013) claimed that the state of insecurity caused by Boko Haram terrorist group in the north is quite worrisome as it has resulted into bombings and killing of innocent people and damage of properties value billions of naira. Onapajo claimed further that it is more disturbing that all the attempts made by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram activities have not produced any meaningful positive outcome. Thus, the attacks from the Boko Haram sect remain intractable, and it appears that the government is helpless in curtailing them. The dynamics and complexity of the sect attacks have raised some fundamental questions about governance issue, national security, and Nigeria's corporate existence. He argued that the situations that led to Boko Haram terrorists are linked to the dissatisfaction and disaffection caused by high level of

unemployment, poverty, weak governance, religious, violation of fundamental human rights, among others and recommended the need to address poverty, religious fanaticism, and political exclusiveness (Onapaajo, 2013). He also advocated the importance of adequate collaboration and partnership among all the stakeholders and organizations as well as the re-evaluation of the Nigerian domestic and foreign policies as a strategy of fighting the threat of Boko Haram terrorist group (Onapaajo, 2013).

Idowu (2013) provided an insight on the teleology of the pattern of the Nigerian responses to Boko Haram insurgency but did not provide an in-depth analysis of these approaches neither focus on development and implementation of counterterrorism policy. Akpan et al. (2014) reviewed the intrinsic weaknesses in the Nigerian's counterterrorism policy which was based on military force rather than good governance. They concluded that these weaknesses accounted for the inactivity of the counterterrorism effort in Nigeria and linked effective counterterrorism to the making and implementation of sensible socioeconomic and political policies.

Akinbi (2015) linked the failure of the Nigerian counterterrorism strategies and unabated violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram terrorist group to the underperformance of the government in the area of governance occasioned by corruption, ethno-religious conflicts, bureaucratic inefficiency, and prolonged military rule which has isolated the masses from political participation. He, therefore, established the importance of pro-active strategy, collaboration with regional and international actors, and provision of necessary infrastructures that bring about good governance and boosts government legitimacy.

Gaps Identified in Previous Research

In the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy in Nigeria, several gaps in literature are identified. The literature appears not to have revealed an in-depth study on Boko Haram counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria (Akpan et al., 2014; Chinwokwu, 2013; Ogunseye, 2012; Omale, 2013). The literature indicates that others studies have investigated the rise in terrorism by Boko Haram by looking at its nature, its cause, and the Nigerian government efforts in combating it (Akpan et al., 2014; Chinwokwu, 2013). However, the literature appears not to reveal what is needed to improve communication, collaboration, and synergy on Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts.

Gray and Adeakin (2015) investigated the evolution of Boko Haram and the failure of the security forces in Nigeria; however, the study focused mainly on the transformation of Boko Haram and factors that influence the inability of the Nigerian security forces to counter the Boko Haram terrorism successfully. Other researchers on Boko Haram focus on how the heightened relationship between Christian and Muslims in Nigeria has fuelled the flames of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Chinwokwu, 2013; Onapajo & Usman, 2015). (2017) examined the challenges facing multi-agency management efforts in countering terrorism in Nigeria. Albert claimed that the government is yet to structure the multi-agency approach formally in Nigeria, and personnel lacked the understanding of the cultures and processes of the other agency they must work with. He only recommended a multiagency approach to counterterrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Albert, 2017). However, competition and rivalry continued among the security forces,

and Nigerian government does little to address the challenge. Bodunde et al. (2014) identified the multiplicity of Nigerian security agencies with dual responsibility as the bane of their inefficiency.

With the rise in the attacks of the Boko Haram sect, there is the need for the Nigerian government to respond to it holistically. The government has the power and resources to counter Boko Haram uprising and should address the rebellion that affects the security and loss of life in Nigeria. This happens when the appropriate strategy is in place instead of fighting the terrorism through trial by error. Thus, the government response will remain ineffective, the Boko Haram group will continue to attack with impunity, and the security forces will be overwhelmed. Nigerian government has a responsibility to ensure peace and security in the nation and must consider solutions to address the menace of the group. The government should adopt a comprehensive policy to adequately counter Boko Haram terrorism (Agedo & Osumah, 2012). Nigerian government has taken some strategies to tackle the menace of the sect (Odo, 2015; Omale, 2013; Onapajo, 2017). However, the attack of the Boko Haram sect is on the increase, and for almost two decades it seems as if the Nigerian security forces are still strange to this threat due to the dynamism of Boko Haram terrorism.

Nigeria state has responded to this threat by developing and implementing some policies to counter the threat of Boko Haram (Dasuki, 2013; Odo, 2015; Omale, 2013; Onapajo, 2017). The policies ranged from the presidential directives, declaration of state of emergency, passage of Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and 2013, and the establishment of an additional military division at Maiduguri, Borno state (Aderonke,

2015; Agbiboa, 2014; Agedo & Osumah, 2012; Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013). Also, the president directed the service chiefs to relocate to the war theatre in the northeast of Nigeria and launched the National Action on Counterterrorism (NACTEST) (Aderonke, 2015; Agbiboa, 2014; Akinbi, 2015; Dasuki, 2013; Odo, 2015; Omale, 2013; Onapajo, 2017).

This study offered an in-depth understanding of these policies during the bounded time frame of 2009-2015 to improve policy efforts that can be used to neutralize the threat and prowess of Boko Haram terrorism. I carried out this study to enhance the Nigerian Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts.

Summary and Conclusions

In the literature review, I explained the concepts of terrorism, Boko Haram, and counterterrorism policy and the theories that undergirded this study to show the potentiality of their impacts on the policy environment and process. I offered the perspectives from other studies that indicated how there is the limited study on the counterterrorism efforts toward Boko Haram in the year 2009-2015.

Major Themes in the Literature Summarized

Authors of most of the literature explored in this study did not examine Boko Haram counterterrorism from the policy or legislative perspective or from the viewpoint of people who are impacted by the policy. In spite of the shortage of detailed study on the phenomenon of this research, some research works contributed to providing an in-depth understanding of the Boko Haram counterterrorism. Counterterrorism policy is a significant component of any effort to efficiently tackle the threat of Boko Haram

terrorism in Nigeria (Gray & Adeakin, 2015). Researchers of different studies on this phenomenon of study argued that policy process is complicated and must be comprehensive and pragmatic taking into consideration the threat, vulnerabilities, legal and other socio-economic indices (Blanchard, 2016). It is from this viewpoint that the Nigerian government developed counterterrorism strategies towards Boko Haram terrorism.

Using theoretical frameworks of institutional theory, and punctuated equilibrium theory, I explored the impact of Boko Haram counterterrorism policies on the counterterrorism operations in Nigeria as it becomes important to understand how counterterrorism policies could be improved to combat Boko Haram uprising. According to Onapajo (2017), there are gaps in research regarding the counterterrorism approach in Nigeria. This study provided access to this insight. Many of the referenced literature in this study show the difficulty in thwarting all the Boko Haram terrorist acts.

Unfortunately, there are many examples of Boko Haram terror acts in Nigeria. One of the reasons for the difficulty in preventing Boko Haram terrorism is the bickering and lack of understanding of the working relationship among various security agencies (Albert, 2017; Bodunde et al., 2014). Other researchers examined the socio-political configuration of the Nigerian state (Agbibo, 2013; Akpan et al., 2014). Osumah (2013) explained that ineffective Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy is due to lack of the institutional framework for policy conduct and conflict resolution; however, there is an opportunity to improve.

What is Known and Not known in the Discipline Connected to the Topic of Study

The literature used in this work has provided an understanding of the phenomenon of study; however, there is lack of knowledge regarding the role that policymaking plays in counterterrorism strategy that can ensure cohesion among security forces and efficiently address the threat of Boko Haram terrorism. This research used the institutional framework to investigate the challenge of working relationship among the security forces and punctuated equilibrium theory to explore the development stated in policy formulation.

In examining Boko Haram counterterrorism policy, I found that suitable policy decisions should be comprehensive and all-encompassing. Additionally, military force alone cannot adequately tackle the threat. It is, therefore, necessary to get the perspectives of all those who were involved in the counterterrorism efforts to understand the perspectives that they have to offer. Even though the theoretical frameworks for this study are recognized theories about organizational behavior and changes in policy, more research is required to provide an understanding of the linkages between these theories and the concepts. The linkages will come out from interviews with retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the military who had participated in the counterterrorism operation.

Researchers that have carried out these studies on policy making and implementation processes provided insight on how the theories developed. The research finally closed the gap between policy development and policy implementation, and theory and standard operating procedure of the security agencies in operation. In Chapter

3, the researcher outlined the steps used to collect useful data from retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the military, and civilians who are beneficiaries of the policy to understand the counterterrorism policies in the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy during 2009-2015.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe counterterrorism policy and its development and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Analysis of the data that I collected in the course of this study helped to provide an understanding of how the counterterrorism strategy was developed and is being implemented by the government of Nigeria. Counterterrorism strategy provides policy measures to combat terrorism (DoD, 2013; Omale, 2013). Active counterterrorism policy involves adequate planning, review mechanisms, legal framework and adequate training (Brzoska, 2011; DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Renard, 2012). Understanding this framework and its application will offer an insight to the government to better fight Boko Haram threat (DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Omale, 2013). In this chapter, I discuss the elements of the research design, strategy of data collection, sampling strategy, criteria and rationale for selecting participants, and the data collection and analysis methods. I also identify research biases and ethical issues relevant to the study as part of a discussion of ethical procedures and trustworthiness.

Research Design and Rationale

A researcher makes use of research design to guide the conduct of the research and find solutions to research challenges (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). A research design enables the researcher to structure the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I used the research design to guide me exploring the phenomenon of study concerning the process of the

research. This qualitative study provided an answer to the research question: What was the process of development and implementation of Nigerian counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015?

Central Concepts

The central aims of this study were to explore the counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government during 2009-2015 and to consider whether counterterrorism policy development and implementation had the potential to combat Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria effectively. I used the conceptual framework to explain the idea that Nigerian counterterrorism policy development and implementation is essential to the success of Boko Haram counterterrorism. Previous researchers have argued that the major impediment to a successful counterterrorism effort by Nigerian security forces was the lack of comprehensive antiterrorism or counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during the years 2009-2015 (Busher, 2014; Idowu, 2013). They have also contended that a detailed and all-encompassing strategy must be put in place if there is to be any meaningful achievement in the fight against the terror group (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012).

Successful counterterrorism effort is also hindered due to interagency bickering among the agencies of government, personal interests of individuals in government, and lack of political will owing to the ethnicity and religiosity of the country (Bodunde et al., 2014; Omale, 2013). Thus, I concluded that counterterrorism policy in Nigeria has the potential of reducing interagency wranglings among the Nigerian security agencies and that all political obstacles are impediments to the success of the counterterrorism effort in

the country. However, I limited my study focus to the development, implementation, and progress of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015.

Research Tradition and Approach

I used the qualitative case study approach to understand and explore the dynamics associated with the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. A qualitative case study is an approach that is used to describe an event, a process, an issue, or a phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). According to Yin (2013), a qualitative case study provides an in-depth understanding of the context and conditions of an issue and efforts taken to address it. This qualitative study provided an opportunity to genuinely interrogate the development and implementation of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during the year 2009-2015. I used in-depth interviews to collect data from individuals who were involved in the development and implementation of the counterterrorism policy and those who are beneficiaries of the policy.

I adopted qualitative study because it helped to facilitate the gathering of detailed information from research participants and address the research question. Rover (2005) argued that research questions are descriptive, process-related, and cause-related. A question is descriptive if it explains an ongoing event or incident; a question that focuses on the cause will address the consequence of an occurrence while a process question ascribes reason to a phenomenon (Rover, 2005). This study was descriptive because the research question was descriptive (Yin, 2013). In qualitative research, the researcher can use different facets of the inquiry to offer a rich description of the subject matter.

Role of the Researcher

As the researcher, I played many roles. I am a Nigerian, and I have been working with the Nigerian government as a security intelligence officer for the past 26 years. My work experience has provided me with background information about the state policy and culture and access to individuals inside and outside the government. I have also been part of the Boko Haram counterterrorism operation at various times. This participation has given me a fair understanding of the counterterrorism of Boko Haram development and implementation and significant players in the security sector and National Assembly as well as documents.

Second, as a Security Intelligence Officer, I have had the privilege of working directly with security agencies that are involved in the counterterrorism in Yobe state and Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria, which has enabled me to have an understanding of the challenges confronting the counterterrorism effort. Third, I am presently a research officer at the Institute for Security Study, Abuja, where I have the task of researching issues of security and intelligence. These have provided opportunities to meet and interact with Nigerian security commanders, policy makers, and community leaders during work or at the leisure hours and have offered me the required experience to carry out this study.

Personal and Professional Relationships

The credibility of a researcher is vital to the outcome of qualitative research. As the researcher, I had the advantage of identifying with the research participants (Maxwell, 2013; Schensul et al., 1999) and this professional relationship facilitated the depth of

information collected. Also, as a Nigerian and a security intelligence officer, and I established a personal rapport with the research participants knowing well that such rapport was vital to conducting good interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

I was able to collect the maximum amount of useable information because I established a good rapport with the research participants. I listened to the research participants and was interested in what they said as they communicated their experiences, perception, and reality. Being cognizant of the need for professionalism, I did not interview individuals with whom I had worked or had any formal relationship.

Researcher Bias

I am a Nigerian, a Security Intelligence Officer with the Nigerian government, and therefore, have my perspective on the phenomenon. I have worked at the theatre of war in the northeast, Nigeria and I am of the view that the counterterrorism policy is not all-encompassing because of the unabated Boko Haram attacks that are leading to the daily death of innocent Nigerians and members of the security forces.

I am a proponent of a comprehensive Boko Haram counterterrorism policy, but this was not a challenge to this study because this work was an effort to examine the counterterrorism policy in Nigeria, and its development and implementation. Consequently, the need for improved counterterrorism policy has already been established because the present strategy is not adequately working and why this is so, this was one of the issues this study explored.

Ethical Issues

In this study, the ethical issue that I tackled was the challenge of whether to refer to research participants by name or otherwise. This study was sensitive because it involves security and government policy. I did not reveal the real identity of the research participants but identified them in the third person; as a retired senior intelligence officer, a retired military officer, a community leader, and so on. This was done to ensure the full participation of the research respondents, robust discussions, unbiased and detailed responses that was not detrimental to their lives.

Methodology

This study was carried out in inYobe state and Abuja Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. I collected data face-to-face by conducting in-depth interviews with those who were involved in the development and implementation of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015 in the Federal Capital Territory and also traveled to Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state, Nigeria. This was in tandem with the protocol of qualitative research that necessitates a robust data collection process and answers questions such as how and why of a decision-making process (Alasuutari, 2010; Creswell, 2013; Maxwell, 2013). This qualitative approach provided a wide range of perceptions from these people as it supported naturalistic study that seeks an in-depth understanding of social phenomena (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Participant Selection Logic

I used purposive and criterion sampling to collect data from participants. Purposive sampling is used to identify and select participants who are knowledgeable or

have experience on the phenomenon of study (Creswell, 2013; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Patton, 2002). I chose this method to identify and gain access to participants regarding their role in the development and implementation of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during the year 2009-2015. Their role was known to me because as a security intelligent security officer I have been a participant in the process, thus confirming to me that they would meet the participation criterion.

I conducted twelve in-depth interviews. The 12 participants were developed and contacted after the researcher secured the approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Only those who agreed were contacted and interviewed while those who declined were not contacted and hence did not participate. Each participant was given the consent form to sign before the interview. The selection of the participant size was purposefully not more than twelve to allow for a robust and in-depth discussion with participants closest to the process of the development and implementation of the policy to understand the reality of the case from their perspectives and experiences. Saturation was accomplished due to the quality of the participants that were identified for this study. I requested the participants to be on hand for face to face or Skype follow-up for two months after which they would be asked to exit the study.

Instrumentation

I used the interview instrument as the primary source of data gathering. According to Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, and Namey, (2005) interviews are used to get participants to express their perceptions and experiences. This instrument allowed me to connect with participants and enabled them to have a robust and broad

discussion on the phenomenon of study. I developed and conducted the open-ended interview questions. This approach was flexible because it allowed me to follow the participants' line of thought while still beginning with a prearranged question framework (Yin, 2013).

The approach also allowed me to observe the participant's nonverbal conversation. The duration of each interview was a minimum of one hour. In every interview, I asked questions from the participants and audio recorded their descriptions. I replayed the recorded responses to have a clear understanding of the participants' responses. The open-ended interview questions which were developed based on my experience and searched literature are in the appendix

Data Collection Procedures

Data collection through interview requires clean and clear recordings. Hence it is important to try different recording Apps before deciding on one. I used the Sony tape voice recorder. The tape recorder was tested before the interviews to ensure excellent quality recordings. The tape recorder was used to record the interviews while I was, besides, took notes and jotted down in journal format the unrecorded interview. I made appointments with the identified participants and requested for a minimum of one hour from each of them. I allowed the participants to decide the suitable place appropriate for the interview whether in their offices, restaurants or at their personal residences.

The interviews questions were open-ended with participants who are highly knowledgeable on the issue of study (Yin, 2013). The protocol questions were used to commence the interview with each participant (see Appendix). The predetermined

questions gave clear direction to the conduct of the interviews and allowed for follow up questions that permitted an in-depth discussion as it progresses. I asked follow-up questions once the process started to add depth to the discussion. I asked questions from the protocol questions and followed up with further relevant questions based on the participant's description and researcher understanding of the phenomenon. However, not all protocol questions were asked from all the participants, but only relevant ones particular to each participant were asked to give the specific experience and involvement in the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. This process produced an in-depth discussion. I conducted Skype interviews, send emails and use face to face personal interaction with the participants to clarify and shed light on the subject of discussion.

Data Analysis

The method of data analysis in this research was content analysis. I developed meanings and relationships from data protocol framework using content analysis. Content analysis has three approaches which are summative content analysis directed content analysis, and conventional content analysis (Saldaña, 2013). The directed content analysis starts with the definition of a theory while there is the definition of code before and during the analysis of data. The developed theory and relevant findings helped to develop the pre-list of codes. I made use of the directed content analysis and NVivo coding approach to code data. Collected data from this case study were analyzed through conventional content analysis derived from open-ended questions and interpreted from the data protocol framework (see Appendix). The insight provided by the participants

was helpful to gain an understanding of their experiences and perception about the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. At the completion of all of the interviews, I compared and analyzed all responses from the participants according to emergent themes and patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994), using the theories as guides.

Issues of Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness is an issue in a qualitative research study because the researcher is the principal instrument for investigation and research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I as the researcher was deeply involved in all the processes of the qualitative research; from the conduct of interview and data collection to the interpretation which was open to bias. I ensured trustworthiness through a rigorous and systematic process and with the research methodology that it is self-conscious. The process of qualitative research must be rigorous for it to be credible and useful (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). According to Cresswell (2013), reliability and validity must be substantiated by credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Creswell, 2013). Methods employed must be shown to be rigorous for findings and conclusions to be deemed trustworthy (Murphy & Yelder, 2010; Roberts, Priest, & Traynor, 2006). Methods use must be rigorous and can involve categories, member checking, peer debriefs and results' confirmations (Morse et al., 2002). I used categories, triangulation, and member checking to build up trustworthiness.

Credibility

A study is credible when there is adequate rich data to support its outcomes. In a qualitative study, the findings must have internal validity and should match the reality

(Golafshani, 2003). The threats to credibility are the researcher bias as the only instrument of the research to collect the data, the selective data analysis to achieve the research findings and the credibility of the participants and the information provided. My understanding of the phenomenon of study and background of the country as a Nigerian and security intelligence officer in Nigeria for 26 years will assist to address this threat. The researcher as the only instrument of data gathering (Golafshani, 2003) ensured credibility by using more than one method as advised by Patton (2002). I captured and analyzed the participants' responses to truly legitimize the credibility of the outcomes (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011; Trochim, 2001). I employed different methods to substantiate or triangulate the findings. The information provided by one interviewer was checked against what another provided, and I also cross-checked the data against the available documents. This case study allowed the participants to express their perceptions of the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015 accurately. Only those who were knowledgeable about the phenomenon of the study were contacted and interviewed. The careful analysis was not an issue because I did not have any specific outcome but to obtain fact relating to the process of the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015.

Transferability

Research trustworthiness ensures its transferability; I used full description to guarantee its transferability (Creswell, 2013). Transferability refers to the degree that the outcome of research outcomes can expand beyond the boundary of the study (Merriam,

2008). According to Moustakas (1994) transferability refers to external validity while Guba (1981) saw transferability as a viewpoint of applicability. Applicability applies to the extent to which the outcomes of research apply to other settings or other locations with different groups of people. While applicability may not be the same as a generality, qualitative study is unique because it can examine a phenomenon in a targeted natural environment and its key features are transferable to other research settings (Guba, 198). Therefore, research is said to be transferable when the degree of its findings is similar to the others.

Threats to transferability involved the likelihood of participants not providing detail account of their perspective because of the sensitivity of the phenomenon of study or reluctance to giving less than the full picture due to the unwillingness to be forthcoming or inadequate knowledge that had the potential to lead to an inadequate description of the required information. I muted this challenge through the use of purposeful sampling strategy to choose the research participants (Yin, 2013). The participants were senior ranking government officials who played active roles and highly knowledgeable in the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy development and implementations process during 2009-2015. The participants were those with first-person information and highly experienced in the process and politics of government policy and understand its impact on people and institutions.

Dependability

Dependability in qualitative research refers to the research questions producing the same findings each time the study is repeated (Moustakas, 1994). Dependability can

take place if the interviewing protocol is short of consistency, the researcher's failure to follow the interviewing protocol, an error in the transcription of interview information. I used case study protocol questions to address this threat to begin the interview to ensure consistency. I recorded all interviews to guarantee the accuracy of transcription and usage to ensuring dependability of outcomes.

Confirmability

I addressed the issue of confirmability by purposeful selection of the participant. I did not select participants that are not known as this is significant in making appointments with the participants and to establish the credibility of the process. This ensured openness and deep discussion during the interview. My status as a security intelligence officer was critical in establishing rapport and access to participants. The participants were excited seeing their colleague trying to conduct a study on the phenomenon, and this built respect and understanding with the participants that enhanced objectivity and interview quality.

My role as a practitioner and a senior member of the Nigerian state apparatus who is an active player in counterterrorism operations was a potential threat. However, this did was not negative as it assisted in getting access to and establishing a relationship with the participants that ensured in-depth discussion. The interview aimed to provide that the research participants answer the research question with meaningful reflexivity (Maxwell, 2013).

Ethical Procedures

As argued by Creswell (2013) trust between the researcher and the research participant is a significant element of qualitative research (Creswell, 2013). I did respect the participant's right to participate in the study (Schensul et al., 1999). I obtained the IRB approval to conduct this study. The approval code is 08-16-18-0548657. I ensured that each participant read and sign the consent agreement.

Treatment of Participants

I selected the participants based on their involvement in the process of counterterrorism policy development and implementation Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. All participants were those who have the understanding of government policy, the research process and ethical issues. I established a good rapport with the participants to facilitate in-depth discussion. The research participants were informed of their rights to participate in the research and that their involvement would be kept anonymous and confidential.

Treatment of Data.

I protected the research data through backup procedures to avoid data loss. I daily backed up the data throughout the research process. Only me as the researcher had access to the data and I ensured I protected it in my home. I will preserve the data for a minimum of five years after the final dissertation approval.

Summary

Qualitative research process starts with me as the researcher, and it is unique because I was the coder. I analyzed the data through the experience and coding process. I

collected data through open-ended interview and recorded the transcripts. I used the NVivo to analyze the data to develop relevant themes and illustrations that addressed the research questions for the bounded time. This process allowed me to gain credibility and transparency of process. The qualitative case study enabled the data gathering from retired members of the security forces and community leaders who are beneficiaries of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. The participants' insight and perspectives provided data a full, thick, and rich description regarding the process and effectiveness of the counterterrorism policy. I conducted the research in Yobe state and Federal Capital Territory.

Due to my experience as a participant observer, I was able to establish a relationship with many of the participants. I purposefully selected the research participants because of their deep understanding and knowledge of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015 and they understand the research from the perspective of a student gaining information. I tackled threats to credibility and ethical issues.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe counterterrorism policy and its development and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015. The aim of counterterrorism policy design is to reduce the threat of terrorism and make it difficult for terrorists and their allies to carry out terrorist attacks (Dasuki, 2013; DoD, 2006, 2013). In this study, I discuss how the different antiterrorism policy measures of the Nigerian government towards Boko Haram were developed and implemented.

Nigerian counterterrorism policies during the years studied were designed to provide a legal framework to fight Boko Haram terrorism. In an effort to fight the terrorist threat, Nigerian government officials established the National Counterterrorism Strategy and passed the Terrorism Prohibition Acts of 2011 and 2013. The Terrorism Prohibition Act 2011 was later revised resulting in the enactment of the Terrorism Prohibition Act 2013. These efforts have a direct link with Boko Haram counterterrorism in the following ways:

- stipulating processes by which the government forces can arrest, prosecute, and checkmate terrorism financing as well as measures to check the influence of international terrorist organizations in Nigeria;
- giving the Federal High Courts the power to interpret and government agencies (the Central Bank of Nigeria, Department of State Services, military, police, the Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit, and the Nigerian Prison Service,

among others) the power to to implement the provision of the Terrorism Prohibition Acts;

- creating the Office of National Security Adviser as authority to provide the necessary leadership role to minimize vulnerabilities and coordinate counterterrorism efforts among security forces in Nigeria;
- specifying the roles and responsibilities of ministries, departments, and agencies involved in the counterterrorism efforts;
- developing a single comprehensive database for information sharing among various agencies in counterterrorism operations;
- developing a counterterrorism call center in the National Security Adviser's office to enable citizens to pass anonymous information on terrorist activities;
- providing law enforcement agencies in Nigeria with the responsibility of intelligence gathering and investigation of terrorist activities;
- granting the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation the prosecution power;
- strengthening the criminal justice system by establishing courts dedicated to counterterrorism cases and the capacity of law enforcement agencies in terrorism investigations to guide against situations whereby evidence is compromised;
- creating opportunities and hope for victims of terrorism in the affected areas and restoring their confidence in the government;

- initiating programs that would identify and engage with key stakeholders in the community for deradicalization process;
- creating job opportunities by establishing small business enterprises and other initiatives the government may provide; and
- creating transparent, accountable, ethical, and results-oriented government institutions to fight terrorism (Office of the National Security Adviser, 2014, pp. 18-45).

The developers of the counterterrorism policy recognized that terrorism is a complicated subject and efforts to tackle it must include the whole of the society. They proposed a holistic preventive and active counterterrorism approach, appropriately planned and articulated in a document. Thus, counterterrorism policy is significant to defeating the Boko Haram terrorist group because it provide policy framework that guides terrorism fight (DoD, 2006, 2013).

The research question was, what was the process of development and implementation of Nigerian policy toward Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015? In this chapter, I explain how I conducted the research study, and I describe the setting as well as the conditions for participants' involvement. This chapter provides the demographics of the total sample of participants and an explanation of the nature of the collected data. In this chapter, I also describe the duration of data collection and how the data were recorded and analyzed. In addition to presenting the findings, I also discuss how the trustworthiness of data were confirmed.

The Setting

Damaturu and Abuja were the settings where I conducted the personal interviews between August and September 2018. Damaturu is in northeastern Nigeria, and it is the capital city of Yobe State (Omipidan, 2011). The city is located in a plains region covered by savanna that supports the production of crops such as millet, sorghum (Guinea corn), and peanuts (groundnuts). Damaturu is located between Potiskum in Yobe State and Maiduguri, Borno State, and has a population of 44,268 and an area of 2,366 km² (National Population Commission, 2006). The town, as the headquarters of Damaturu Emirate, became a site of Boko Haram terrorist attacks where people were being killed and properties destroyed since 2010 (Omipidan, 2011). Long before the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorism, Yobe State, Nigeria, was known for ethno-religious conflicts that have often led to the loss of lives and properties (Akinbi, 2015). However, these conflict were not grave like Boko Haram terrorism and were largely contained, and thereby had limited consequences on the political and socioeconomic life of the citizenry (Aderonke, 2015; Afolabi, 2014; Agbibo, 2013). Thus, the massive surge of attacks associated with Boko Haram terrorism in Damaturu and other towns in Yobe State became more worrisome to the Nigerian government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Bamidele, 2013). Many of the policies that have been developed and are being implemented in the bounded period are part of an effort to address Boko Haram in Damaturu and other parts of the state.

Abuja became the federal capital city of Nigeria on December 12, 1991. It is located in the center of the FCT with an area size of 713 km² (The Federal Capital

Development Authority [FCDA], 2018). Abuja was conceived as the Nigerian capital city in the 1980s to replace Lagos, the most populous city in Nigeria. The geography of Abuja is defined by Aso Rock, a 400-meter (1,300 ft) monolith left by water erosion (FCDA, 2018). The 2006 Nigerian census results show that Abuja had a population of 776,298, thus making it one of the first 10 densely populated cities in the country (National Population Commission, 2006). The first terrorist attack, which involved two car bombings, took place in Abuja near the Eagle Square in October 2010 during the Independence Day celebration (Dasuki, 2013). Subsequently, the Boko Haram terrorist group carried out some other attacks in Abuja and its outskirts, leading to the death of many people and destruction of properties (Dasuki, 2013). Abuja, being the city of government, is vital to this study because many of the Boko Haram policies were developed in the city (FCDA, 2018).

Demographics

All of the 12 participants in this study were male, and they met the criteria for participation. 9 of the participants were government officers who were involved in the making and implementation of the counterterrorism policies towards Boko Haram during the year 2009-2015 while 3 were its beneficiaries. The government officials have all retired from the public service. Three personnel were selected from each the Department of State Services, the military, and the former members of the National Assembly while the other participants are community leaders who were beneficiaries of the policies. They all met participation criteria.

Data Collection

Upon the receipt of the Walden University IRB approval (08-16-18-0548657), I started the recruitment of the research participants and made appointments with the selected participants. I scheduled an hour for every interview. The interview ranged from 45 minutes to one hour with an average of 40 minutes and 10 seconds per participant.

The data collection process took me about three weeks. All the participants in the study accepted to have the interview in their offices, only one preferred to be interviewed in a personal residence. Their offices were conducive and afforded open communication. The study interview protocol questions (see Appendix) guided the interview. I applied the protocol questions as the opening point for the interview with all the 12 participants, and I consistently used the protocol to all interviewees throughout the data collection process. I followed up the initial question with additional relevant questions from the protocol to elicit further information for robust conversation. I did not ask all the participants all case study protocol questions, but only questions that were relevant to each participant based on their involvement and participation in the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015.

I gathered the data through interviews and protected them in audio recordings as planned in the methodology. As the instrument of the data collection, I used an audio recorder to record the interview. All the participants willingly allowed me to record the interview and they provided feedbacks that supported the research question and interview questions. I played the audio recordings of the interview many times, listened to them actively, later transcribed the interviews, and used member checking to be sure that I

captured the participants' responses correctly during the interview. I saved the transcripts on Word document in a laptop, sent them through emails to the participants who had Internet access while I took the hard copies of the transcripts to the ones who had no Internet access to confirm the correctness of the information as recorded. I requested the participants to provide feedback on the recorded data as captured within 48 hours if changes were required. I did not get one reply or complaint from any of the research participants, thus presumed that they were pleased with the contents of the transcripts. I will store all the data collected for five years before destruction.

Data Analysis

The data analysis approach for this study was deployed as previously planned and outlined in Chapter 3. The instruments of data collection that I selected and used for this study were semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, field notes from interview observations, and archival document reviews. I used these sources of data to provide an answer to the research question which was, what was the process and effectiveness of development and implementation of Nigerian policy towards Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015? As observed by Creswell (2013), the analysis of data was a continual moving in and out. I repeatedly organized, read, categorized, and reflected on data, raised questions on issues, created categories, described, classified and interpreted themes and finally prioritized data and discarded those that were not useful. I listened to the audio recordings 6 times and read through the transcribed interviews, observation field notes and documents to bring out initial categorization. I compiled and organized all responses to the interview questions as discussed by the interviewees. I transcribed the interviews

on paper, typed into Excel spreadsheet on separate files, and later stored all of them into another big file to bring out the groups and themes.

The data was organized using the NVivo 11 software by uploading the textual transcripts into it which assisted the categorization and comparison of the data (Miles et al., 2014). The deployment of the NVivo11 software helped the manual hand coding that guaranteed reliability. I reviewed copies of field notes and policy documents on Boko Haram counterterrorism and this aided the confirmation of some of the facts as obtained from the interviews. As part of my data analysis plan, I secured the transcripts in the backup file to prevent them from loss or damage. The method also involves issues of trustworthiness towards the replication of findings and further analysis (Yin, 2014).

I used the procedure drawn out in the interview protocol (see Appendix) for the data analysis obtained from all the interviewees. I used the information from the audio recorder, the hand-coded transcripts, and the field notes for comparison and the analysis. The grouping together of the information helped to facilitate the identification of codes, themes, and possible patterns (Myers, 2013).

I listened to the audio recorder, reviewed transcripts, and field notes to determine common patterns during the second coding attempt by organizing the identified data to provide the records of the emerging codes, themes, and patterns for interpretation. After many reviews of the transcripts, I developed a list of emerging codes to facilitate the identification and development of themes and patterns for this study. I reviewed the transcript of each of the interviewee 6 times to be sure that the transcripts were reflections of the appropriate categories, sub-categories, and identified patterns. The

analysis on the 12 interviewees generated 19 topics. I also established or disproved the connection of the themes to the earlier discussed literature and dedicated time to the wording and phrasing of the themes to adequately understand them. However, I brought themes to the forefronts based on their importance and not on the number of counts. I transferred the 19 topics to a table to show how the topics were generated from thoughts, the number of their occurrence, and the percentage of occurrence. The 19 topics are listed on the table with the number of occurrence and percentage of occurrence (see Table 1).

Table 1

Analysis of Interview References Related to Topics

Topics from interviews	Number of Occurrences	Percentage of Occurrences
Concern over Boko Haram terrorism	12	7.27%
Need for Boko Haram CT policy development	15	9.09%
Previous CT efforts in Nigeria	5	3.03%
Background of Boko Haram CT policy in Nigeria	11	6.66%
Overall goal of CT effort	8	5.45%
CT policy is critical to active CT efforts	11	6.66%
Various CT policies	9	5.45%
Needs for inclusion of soft and hard approaches in the CT policy	6	3.63%
CT development process	8	4.84%
CT policy developmental progress	5	3.03%
Failure of initial CT efforts	14	8.48%
Kinds of CT policy needed	6	3.63%
Stakeholders in the CT policy process	10	6.06%
Impact of the CT policy	8	4.84%
Implementations of the CT policy process	7	4.27%
Implementation progress	3	1.81%
Implementation challenges	8	4.84%
Demand for active CT policy	9	5.45%
Future research needed	16	6.08%

Since I aimed to bring out themes from findings, I identified ten potential themes from the related topics that genuinely described the data from the interview, but after reflection on them I combined two into one and left with nine themes. I generated the thematic findings from the research question and interview protocol questions. The hand-coding aided the emergence of themes which I grouped into two main thoughts of the process of progress as emphasized by the research question and based on the case protocol questions. The first was the process of development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015 in Nigeria, and the second was the progress of implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. The process of analysis predicated on the similarity of thoughts in the discourse and the correlation of topics to sustain subjects within a conversation. An interviewee provided an answer to a question on a specific topic by using some paragraphs in the transcript.

I gained a broad perspective by regularly listening to the audio recorder of the participants' interview and their expert advice. According to Yin (2014), participants' philosophical and worldview are important in research studies. The regular reviews of the transcripts, audio recordings, and notes provided me with an appreciation of each interviewee's understanding regarding the development and understanding of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015, their contributions, and social change perspective. All the research participants expressed concerns about the threat of Boko Haram terrorism and wanted a more active counterterrorism policy to address it. Their responses assisted me in formulating the emerging codes and themes.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

The strategies highlighted in Chapter 3 were adapted to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as there was no necessary adjustment for trustworthiness. As contained in the methodology, I gathered the data from individuals who participated in the process of development and the implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015. All the interviewees were former senior personnel of the Department of State Services and the military who had served in the counterterrorism operation in Yobe State, former members of the Nigerian National Assembly who participated in the formulation of the terrorism policy, and community leaders who are beneficiaries of the policy. They were active participants in the process and knew the benefits and the challenges of the counterterrorism policy process on the security operation and the people of Yobe State. The information they provided as first eyewitnesses helped to capture in their natural setting, the understanding of the phenomenon of study and to answer the research question. I audio recorded all the interviewees and reviewed them for data accuracy. I made sure I followed the interview protocol that guaranteed the questions for uniformity of data collection processes.

Credibility

I established a good rapport with the study participants to gain and receive their confidence and trust. I spent adequate time with the participants during their interview process to obtain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. I verified and validated the responses provided by the participants many times to bring out the credibility of this

study. In qualitative research, credibility is an important strategy that ensures the facilitation of the management of data findings for a study (Berger, 2013). I used member checking, review of the audio recorder, field notes taking, and transcripts for triangulation that confirmed the authenticity and credibility of the findings. I transcribed verbatim the recorded interviews after every interview and made sure the interviewees obtained within 48 hours a copy of the transcript for their comments, corrections, and approvals through their personal e-mails.

Transferability

The findings of this study showed the suitable outcome to confirm the potency of transferability. I provided a detailed protocol and described explicitly the process I took to ensure external validity and present the ability of the research findings transferable. Transferability in research describes the reapplication of the findings of a study in another (Collins & Cooper, 2014). As described in Chapter 3, I used the same approach to ascertain transferability. I provided a detailed description of the participants' natural settings where the data were collected and offered an in-depth account of how the data were collected and analyzed. Future researchers and readers will have access to the findings of the study to evaluate for transferability to similar settings and larger population (Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, & Fontenot, 2013).

Dependability

Dependability is a part of trustworthiness used to show research integrity (Hesse-Biber, & Leavy, 2006). I followed the procedures appropriately, to confirm the dependability of the research. When I applied the approach I described in Chapter 3,

replication occurred. I also followed the ethical guidelines of constant review throughout the whole study. I observed the repeated responses from the participants for saturation formulation. I developed codes and thematic categories in line with the conceptual framework that underlies this study, using Microsoft Word and Excel applications to ascertain consistency in every aspect of this study.

Confirmability

I followed the appropriate steps I outlined in Chapter 3 to confirm confirmability for this study. I provided what is required to justify the rationale for the choice of the methods of data collection and established its alignment with the problem statement and research question. Confirmability describes the data objectivity and correctness (Abend, 2013; Houghton et al., 2013). I provided an in-depth account of the analysis process to show and make known the process of transparency. The use of different strategies for the management of a shared understanding ensured the credibility of the outcomes from this topic of study (Hyett et al., 2014). I reviewed the audio recorder many times, compared it to the transcript, field notes, and ascertained codes and themes to ensure its confirmability. As argued by Anney (2014), I remained objective and unbiased; the findings of the study showed the understanding and experiences of each of the participants and not on my prejudices. I adhered to the ethical research standards and the participants' responses underpinned the purpose of this study.

Research Results

As outlined in Chapter 3, that the involvement of the research participant would be confidential and anonymous, the names of the interviewees are not mentioned in the

findings. I did not attribute any separate information to specific Interviewee #1, or Interviewee #2, and etcetera to maintain confidentiality. The findings are to a certain extent presented as a whole, and I compiled together all the interview information without any differentiation of the research participants. Therefore, the information regarding the findings of this study is presented to the reader as the one collected from interviews. This method made the descriptions and perspectives as presented by the participants to flow without attributing it to any particular interviewee.

In a well thought out plan, I put together the finding of this study and presented them under two major headings: 1) the process of the development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015, and 2) the progress of the implementation of the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015.

Process of the Development of Counterterrorism Policy

The findings of this section are linked with the process of how the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015 was developed as a strategy to fight terrorism. I interviewed participants who participated in the process of development, and they provided rich insight into the study. Their descriptions showed how the policy started. The increase in the Boko Haram terrorist attacks necessitated the development of the policy during 2009-2015. The process of the policy was decisive and gradual. Findings regarding the process of development were as follows:

- (1) The need for counterterrorism policy development framework.

- (2) Impact of counterterrorism policy development towards Boko Haram.
- (3) Specific counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria.
- (4) Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy initiation process.
- (5) Critical Stakeholders in the of Boko Haram counterterrorism policy process during 2009-2015.

The need for counterterrorism policy framework. The theme of the continued need to have a counterterrorism policy framework on which the Boko Haram terrorism could be fought was regular throughout the interviews. Majority of the participants explained that the call for appropriate counterterrorism policy became serious since 2009 when Boko Haram became violent and began to unleash unprecedented attacks on the Nigerian state. These attacks have been so challenging on the Nigerian nation, particularly in the northeast of the country where Churches, Mosques, schools, and Prisons, and Police Stations were bombed. The attack on the United Nations building in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, made the Boko Haram sect to gain global recognition as a terror group.

The gravity of the incessant attacks became worrisome as government efforts to fight the threat appeared ineffective due to its sophistication, complexity, and ramifications of its relative newness. The military and security approach was ineffective as the terrorist group continued carrying out kidnappings, hostage takings and killings of citizens and foreign nationals, raping of women, smuggling as well as human trafficking. There were accusations and counter-accusations from international and national organizations that Nigerian security forces were not obeying human rights laws in their

counterterrorism operations. The realities at that time made it essential for counterterrorism operation to focus more on human needs as canvassed by the United Nations and developed countries than just focusing on the safeguarding of the country from this national threat as posed by Boko Haram terrorism. All the interviewees believed that the security forces could not route out Boko Haram group by mere military and security actions but by addressing human needs challenge of the people of the northeast region of Nigeria.

The counterterrorism operations of the Nigerian forces also brought to fore the need for collective efforts among the internal security forces and within the regional forces. The counterterrorism operations previously lacked collective and diplomatic efforts as agencies were individualistic and uncooperative. The inability to keep the terrorist group at bay was because the security agencies were interested in securing the individual's glory as well as the President's attention at the expense of working together to win the war. The lack of a framework to ensure a collective effort became significant within the Nigerian security apparatus and her immediate neighbors as the realities on the ground made it essential for security agencies to be organically related. This became vital as the police force that has the primary responsibility for a particular role in the counterterrorism operation appeared to have failed in the performance of that role; thus it became inevitable for other agencies to provide the required support to succeed.

The counterterrorism effort of the Nigerian government was largely ill-defined, ad hoc and reactionary. Participants stated that failure of many of the government responses, especially those concerning the use of military approach, created unexpected negative

consequences. More worrisome was the considerable sum of money the government had spent on Boko Haram terrorism that appeared not to have produced the desired result. Arising from this, Nigerian people began to call for an appropriate and workable counterterrorism strategy that would be all-inclusive and comprehensive as well as take into consideration both military and other non-military approaches. Majority of the interviewees believed that this led to the passage of the Terrorism Prevention Acts.

Owing to the continued attacks of Boko Haram terrorist group and calls from Nigerians and the international community, the Nigerian federal government took a cursory look at the posture of its various counterterrorism strategies in theory and practice. Thus, a directive from the former President, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to the National Security Adviser to come up with an all-encompassing strategy to address Boko Haram terrorism. This theme of the call for a comprehensive national strategy that would incorporate military and civilian capabilities and be designed around the functions of security, diplomatic, economic, political, and elements of national power was high in the mind of people. There was the need for a counterterrorism strategy that would be all-inclusive, and not dictated by the prevailing situation, but supportive and complimentary of the security, economic, social, political, and diplomatic efforts. The Nigerian counterterrorism policy framework tagged National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), was developed and approved for implementation by President Jonathan in 2014.

Impact of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram. Another finding was that majority of research participants agreed that counterterrorism policy had a significant

impact in addressing terrorism in Nigeria. They believed that the counterterrorism policy in Nigeria is essential as it improves criminal justice capacity. It is also useful for terrorist case investigation, prosecution and adjudication, based on the rule of law; promotes collaboration among the security agencies, ministries, and agencies on counterterrorism matter which enhances the country's legal regime for the fight against terrorism. Many of the participants explained that counterterrorism policy had the potential to make stronger international cooperation against terrorism and guarantee respect for human rights. Some of the interviewees stated that the counterterrorism policy was necessary to achieve interagency collaboration in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism that was not previously present. They recognized and maintained that the significance of counterterrorism policy would assist in addressing the individualist approach that had negatively affected the counterterrorism effort. They claimed that it had the potential of ensuring an all-encompassing counterterrorism approach that would prevent the preference of the security or military approach that seemed not to have achieved meaningful results. They believed that counterterrorism policy would provide a platform to achieve a common goal in fighting terrorism that was difficult to achieve due to the multiplicity of Nigerian security forces that have similar responsibilities and functions that often led to a conflict of role. This corresponds with the claim of Bodunde et al. (2014). They believed that the policy would make counterterrorism towards Boko Haram active and result in distinct collaborative responsibilities of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination.

Specific counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria. A theme that emerged from the interview was the different strategies the Nigerian government has put in place to fight Boko Haram terrorism. Many of the participants explained that the government effort was mostly military. They stated that when the Boko Haram terrorism started, each of the security agencies was fighting Boko Haram individually and without the desired result, but later the government of President Jonathan established a Special Military Task Force. The area of operation covered Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State. The task force comprised personnel of the military, the Department of State Services, the Immigration Service, the Customs Service, and the Police. The creation of the task force was aimed at pooling resources together, preventing duplication of efforts, and allowing free flow of information among the security forces. The authorities of these agencies increased their deployment to serve in the task force. Some of the interviewees explained that the Nigerian government established a new military division (7th Division) in Maiduguri to assume the responsibility of fighting the Boko Haram terrorism and that the army supported the formation of the Civilian Joint Task Force, a vigilante/volunteer group to assist in the fight (see Dasuki, 2013).

Majority of the interviewees explained that the federal government established police and military checkpoints in the northeast and some parts of Abuja, the federal capital territory. It also declared of a state of emergency and imposed curfew in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. Few of the participants mentioned that President Jonathan's government closed the Nigerian porous northern borders with neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. All the interviewees claimed that the

government passed into law the Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013 to provide legislation upon which the fight against Boko Haram terrorism should be based.

Another strategy many of the participants referenced was the regional cooperation between Nigeria and her neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon that led to the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The headquarters of MNJTF is N'Djamena, the capital city of Chad. MNJTF was established to fight the threat of the Boko Haram terrorism jointly. This corresponds with the literature in Chapter 2 (Onapajo, 2017; Sampson, 2015).

Some participants also referenced the establishment in the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Counter Violent Extremism Program (CVE) aimed to reduce the incidences of radicalization and violent activities, modify the behavior of violent extremists and counter the narrative of terrorist groups while promoting the Nigerian core values. The program has three elements of counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, and strategic communication. The element of counter-radicalization focuses on community engagement, education and economic-based projects positioned to prevent and reduce the recruitment of individuals for radicalization. De-radicalization aims at reintegrating the terrorists and their family members back into the society through vocational training and the activities of prison interventions. In the strategic intervention, the government seeks to offer a counter-narrative that present moderate Islamic views to counter and contrast violent messages and extremism, and promote Nigeria's core values.

Majority of the participants mentioned that in 2013, the administration of President Jonathan adopted a dialogue strategy to negotiate with the Boko Haram terrorist

group. Government establishment of the Boko Haram Committee was to engage in discussion with the group's leadership to end the violence and provide a framework for possible disarmament and compensation for the victims of the terror group. Many Nigerians criticized the effort as they were unsure of the committee's success.

Many of the participants claimed that the Nigerian government developed the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) document in 2014. The document provides guidelines on all the efforts and activities of the government to address the terror attacks in Nigeria. The document describes the counterterrorism strategy of the government in a simple, straightforward, achievable and time-bound approach. NACTEST specifies the responsibilities of each of the agencies and other bodies (beyond what the Terrorism Prevention Acts contain) in a single document and how their activities are synchronized under the Office of the National Security Adviser. The NACTEST provides guidelines for counterterrorism implementations and seeks to embrace a comprehensive approach to tackle the causes and respond to terrorism more effectively (see Dasuki, 2013). The NACTEST is a combination of hard and soft approaches to counterterrorism designed to address radicalization and extremism. The NACTEST is a presidential directive that brings about synergy among all the agencies responsible for countering terrorism. The Counterterrorism Center domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser is responsible for the implementation of the NACTEST.

Counterterrorism strategy initiation process. Another theme that emerged from the interview was the counterterrorism policy initiation process. Many of the

participants explained that the strategy for counterterrorism policy initiation involved the ‘top-down’ executive management efforts that included the three steps of development, drafting, and finalizing. The finding was not discussed in the previous discussion, literature or earlier conversations.

Majority of the participants explained that the President, based on the advice of the security chiefs, realized the need for a workable counterterrorism strategy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria and issued a written directive to the then National Security Adviser, General Owoeye Andrew Azazi. The President saddled him with the responsibility of developing counterterrorism strategy initiation towards Boko Haram in collaboration with Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Justice. The National Security Adviser in collaboration with the head of these ministries analyzed the Presidential directive in a meeting to identify and have a clear direction of the objectives of the directive. The membership of this group was a small one of not more than ten persons with its secretariat at the National Security Adviser’s office. The group, in turn, transferred the president’s directive to a group of experts picked from these ministries and agencies for further interrogation.

These selected experts provided desk-based research on the phenomenon to gather evidence from secondary sources such as security and intelligence reports and other open sources for strategy development. The group got support from local and international consultants, and technical advisers. Accordingly, it also examined the counterterrorism strategies of about fifteen countries among others including Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bangladesh, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Israel, United Kingdom, and the

United States of America. This group identified the thematic formulation or development for the approval of the convening authority. This group set out the roadmap for approach by preparing and providing a draft framework of the policy for the convening authority approval. The National Security Adviser under whose authority the meeting was convened approved the proposed strategy and later sent it to the President through the for his further directive.

The participants explained that because the Terrorism Prevention Acts needed legislative approval; the Ministry of Justice sent their draft bills to the National Assembly on behalf of the executive in the form of Bill for its passage. The National Assembly comprising the Senate and House of Representatives deliberated on the Bills all the way through some stages and passed them separately. The Committee of the whole house later ratified the Bills before sending them to the President for his assent. The signing of the draft Acts in 2011 and 2013 by the President gave them the force of law. The passage into law of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013 was not surprising as they were majorly a reaction to pressure from the United Nations and the United States of America which corresponds with the literature on legal framework on Boko Haram terrorism (see Olawuyi, 2015; Omoleye-Ajileye, 2015). However, the Acts were with some controversies as Sections 15 and 16 only describe terrorism offenses and do not accommodate any likely change in the tactics by the Boko Haram terrorists, thus not providing a holistic response.

Participants explained that the passage of the Acts was shrouded in a lot of politicking owing to religious and ethnic affiliations of National Assembly Members.

Some members were opposed to the passage of the Acts because they felt they were against the Muslims and anti-Islamic but due to the intervention of the international community led by the United States of America members had no option but to pass the bills into laws.

Critical stakeholders of Boko Haram counterterrorism policy process. An analysis of the participants' responses revealed that critical individuals in the executive and the legislature were involved in the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy development process in Nigeria during 2009-2015. The executive comprised some members of essential ministries such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They explained that critical personnel of other strategic Departments and Agencies such as the Intelligence, Armed Forces, Law Enforcement and National Emergency Agencies as well as Office of National Security Adviser were pulled together as experts based on their specific functions, knowledge, and experience for the draft policy. The legislature comprised of members of the two Houses of the National Assembly. Members of the Security and Intelligence Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives made their useful input on the Terrorism Prevention Bills at the plenary and committee stage. Some interviewees explained that members of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, professional organizations, traditional institutions, youth organizations, faith-based organizations and international non-governmental organizations made several inputs into the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Prevention Amendment Act 2013

during the public hearing of the two Houses of the National Assembly and later signed in to law by the President Jonathan.

Progress of the Implementation of Counterterrorism Policy

This second part of the outcomes was related to the progress of the implementation of counterterrorism policy toward Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Findings regarding the progress of implementation were as follows:

- (1) Government efforts at implementing Boko Haram counterterrorism policy.
- (2) The challenges of implementing Boko Haram counterterrorism policy.
- (3) The counterterrorism policy itself and how it measures up to defeating Boko Haram terrorism.
- (4) Opportunity for improvement.

Government efforts at implementing Boko Haram counterterrorism policy.

All the participants explained that government early efforts to address the threat of Boko Haram were reactionary and not proactive. Individual agencies operational directives initially drove the policy process. When the government realized the failure of this effort, meetings were called and held among the heads of security agencies at different places such as the Office of the National Security Adviser and most times at the Presidential Villa, the seat of the Nigerian government. When the government realized that success of counterterrorism efforts would require creating a platform for collaboration to fight the threat of Boko Haram activities, the government created the Office of Coordinator on Antiterrorism after the signing into law the bill for its establishment

The Office was established to coordinate all agencies and measures to combat terrorism in the country. On 28 January 2011, Ambassador Zakari Ibrahim, the Director-General of National Intelligence Agency (NIA), was appointed by President Goodluck Jonathan to coordinate national anti-terrorism efforts. It was the first attempt to give legislative force to any law regulating terrorism in Nigeria. The Office of the Coordinator on Anti-terrorism was to be responsible for the coordination of all intelligence efforts on the activities of terrorist organizations, all operations to neutralize the terrorist's actions, all responses to terrorism incidences, and to enforce all laws addressing terrorism and terrorist financing. The office was to coordinate the activities of the Military, Department of State Services, National Intelligence Agency, the Defence Intelligence Service and the Nigeria Police Force as it affects tackling terrorism in Nigeria. However, the Office could not take up due to confusion regarding its functions and that of the National Security Adviser. Of note is the non-capturing of the Office of the Coordinator on Anti-terrorism in the Terrorism Prevention Acts, 2011 and 2013.

Many of the participants explained that the Nigerian efforts to improve interagency counterterrorism efforts and strengthen the anti-terrorism law necessitated the passage into law by Nigeria's Senate and House of Representatives, the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act on February 17, 2013. The Act empowers security agencies to detain and prosecute terror suspects and also provides specific guidelines for the prosecution and awards of punishment for terror crimes. The Amendment Act 2013 prescribes the death penalty for anyone found guilty of terrorism. With the passage of the law, the Office of the National Security Adviser took over the leadership role of Nigeria's

counterterrorism responsibility; coordinating counterterrorism efforts among the security forces and the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF). The Counterterrorism Center became the driving tool of all counterterrorism efforts. The National Security Adviser's office developed an information sharing system that serves as a single comprehensive database where all security and public safety agencies in the country can exchange data.

Majority of the participants explained that the Police and the Department of State Services reactivated their respective crime registries for digital storage of information to provide easy retrieval. The National Identify Management Commission (NIMC) was strengthened to facilitate the identification of all Nigerians through biometric data process for the opportunity of its usage in other areas such as in the hospital, clinics, and schools. The fingerprint identification system of all arrested persons for any offense was developed, and it is being accessed centrally by these agencies. The security forces and other agencies of government have access to the databases of the Population Census, National Identify Management Commission, and Independent Electoral Commission.

The National Security Adviser ensures joint training among the security agencies to build core counterterrorism competencies and facilitate civil-military relations to ensure collaboration and synergy among the security agencies as well as building citizens' confidence to volunteer information and assist in the fight willingly. This has provided a framework of engagement between the security agencies and the populace.

The Ministry of Justice began to regulate the activities of the security agencies in agreement with international counterterrorism legal instruments. The Ministry of Justice provided leadership in the investigation and prosecution of terror cases among the

prosecution agencies; the police, the Department of State Services and other law enforcement agencies. The Justice Minister, who is the Attorney General of the federation started to coordinate all terrorism cases for their speedy trials. Many participants stated that the Ministry organized training and workshops for investigation desk officers in these agencies to ease prosecution and conviction. The Justice Ministry, realizing that many of the judges lack competencies in dealing with terrorism cases organized capacity building lectures in the criminal justice system to fill this gap and created a dedicated division to hear national security issues.

The participants stated that the Nigerian government equipped and provided improved manning of its facilities at the airports, seaports and land borders. The agencies saddled with the responsibilities included the Federal Airport Authority, Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Customs Service, Department of State Security Services, Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Port Authority, National Drug Law Enforcement Authority and the Armed Forces. Their statutory responsibilities govern the role being performed by these agencies at the border points. This is to prevent the undesirable element from gaining unauthorized access into the country.

The National Security Adviser's office ensures that no firearm, ammunition, and explosive or other related-military hardware are imported into the country without authorization or approval. It issues the end-user certificate for the importation of any of such equipment and periodically reviews the list of the items. The Department of State Services in collaboration with other security agencies and the Ministry of Solid Minerals

ensure that the usage of explosive at quarry sites are monitored and supervised accordingly. The security forces also tracked the sales, distribution, and use of any material that can be useful for the making of improvised explosive devices

The National Emergency Management Authority was empowered to coordinate disaster management efforts of the government that were hitherto uncoordinated and unorganized. The Disaster Response Unit was created and has all intelligence and non-security departments as members, especially the Federal Ministry of Health, this serves as a contingency plan to minimize the impacts of any terrorist attack in the country.

The federal government of President Jonathan approved the contract for the installation of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor and track all criminal activities within Abuja, Federal Capital Territory. The data provided by the CCTV were being used to identify offenders and criminals, and other investigation purposes by security forces. The deployments of CCTV at strategic areas of Abuja are being manned by specialized trained personnel of the relevant security agencies twenty-four (24) hours daily.

The Ministry of Information in collaboration with National Orientation Agency and Center for Terrorism Unit in the Office of National Security Adviser put in place an elaborate program to counter extremist ideologies through print and electronic media. The communication strategy aimed to combat and disrupt terrorist media campaigns and propaganda. The policy was institutionalized in the training modules of all the security services and incorporated in the scope of the Civil-Military Collaboration.

The challenges of implementing Boko Haram counterterrorism policy.

Majority of the participants referenced the human rights concern of the counterterrorism

policy which they believed contravened some aspects of the fundamental human rights every Nigerian should enjoy as guaranteed under the Nigerian constitution. They explained that the Terrorism Prevention Acts gives more power to the security forces to detain without warrant any terrorist suspect while the court can also order for the detention of same upon an ex-parte application for a renewable period of 90 days (see Bhura, 2012; Ikenna, 2016; Omoleye-Ajileye, 2015).

Many of the interviewees explained that the counterterrorism strategy is being loosely coordinated under the National Security Adviser's office. They claimed that the Act that established the National Security Adviser's office does not give it superior power over the security agencies it coordinates because they also report to the President directly. Personal disagreement between the National Security Adviser and any of the heads of these agencies often resulted in the starving of intelligence to Counter Terrorism Center that might be critical to its analysis. These agencies decide who should be posted to the NSA's office and in case of misunderstanding with the National Security Adviser can withdraw them at will.

This lacuna in the constitution is a clog in the wheel of the policy's progress. Participants also claimed that the level of cooperation that existed at the level of commanders had not been translated down to the operatives, the junior personnel because of lack mechanism to do so. The participants also claimed that the NACTEST does not capture the required collaboration and cooperation explicitly.

Participants observed that the NACTEST does not address the challenge of poverty prevalent in the northeast of the country. They believed that the counterterrorism

policy should solve the problem of unemployment and poverty that the sect capitalizes on in getting people recruited into the group; that unless unemployment is tackled people would still be attracted to Boko Haram terrorism. The participants referenced that the NACTEST does not address the challenge of good governance. They believed that this policy should be concurrently developed and employed as a remedial strategy to create a much more enabling environment to fight the terrorists and reduce the chance of natural recruitment of the youths.

Some participants mentioned that many of the security forces involved in the counterterrorism efforts are having issues with the adaptation of some of the provisions of the NACTEST in their individual agencies. They have difficulty in internalizing some of the provisions of the document in a way to significantly affect counterterrorism operations due to their belief that they are not in agreement with their individual agencies' standard operating procedures and statutory responsibilities as guaranteed by the existing law that created them.

Another challenge the participants stated has hampered the implementation of counterterrorism policy was the brutal, corrupt and undisciplined security forces. They believed that this issue is not addressed by the policy and that of the central policing system in Nigeria and has negatively affected the effective policing of the areas conquered by the military. This they believed was an impetus for the re-conquering of these areas by the Boko Haram group.

The tenure of the fighting forces at the theatre is unclear and not specific; officers and men were being kept in Yobe State without being told or aware of the length of their

deployment or for how long they would remain. The welfare package of the fighting force was not being paid when due and this has negatively affected their morale as well as their fighting strength.

The Nigerian financial status is a challenge to the fights against Boko Haram terrorism. The financial nature of a cash economy offers the Boko Haram group access to funding from allies and is difficult to monitor in Nigeria. Majority of the participants explained that the policy does not address the funding deficit which has been a significant challenge to the counterterrorism efforts as all the counterterrorism agencies are not adequately funded. This has negatively affected their functions. The inability of the country to make an adequate budgetary provision for its security agencies has led to a training gap and deficiency in these agencies as most personnel are undertrained and understaffed and often counterproductive to terrorism fight. Many times the country had to rely on inadequate international assistance, in the form of grants for training and supply of equipping security forces to reduce the financial burden.

The interviewees stated that the policy fails to reiterate the significant role of intellectuals and the academia. They believed that they could provide the complementary role of analysis and research support in addressing the threat of terrorism and developing theories as well as making suggestions to countering terrorism. However this is presently missing.

The counterterrorism policy itself and how it measures up to defeating Boko Haram Terrorism. Majority of the participants felt that the policy had achieved a great deal in tackling Boko Haram terrorism. They believed that the policy had provided a

platform for fighting terrorism in Nigeria which was hitherto absent. The NACTEST has specified the roles and responsibilities of the security forces, ministries and other agencies of government which were previously confusing and serving as clogs in the counterterrorism effort in the country.

Many participants believed that the counterterrorism policy had enhanced intelligence sharing and collection among the agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort. The participants felt that the policy had facilitated an improved understanding among the security forces thereby reducing the lack of trust and bickering that previously existed. However, many participants pointed out that the policy has some implementation challenges. They referenced that the counterterrorism project in Nigeria has not adequately enhanced criminal justice capacity for the judges and lawyers as most times government cases against terrorists are lost due to the ineffective investigation, prosecution, and adjudication.

Although the counterterrorism policy guarantees a co-ordinated response to dealing with terrorist threats, this has been missing. The strategy is coordinated by the National Security Adviser who only loosely coordinates intelligence activities of the intelligence agencies. The office neither has enforcement authority over the intelligence agencies nor compelling power over all other security agencies.

The policy does not adequately address mechanism for interagency cooperation and collaboration as inter-agency collaboration on counterterrorism matters is still far below expectation; security agencies still hold to their statutory responsibility at the expense of teamwork against terrorism. Majority of the participants referenced that the

Terrorism Prevention Acts deny the terrorist suspects their fundamental human rights such as the right to right to innocence until proven guilty until proven guilty. They claimed that the line between where the suspects' right ends and that of the security agencies begins is quite blurred.

Opportunity for improvement. Majority of the interviewees suggested that there are prospects for improving Nigerian counterterrorism strategy if the government exerts the political will. Participants also shared their views about the usefulness of counterterrorism training and the need to properly equip the security forces. All the participants emphasized the effectiveness of counterterrorism training and retraining in their responses. They believed that training is significantly effective in raising awareness of the populace and the fighting forces in understanding what action to take in case of a terror attack. An in-depth review of the available literature and the interviewees' responses revealed some concerns on the counterterrorism policy; however, the participants of the study provided possible solutions.

The participants mentioned a need for the incorporation of consistent and effective counterterrorism training and financial programs in the policy. Participants also stated the need for an explicit articulation of functions for all the agencies at the three levels of responsibilities (operational, tactical, and strategic) in the policy.

The participants referenced the need for a policy mix that would improve the standard of life and improve policing efforts against Boko Haram terrorism and other related acts as well as cost-effective which is presently lacking due to the weak institutional capability in Nigeria.

Majority of the participants believed that given terrorists' use of violence in pursuit of their ideology, the government should embrace counterterrorism initiatives that would be a combination of soft and hard power components as only military security measures alone might not be successful to tackle the menace. They suggested good governance as a panacea to terrorism attraction by the youths and the review of all existing security and defense policies in the country that would guarantee more harmonious relations among the security agencies as well as with the civilian populace.

Finally, the participants suggested a need for a policy framework that offers prospects for collaboration among the agencies that are involved in the counterterrorism efforts. They claimed that a well-articulated defense policy or security policy in the country would have the potential of promoting a healthy relationship between and among these agencies. This provides an opportunity for researchers to explore this area in future.

Summary

This chapter presented the findings of the data gathered from the 12 interviewees based on the research question which include both the process and progress of development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-20015. The findings of this study offered a robust insight previously not explored. I analyzed and presented the information from the interview data. In Chapter 5, I will provide the interpretation of the findings and the implication of the study, and proffer additional insight into recommendations for further research.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram, its development, and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015. This qualitative case study was based on the proposition that counterterrorism policy has the potential to reduce and defeat the threat of terrorism, and make it more difficult for terrorists and their allies to carry out terrorist attacks (DoD, 2006, 2013). I collected data through informal interviews and interactive discussion with key stakeholders in Damaturu, Yobe State, and Abuja, FCT, Nigeria. I carried out this research to describe and shed light on the process of development and implementation of counterterrorism policy in tackling the threat of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during the bounded period of 2009-2015. Findings in relation to the process of the policy development were (a) the need for counterterrorism policy framework, (b) the impact of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram, (c) specific counterterrorism strategies, (d) Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy initiation process, and (e) critical stakeholders of Boko Haram counterterrorism policy process. Findings relating to the progress of the policy implementation were (a) the Boko Haram counterterrorism implementation efforts, (b) the policy implementation challenges, (c) the counterterrorism policy itself and how it measures up to defeating Boko Haram terrorism, and (d) opportunity for improvement.

Interpretation of the Findings

The findings of the study confirm knowledge in the literature that counterterrorism policy is significant to active counterterrorism efforts (Aghedo &

Osumah, 2012; Brzoska, 2011; DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Omale, 2013; Renard, 2012). Study findings show that Nigerian government have put in place various measures to tackle the menace of Boko Haram terrorism (Akpan et al., 2014; Bamidele, 2013; Dasuki, 2013; Ikenna, 2016; Isyaku, 2013). However, these measures have been largely not successful because the Boko Haram still carries out attacks in the northeast (Agbibo, 2013; Ahokey, 2012; Bappah, 2016; Onapajo, 2017). This study broadens knowledge in describing how counterterrorism policy was developed and how it is being implemented in Nigeria.

Extension of Knowledge

I found no previous study on counterterrorism policy development and implementation in Nigeria during 2009-2015 which highlighted a knowledge gap in the literature and the need to examine factors responsible for the inability of the government to defeat Boko Haram, and how counterterrorism efforts should be improved. Some researchers mentioned the Nigerian counterterrorism approaches in providing a platform for fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria including Aghedo and Oshuma (2012), but their study focuses on the challenges of Nigerian counter-offensive policy. Idowu (2013) provided insight into the pattern of the Nigerian responses to Boko Haram insurgency but did not offer a detailed analysis of these approaches. Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) argued that the threat of Boko Haram terrorism in the northeast, which has remained a challenge to Nigerian national security (Onapajo, 2017; Ukase, 2015), needs a robust counterterrorism policy to provide a platform for fighting terrorism.

Onapajo (2013) linked the dynamics and complexity of Boko Haram attacks to inadequate collaboration and partnership among security agencies, and dissatisfaction and disaffection among the population; but only advocated for a re-evaluation of government counterterrorism approaches. Akanbi (2015) linked the inability of government counterterrorism strategies to the failure of good governance but advocated for a proactive strategy that would bring about good governance. None of these studies centered on the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015 with the aim of improving the Nigerian government's strategy and ensuring active policy for the fight against the sect.

Therefore, this study widens knowledge in critical ways. First, it offers a background understanding of the process of how counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram was developed. This knowledge may be useful for researchers and practitioners who would like to either study counterterrorism policy or its usefulness or initiate a similar strategy to fighting terrorism in another country. Second, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the observations regarding the implementation efforts of the counterterrorism policy in Nigeria through a detailed and pragmatic examination of the Nigerian policy approach to combatting terrorism and guiding the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts. Third, the study presents a synthesis of literature concerning the Nigerian counterterrorism approaches to fighting Boko Haram terrorism with a view to improve the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts. This additional knowledge is explained further in the statements that follow:

- Counterterrorism policy development during 2009-2015 was as a result of the call for an appropriate and workable strategy that would provide a platform to fight Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.
- Counterterrorism policy occurred and initiated gradually during 2009-2015 through incremental adaptation as it was usually in response to Boko Haram attacks.
- Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram has to a great extent impacted the fight against terrorism positively.
- Counterterrorism policy has not adequately addressed Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria due to some barriers, and
- Counterterrorism policy process has opportunity for improvement through political will, institutional building, and good governance.

Analysis

The findings of this research are in tandem with the conceptual and theoretical framework that I outlined in Chapter 2 regarding the counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Counterterrorism refers to measures designed to tackle the terrorist and extremist threat and make it difficult for their allies to carry out any attack (DoD, 2013; U.N., 2006). The development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is potentially a path to adequately address the threat of the Boko Haram terrorist group and ensure peace and security (DoD, 2013). This position was confirmed from the accounts of the research participants who were able to articulate their experiences in a manner that showed that

they were conversant with the process. The policy should be comprehensive to detect, delay, and respond and prevent terrorism, and it should strengthen the capacities of the security forces to fight terrorism (Agboola, 2014; Ancker, 2001; Alemika, 2013; Owezarak & Vaderlinden, 2016) and to produce the desired result.

Researchers have called for active counterterrorism policy that would involve understanding of all the issues that motivate terrorism activities such as economic, social, political, and religious factors (Agbiboa, 2013; Idowu, 2013; Omale, 2013). In this study, I explored the counterterrorism policy development and implementation towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015 to explain the policy initiation and practical application of its implementation fully. This study offered an understanding of the factors that necessitated the Boko Haram policy development and implementation in Nigeria. The security forces are crucial in fighting terrorism, and they must work together and vary their methods of engagement to include both soft and hard approaches (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014). Therefore, the conceptual lens of development and implementation of Boko Haram counterterrorism in Nigeria are vital to the initiation of a pathway forward for improving and developing an active policy. This study offered an analysis of the process and progress of developing and implementing counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during 2009-2015 as a critical approach to tackling the menace of Boko Haram terrorism and of creating and implementing a more active and improved policy.

The data were interpreted as follows:

Counterterrorism policy development during 2009-2015 was as a result of the call for an appropriate and workable strategy that would provide a platform to fight

Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The data confirmed the literature that counterterrorism policy of any government is to tackle the threat of terrorism (DoD, 2013) and that when the Boko Haram terrorist group became violent, the government of Nigeria emplaced different measures to combat it (Loimeier, 2012). The strategies included the creation of Counter Terrorism Center, the deployment of military capabilities, the passage of Antiterrorism Laws and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral engagement with allied countries (Dasuki, 2013; Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015; Onapajo, 2017). The counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government was to defeat the threat of terrorism and make it hard for the terrorists to attack the people of the country.

Counterterrorism policy occurred and initiated gradually during 2009-2015 through incremental adaptation as it was usually in response to Boko Haram attacks. This interpretation of findings was connected to the development process. The Nigerian government emplaced several strategies to fight Boko Haram terrorism on incremental adaptation. Interviewees who were involved in the development of the counterterrorism policy document claimed that the initial responses of the Nigerian government were unplanned and reactionary to the group's attacks because terrorism was new to the country's security apparatus (see Givel, 2008; Jensen et al., 2014). However in contrast, they cited that the making of Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and 2013, and NACTEST was a proactive, conscious, and significant attempt by the Nigerian government to tackle Boko Haram terrorist attacks against the citizens of the country. The interviewees who were involved in the development of the strategy examined the

counterterrorism strategy documents of about fifteen countries and visited the same before they could come up with a design for Nigeria.

Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram has to a great extent impacted the fight against terrorism positively. From the participants' perspectives, the counterterrorism policy during 2009-2015 has achieved some small success in addressing the threat of Boko Haram terrorism. The interpretation of this finding on the impact of the counterterrorism policy confirmed the previous literature that the policy had provided a platform to fight the threat of terrorism and has been positive in preventing and thwarting many of the group's attacks. The sect can no longer lay claim to any territory in Nigeria, and many of their members including some of their leaders have been killed and some arrested (Dasuki, 2013, Jideofor, 2014; Ogbonnaya & Ehigiamusoe, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). The local people now give information on Boko Haram terrorism voluntarily to the security forces, and those who offered tacit support to it have now realized that it is dangerous to do so and they are presently part of the solution.

Counterterrorism policy has not adequately addressed Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria due to some barriers. Despite the emplacement of different strategies for fighting Boko Haram terrorism, its attack continues due to policy implementation challenges. Counterterrorism project in Nigeria has not adequately enhanced criminal justice capacity for the judges and lawyers as most times government cases against terrorists were lost due to the ineffective investigation, prosecution, and adjudication.

The strategy is coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser that loosely coordinates the intelligence activities of intelligence agencies as it does not have compelling or sanctioning power over them. The office, however, does not have such influence to exert on other security agencies. Mere personal disagreement between the National Security Adviser and any of the heads of these agencies often caused the starving of critical intelligence to Counter Terrorism Center. The inter-agency collaboration on counterterrorism matters is still far below expectation, security agencies still hold to their statutory responsibility at the expense of teamwork against terrorism.

The group still has access to weapons due to the porosity of the Nigerian borders and access to funding because of the financial nature of the country that is mainly a cash economy which has necessitated flow of financial resource to the sect.

Counterterrorism policy process has opportunity for improvement through political will, institutional building, and good governance. This interpretation of findings was connected to the implementation of the policy process. There are opportunities for counterterrorism policy improvement. The NACTEST could be reviewed periodically to address the grey areas in the document. DoD (2014), Ikuomola (2011), Isyaku (2013), and Nacos (2006) all argued that a well-articulated counterterrorism policy development and implementation could elicit high-level performance and active counterterrorism efforts. There are prospects for collaboration among the agencies that are involved in the counterterrorism efforts. A well-articulated defense policy or security policy has the potential of promoting a healthy relationship

between and among these agencies and this provides an opportunity for researchers to explore this area in the future.

In summary, the main interpretation of the findings is that Nigerian counterterrorism strategy is not as robust as it could be and needs to be reviewed and updated regularly in order to reach its potential of an active and significant impact in tackling Boko Haram terrorism.

Limitations of the Study

The design of this qualitative case study was only to collect data from Damaturu, Yobe State and Abuja, FCT of Nigeria; this could be a distraction to the validity of the findings and generalizability of the results of the study to other parts of the northeast. The limitation of the research was that due to the sensitivity of the study, I could not access some classified documents; however, I was able to navigate this challenge by relying on open source information and interviews with retired personnel of the Department of State Services, and the Military who provided unclassified information. I was the primary source of data collection, and due to my employment in the security agency and the population sample being formerly connected to the security agencies, the findings may have bias and inherent subjectivity. This has potential implication for future research. I did not encounter other limitations that I anticipated because the data collection went as planned, and the outcomes brought out useful information.

Recommendations

The accounts from the interviewees brought concern concerning the strategies that should be taken to tackle terrorist attacks. My first recommendation is that further

research is required to provide researchers with knowledge about the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies towards Boko Haram terrorism. The Nigerian counterterrorism policy outlines the measures for fighting the threat of Boko Haram in the country (DoD, 2013). Future researches could be carried out to determine if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy meets the aim for which it was established. They could employ quantitative methodologies to arrive at a different perspective about the policy effectiveness.

The characteristics of an active counterterrorism policy are adequate planning, review mechanisms, distinct threat profile, resource allocation, and application as well as proper training (Brzoska, 2011; DoD, 2013; Mueller & Stewart, 2014). My findings of progress were of a qualitative nature from persons who had been intimately involved in counterterrorism policy; however, a rigorous evaluation of the present Nigerian counterterrorism policy effectiveness could help the country to determine its level of progress towards these goals. The findings of this study should be made available to the government of Nigeria as it will help in resource application, terrorism combat readiness, and contingency planning.

Understanding the relationships between institutions that are involved in the counterterrorism effort is crucial as it could develop a healthy relationship and more consistent practices. The harmonious relationship brings about more productivity and more pleasantness at work. The healthy relationships are critical to successful counterterrorism effort in Nigeria and attention should be paid to it. Researchers could explore whether there are healthy relationships among the Nigerian security agencies that

are involved in counterterrorism effort and any future findings could assist in improving the working relationships among these agencies.

Implications

An active counterterrorism policy in Nigeria has the potential to defeat Boko Haram terrorism and contribute to positive social change in the country. The potential impact of this qualitative case study for social change is that the examination of the content and context of the Nigerian counterterrorism policy can lead to improved service delivery, a reduction of inter-agency bickering and conflict among the security forces, and policy direction that can facilitate greater effectiveness in dealing with the threat of Boko Haram terrorism.

Findings also underscore the need for policy makers and implementers to adopt counterterrorism policy as a platform to fight Boko Haram terrorism. The results from the study offered evidence of how the communication, coordination and collaboration effort can be improved among the security agencies responsible for counterterrorism effort in Nigeria. The findings provided the empirical evidence required for addressing misunderstanding and bickering that has marred active counterterrorism effort. The conclusion of this study laid the theoretical framework on counterterrorism policies and practices that further researchers could explore. It can also be a model that other African countries that want to develop counterterrorism policy could copy. It can also model a counterterrorism policy process and progress for other African developing countries.

This study fills a gap in the literature and has contributed to the increased understanding and increased awareness about the development and implementation of

counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram during 2009-2015. Other countries in Africa can study Nigeria's process and progress to their own benefit.

Conclusion

The topic of this study was the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015. Influenced by the institutional theory and punctuated equilibrium theory, the findings from this study resulted from interviewees conducted with retired personnel of the Department of State Services and the Military, and the former National Assembly members as well as the community leaders who are beneficiaries of the policy to offer an understanding of how the counterterrorism policy was developed and implemented.

In this research, I offered a description of the counterterrorism policy development and implementation during 2009-2015 to tackle Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The outcomes of this study would be of benefit to future research on this process and its impact of the policy to improve the counterterrorism policy and ensure active counterterrorism efforts. The counterterrorism policy of the Nigerian government presents a practical roadmap for African and other countries on how to initiate and implement counterterrorism policy. Counterterrorism policy is the means to tackle the threat of terrorism in any country (DoD, 2013).

In this study, I also provided evidence that active counterterrorism policy is critical to winning the war against terror. Active counterterrorism policy is vital to defeating the threat of terrorism and ensuring a platform on which a counterterrorism effort is based (DoD, 2006). A holistic counterterrorism policy should include both the

soft and hard approaches that have the potential to detect, delay, prevent terrorist communication, and respond to terrorist attacks (Alemika, 2013). The critical finding of this research shows the need for continued research to bring positive social change through policy improvement. My hope is that this study on Nigerian counterterrorism policy will assist in providing platforms to deal with the threat of Boko Haram or similar terrorist groups in other countries.

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Appendix: Case-Study Protocol Questions

Research Question

The central research question is: What was the process and effectiveness of development and implementation of Nigerian policy toward Boko Haram terrorism during 2009-2015?

Interview Questions

1. How concerned are you with Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria?
2. What was the genesis of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria?
3. What was the impetus for the development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
4. What were the specific counterterrorism policies towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
5. What has been the process of developing counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
6. What were the factors that influence the development of counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
7. Who were the critical stakeholders that influenced the development of the Boko Haram counterterrorism policy in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
8. What has the federal government of Nigeria done to implement the counterterrorism policy?

9. In your own opinion, how effective and efficient do you think the counterterrorism policy?
10. Has there been any proof within the government that counterterrorism policy is valued as a concept and as a reality? And what is that evidence?
11. What are the procedures and progress of implementing the counterterrorism policy in Nigeria?
12. What role did counterterrorism policy play in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria during 2009-2015?
13. What are the challenges confronting the counterterrorism policy in Nigeria?
14. What are some recommendations for the current counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria?